Ayre & Ors, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

On the night of 12 July 2022, a Ford Mondeo was driven into a group of four pedestrians, resulting in the death of one pedestrian and severe injuries to another, with two others sustaining minor injuries. Following a trial before His Honour Judge Lockhart KC and a jury, three defendants were convicted of manslaughter, grievous bodily harm, and assault occasioning actual bodily harm related to this incident. One defendant was convicted of murder and related offences, while another was acquitted of all counts.

The convicted defendants appealed against their convictions, raising issues around whether they could rely on the defence of an overwhelming supervening act ("OSA"). The proceedings included restrictions on publishing information identifying one injured minor. The case involved allegations of a shared plan to confront the pedestrian group, with evidence including threats, weapons, and coordinated actions leading up to the collision. The judge rejected submissions of no case to answer and gave detailed directions to the jury, who returned the convictions described.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the principle of overwhelming supervening act ("OSA") applied as a defence to the charges faced by the appellants.
2. Whether the judge erred in rejecting submissions of no case to answer on the basis that OSA did not arise.
3. Whether the judge erred in refusing to leave the issue of OSA to the jury.
4. Whether the judge erred in refusing to direct the jury to acquit if unsure that a secondary party had joined a plan to use the car as a weapon.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The defence of OSA should have been available and left to the jury, as the prosecution case evolved to allege a new plan involving the car as a weapon.
• The judge erred in law and fact by rejecting submissions of no case to answer and not permitting the OSA defence to be considered.
• The decision in R v Grant wrongly narrowed the Supreme Court's intended scope of secondary liability established in R v Jogee.
• The appellants did not share the intent to kill at the time the driver formed that intention, and the driving into the pedestrians was a separate, unforeseeable act.
• Jury directions failed to explain that if OSA applied, the appellants were entitled to acquittal.

Respondent's Arguments

• The prosecution case consistently involved a developing plan to use unlawful force, including the car, and the appellants shared a common intention to encourage or assist this.
• The brief time between entering the car armed and the collision supports a shared intention and contemporaneous encouragement.
• The driving into the pedestrians was not an unexpected development but a foreseeable execution of the shared plan.
• The acquittal of one defendant was based on factual distinctions and does not undermine the convictions of the appellants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8	Clarified that secondary liability requires proof of intentional encouragement or assistance with the requisite intent; restricted the scope of OSA to exceptional circumstances.	The court applied Jogee’s principles to confirm that the appellants intentionally encouraged or assisted the principal offence and that OSA did not arise.
R v Grant [2021] EWCA Crim 1243	Confirmed that OSA is not to be viewed through causation but through encouragement and assistance; limited occasions for jury directions on OSA.	The court agreed with Grant’s approach, finding no error in the trial judge’s refusal to leave OSA to the jury.
R v Tas [2018] EWCA Crim 2603	Established that the judge decides whether evidence suffices to leave OSA to the jury.	The court upheld the judge’s discretion not to leave OSA to the jury in this case.
R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38	Used the concept of "necessary linkage" between accused’s actions and consequences.	The appellants relied on this case to argue for a stronger OSA defence, but the court did not accept this application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by emphasizing the legal principles from R v Jogee, focusing on the necessity for a secondary party to intentionally encourage or assist the principal with the required intent contemporaneously. It highlighted that encouragement or assistance need not be tied to a particular method of committing the offence.

The court considered the submissions of no case to answer and the defence of OSA, noting that mere escalation or use of an unforeseen weapon does not automatically trigger OSA. The judge’s finding that the appellants’ conduct was current, contemporaneous encouragement and assistance was supported by the evidence, including threats, weapons, and coordinated pursuit of the victim group.

The court rejected the appellants' argument that the driver’s act of driving into the pedestrians was an unforeseeable, separate plan. It held that the joint intention to use unlawful violence persisted through the sequence of events, and the driving was a foreseeable execution of that plan.

The court also agreed with the trial judge’s approach to jury directions, finding that the route to verdict provided appropriate safeguards and that the jury’s verdicts were open on the evidence presented.

Finally, the court declined to certify questions for the Supreme Court, finding no inconsistency between Jogee and Grant, and reaffirmed that the principles in Jogee remain binding and clear.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeals of the three appellants against their convictions.

The decision confirms the application of established principles from R v Jogee and R v Grant regarding secondary liability and the defence of overwhelming supervening act. It underscores the limited circumstances in which OSA can be considered and affirms the trial judge’s discretion in directing the jury on such issues. No new legal precedent was established, and the ruling maintains the existing framework for assessing secondary liability in violent offences.