Glasgow City Council v X (Scotland)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, together with her spouse and four children (one of whom has autism), was accepted by the Respondent local authority as homeless on 4 February 2020. In February 2021 the Respondent secured interim accommodation – a four-apartment property – under section 29(1) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987. A subsequent occupational-therapy report (21 July 2021) recommended a five-apartment property to meet the son’s additional needs. The Appellant challenged the suitability of the four-apartment property by judicial review.

The Outer House (Judge Ericht) held that the Respondent was under an absolute duty to provide a five-apartment property ([2022] CSOH 35), but the Inner House reversed that decision ([2023] CSIH 7). Leave to appeal was granted, and the present judgment is the Supreme Court’s disposition of that appeal. During the appeal process the family moved, first into temporary and then into permanent five-apartment accommodation, but the legal issue remained live.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, under section 29(1) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 and article 4(b) of the Homeless Persons (Unsuitable Accommodation) (Scotland) Order 2014, interim accommodation is unsuitable unless it meets all the needs of every member of the homeless household.
2. How the phrase “taking into account the needs of the household” in article 4(b) should be construed: as a process duty (considering needs) or an outcome duty (meeting needs).
3. Whether the Respondent acted unlawfully in offering a four-apartment property to the Appellant’s household.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (presented by Attorney Dunlop)

• Section 29, read with the 2014 Order, obliges a local authority to provide interim accommodation that meets all the needs—general and special—of every household member.
• No statutory distinction exists between “general” and “special” needs; failure to satisfy any need renders accommodation unsuitable under article 4(b).
• The Inner House’s construction undermines the protective purpose of the amendments made to article 4(b) in 2020 and ignores ministerial policy material and statutory guidance.

Respondent's Arguments (presented by Attorney Johnston)

• The interim duty requires the authority only to consider the needs of the household when deciding suitability; it does not require that all such needs be met.
• Section 31 contains the more demanding duty to meet special needs when permanent accommodation is secured, highlighting a deliberate legislative distinction.
• The Respondent took the household’s needs into account, and its decision to use a four-apartment property pending availability of a five-apartment property was rational and lawful.

Submissions of Charity A (Intervener)

• Supported the Appellant, arguing that the Inner House’s approach allows authorities to disregard proper needs assessments and undermines statutory guidance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Simler, delivering the judgment of the Court, undertook a textual analysis of section 29 of the 1987 Act and article 4 of the 2014 Order.

• Textual distinction: The statute uses “taking into account the needs” for interim accommodation (article 4(b)) but “meet any special needs” for permanent accommodation (sections 31 and 32(5)), indicating a deliberate difference between a process duty and an outcome duty.
• Legislative context: Interim accommodation is a stop-gap measure provided before full inquiries are complete; imposing a results-based duty at this stage would conflate the separate statutory regimes and be impracticable in light of housing scarcity.
• Order architecture: Article 4 sets non-derogable minimum standards (e.g., wind- and watertight) whereas article 5 adds further factors that may, in emergencies, be disapplied. The phrasing of each provision confirms Parliament’s ability to mandate outcomes expressly where intended.
• Policy materials: While Policy Notes and ministerial guidance emphasise assessing and addressing vulnerability, they repeatedly speak in terms of “taking into account” needs, compatible with a process duty. Clear statutory wording could not be displaced by these secondary materials.
• Rationality control: Judicial review remains available to ensure authorities do not disregard relevant needs or reach irrational conclusions; suitability may change with time (R Imam).
• Application to facts: Evidence showed the Respondent considered the family’s composition and the son’s disability, accepted that permanent accommodation required five apartments, but reasonably concluded that a four-apartment property was suitable on an interim basis.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court affirmed that, at the interim stage, a local authority must consider the needs of the homeless household but is not obliged to meet every need. The Respondent lawfully discharged its duty by providing a four-apartment property while actively seeking a larger dwelling. The decision clarifies the distinction between interim and permanent accommodation duties for Scottish local authorities, reinforcing a process-based standard for temporary housing and preserving judicial-review oversight without imposing an immediate results-based obligation.