GT v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by the Plaintiff seeking an injunction to restrain his deportation pursuant to a deportation order dated 31 May 2023. The deportation was scheduled for 19 March 2023, and the injunction application was heard urgently on 18 March 2025. The Plaintiff also sought leave to judicially review decisions of the Chief International Protection Officer (IPO) dated 18 February 2025 refusing his application under section 22 of the International Protection Act 2015, and the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT) decision of 13 March 2025 refusing his appeal. This judgment addresses only the injunction application; the leave application remains pending.

The Plaintiff has made multiple applications under the 2015 Act since 2023. The IPO refused his initial international protection application on 10 May 2023, and IPAT refused his appeal on 27 March 2023. A deportation order was issued on 31 May 2023 and remained in effect at the time of this hearing. The Plaintiff did not challenge these decisions.

Following his arrest and detention on 28 January 2025 to effect deportation, the Plaintiff applied under section 22 on 12 February 2025 for consent to make a subsequent international protection application, alleging non-disclosure of relevant documents. The IPO refused this on 18 February 2025, and the Plaintiff appealed to IPAT on 19 February 2025, requesting an undertaking not to be deported pending appeal. The Minister refused this, leading to an interlocutory injunction granted on 27 February 2025, which was later refused on full hearing on 14 March 2025. IPAT refused the appeal on 13 March 2025.

The Plaintiff’s grounds for injunctive relief include claims that the section 22 application had automatic suspensive effect restraining deportation, that deportation would expose him to real risk of persecution or serious harm in his country of origin, and that damages would be inadequate as a remedy. He relies on fears of refoulement and harm if returned to Georgia, citing political developments and personal circumstances. The Plaintiff also raises procedural fairness issues regarding prior legal representation and alleged failure to provide all relevant documents, though these are reserved for the substantive judicial review application.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to an injunction restraining the execution of his deportation order pending determination of his judicial review proceedings.
2. Whether an application under section 22 of the International Protection Act 2015 has automatic suspensive effect on deportation pending appeal or judicial review.
3. Whether the Plaintiff has demonstrated a real risk of persecution, serious harm, or refoulement sufficient to justify injunctive relief.
4. The adequacy of damages as a remedy in the context of deportation and asylum proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Plaintiff contends that his section 22 application automatically suspends deportation until the judicial review is resolved, relying on Article 7 of Directive 2005/85/EC.
• He asserts that deportation prior to determination would expose him to real risk of persecution, serious harm, or refoulement in Georgia.
• The Plaintiff argues that damages would be an inadequate remedy and that the balance of convenience favors granting the injunction.
• The Plaintiff raises procedural fairness concerns related to non-disclosure of documents and previous poor legal representation, though these are not the basis for the injunction application.

Respondents' Arguments

• The Respondents maintain that the section 22 application and appeal do not have suspensive effect on deportation orders under the 2015 Act or the Procedures Directive.
• They argue that Georgia is legally categorized as a safe country and that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated a real or substantial risk of serious harm or breach of fundamental rights if returned.
• The Respondents submit that the Plaintiff’s judicial review does not suspend the deportation order and that the Court should not exercise inherent jurisdiction to create such suspensive effect.
• They emphasize that the Plaintiff retains access to the courts and may seek revocation of the deportation order and re-entry to the State if successful in judicial review after deportation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Okunade v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & ors [2012] 3 IR 152	Principles for granting injunctions restraining deportation, including the need to establish an arguable case and consideration of where the least risk of injustice lies.	The Court applied the principles to assess whether the Plaintiff demonstrated a real risk of significant harm and concluded that the balance of convenience favored allowing deportation.
G.T. v. Minister for Justice & ors (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 154	Interpretation of section 22 of the International Protection Act 2015 and the absence of suspensive effect of appeals to IPAT on deportation orders.	The Court adopted the reasoning of Phelan J. that no suspensive effect arises under section 22 or the Procedures Directive, and assessed country of origin information as not supporting a real risk of harm.
P.N.S (Cameroon) and Seredych	Legal authority establishing that appeals under section 22 do not have suspensive effect on deportation orders.	Followed as binding precedent confirming no suspensive effect arises from section 22 appeals, aligning with the Court of Justice of the European Union’s position.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by referencing the binding principles from the Supreme Court decision in Okunade, which require an applicant seeking to restrain deportation to establish an arguable case and that the balance of convenience favors injunctive relief. The Court acknowledged the Plaintiff’s fears of persecution and serious harm if returned to Georgia but noted the State’s classification of Georgia as a safe country in the Plaintiff’s circumstances.

The Court considered the detailed analysis of country of origin information by Phelan J. in the recent decision [2025] IEHC 154, which concluded that the Plaintiff had not met the evidential threshold to demonstrate a real or substantial risk of serious interference with fundamental rights upon return. The Court adopted that reasoning, finding no new material to distinguish the present case.

Regarding the Plaintiff’s argument that the section 22 application and judicial review proceedings should suspend the deportation order, the Court held that no such suspensive effect exists under the 2015 Act or the Procedures Directive. The Court rejected the notion that judicial review can suspend deportation, emphasizing that such a suspension would constitute impermissible judicial law-making reserved for the legislature.

The Court further reasoned that the Plaintiff retains access to judicial remedies even after deportation, including the ability to apply for revocation of the deportation order under section 11 of the 2015 Act and to seek re-entry to the State. This mitigates the risk of irreparable harm and supports the conclusion that the least risk of injustice lies in permitting deportation to proceed.

The Court accepted that damages would be an inadequate remedy for the Plaintiff but found this insufficient to outweigh the absence of a real risk of serious harm or breach of fundamental rights. The procedural fairness issues raised by the Plaintiff were deemed irrelevant to the injunction application and reserved for the substantive judicial review hearing.

Holding and Implications

The Court’s final decision is to REFUSE the Plaintiff’s application for an injunction restraining the deportation order.

The immediate effect is that the deportation order may be executed without further delay. No suspensive effect arises from the Plaintiff’s section 22 application or judicial review proceedings. The Plaintiff retains the possibility of judicial remedies post-deportation, including revocation of the deportation order and subsequent applications for international protection upon lawful re-entry.

No new precedent was established by this decision; rather, the Court reaffirmed existing legal principles regarding injunctions restraining deportation and the non-suspensive nature of section 22 appeals under the International Protection Act 2015.