John, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This case concerns an individual ("Appellant") convicted following a Crown Court trial of multiple sexual offences against a child ("Complainant"), who is anonymised pursuant to the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. The offences occurred when the Appellant was aged between 11 and 15 and the Complainant between 7 and 10. The Appellant was convicted of three counts of rape of a child under 13, eight counts of sexual assault of a child under 13, and one count of causing a child to watch a sexual act. The offending included escalating sexual acts and the showing of pornographic films. The Appellant was sentenced to a total of six and a half years' detention.

The Appellant filed an application for leave to appeal against sentence 755 days late, seeking extensions of time which were initially refused but later granted on renewal. The sole ground of appeal concerns the judge’s treatment of time spent on remand in local authority care prior to sentencing, specifically whether that time was properly credited towards the custodial sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in law by assuming that time spent on remand in local authority care pursuant to section 91(3) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) would automatically count towards the custodial sentence.
2. Whether a downward adjustment to the custodial sentence is required to reflect the restrictions imposed during the period of remand in local authority care.
3. The appropriate approach to crediting time spent on remand under section 91(3) LASPO in sentencing young offenders.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The sentencing judge was misled into believing that the time spent on remand in local authority care would automatically be deducted from the sentence, which is incorrect in law.
• The judge intended that the time spent on remand should be taken into account when considering the length of detention.
• The Appellant’s liberty was significantly restricted during the remand period, warranting a reduction in sentence either equal to the full remand period or some lesser discretionary amount.
• Invited the court to draw inferences about the restrictive conditions despite lack of detailed information about the remand circumstances.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v A [2019] EWCA Crim 106; [2019] 2 Cr App R(S) 11	Clarification that time spent on remand to local authority care under section 91(3) LASPO does not automatically count towards sentence; discretionary judicial adjustment may be made.	Court relied on this precedent to confirm the legal position and to assess whether the sentencing judge made an error by assuming automatic credit; also used it to guide the approach to discretionary credit.
R v D and H [2016] EWCA Crim 1807	Sentencers should give credit by analogy when calculating sentences for offenders remanded under section 91(3) LASPO with conditions equivalent to a qualifying curfew.	Referenced to explain the discretionary nature of credit for remand conditions and that such credit depends on the facts and judge’s assessment of justice.
R v Anderson [2017] EWCA Crim 2604; [2018] 2 Cr App R(S) 21	Consideration of whether a judge’s express remarks about time counting on remand affect the legal position.	Cited to note that express judicial statements might affect credit but was not pursued as a main argument by Appellant’s counsel.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory framework under LASPO sections 91(3) and 91(4) and relevant sentencing law as established in R v A and other authorities. It confirmed that time spent on remand to local authority care under section 91(3) does not automatically count towards sentence, unlike remand to youth detention accommodation under section 91(4). Any credit for such remand requires a discretionary judicial decision, which must be clearly made and declared in sentencing remarks.

The court examined the sentencing remarks and found no indication that the judge made a positive judicial decision to credit the remand period. Instead, the judge appeared to have mistakenly assumed an automatic administrative deduction would occur. The court rejected the argument that the judge intended to credit the time, concluding the judge was merely explaining a mistaken legal effect.

Regarding the extent of restrictions during the remand period, the court considered the evidence, including the pre-sentence report, and found that although some liberty restrictions existed, they were not equivalent to detention or a qualifying curfew condition. The Appellant had freedom of movement within the constraints of local authority care, maintained family contact, and engaged in positive social and educational activities.

Consequently, the court was not persuaded that a discretionary reduction of the sentence was justified in the interests of justice. The sentence was found neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal against sentence.

The direct effect is that the Appellant’s custodial sentence remains as originally imposed without further reduction for time spent on remand in local authority care. No new precedent was established; the decision reaffirms the established legal position regarding credit for remand under section 91(3) LASPO and the necessity for clear judicial discretion and declaration when granting such credit.