Olaszewski v The Residential Tenancies Board (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment concerns a preliminary issue arising from an attempted appeal by the Appellant against a Determination Order made by Company A on 31 January 2024 concerning a rented property in The City. The Determination Order was issued to the parties on 6 February 2024. Pursuant to the applicable legislation, any appeal was required to be issued within 21 days from the date of issue of the Determination Order, thus by 27 February 2024.

The Appellant served a purported notice of motion on 23 February 2024 to both Company A and the Central Office of the High Court; however, this notice had not been issued by the High Court at the time of service. The notice of motion was eventually stamped as issued by the Central Office on 17 June 2024, well outside the 21-day period.

The High Court directed a preliminary hearing to determine whether the appeal was issued within the statutory time limit. The Appellant represented himself, while Attorney Harmon appeared on behalf of Company A. The underlying merits of the appeal were not addressed in this judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Appellant's notice of motion was issued within the 21-day statutory time limit prescribed by section 123(8) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004 (as amended).
2. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to extend the 21-day time limit for appealing a Determination Order under the 2004 Act or relevant procedural rules.
3. The consequences of serving a notice of motion that has not been issued by the Central Office of the High Court prior to service.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The notice of motion was served within the 21-day period, but delays in registration by the Central Office were beyond the Appellant’s control.
• An incorrect stamp duty fee initially caused the documents to be returned, but the Appellant promptly rectified this error and paid the appropriate fee.
• The original notice of motion was served on 23 February 2024 on both Company A and the High Court.
• The delay in registration until 17 June 2024 was due to factors outside the Appellant’s control, and the Court scheduled the hearing promptly after registration.
• The Appellant alleged that Company A provided false information regarding the timelines of service and failed to file opposition papers within the directed timeframe.

Company A's Arguments

• The Determination Order was issued on 6 February 2024, requiring any appeal to be filed by 27 February 2024.
• The notice of motion served on 23 February 2024 had not been issued by the High Court at that time, as evidenced by the Central Office date stamp of 17 June 2024.
• The 21-day time limit prescribed by the 2004 Act is absolute and cannot be extended by the Court.
• Any delay in filing opposition papers was due to the long vacation period, which should be factored into the timeline, and no prejudice arose to the Appellant.
• The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant an extension of time for appealing the Determination Order under the relevant statutory provisions and case law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Noone v Company A [2017] IEHC 556; [2019] 1 I.R. 205	Interpretation of the 21-day appeal period under section 123(8) of the 2004 Act as an absolute time limit not subject to extension.	The Court followed the reasoning in Noone to hold that the statutory 21-day time limit is absolute and no discretion exists to extend it.
Keon v Gibbs [2017] IECA 195	Obiter dicta on the non-extendability of the statutory time limit for appeals where the statute provides no power to extend.	The Court adopted the obiter dicta emphasizing that the statutory time limit cannot be extended absent express legislative provision.
Law Society of Ireland v. Tobin [2016] IECA 26	The inherent jurisdiction of courts to extend time where no statutory prohibition exists, in the context of constitutional appeal rights.	The Court distinguished this case, noting that the statutory appeal here lacks constitutional guarantee and thus no inherent jurisdiction to extend time applies.
State (O'Flaherty) v. O Floinn [1954] I.R. 295; Rainey v. Delap [1988] I.R. 470	Principles that statutory provisions limiting time for appeals cannot be overridden by court rules.	Supported the conclusion that the statutory 21-day limit cannot be altered by procedural rules.
McK v F (unreported, High Court, 2002)	Proceedings are deemed commenced when the originating notice of motion issues from the Central Office, not when served.	Applied to determine that the appeal was not issued until 17 June 2024 when the notice of motion was stamped by the Central Office.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the statutory framework under the Residential Tenancies Act 2004 (as amended), particularly section 123(3) and (8), which impose a strict 21-day time limit for appealing Determination Orders. The Court found that the appeal must be "issued" within this period, and mere service of an unissued notice of motion does not satisfy this requirement.

The Court referenced established case law, including Noone v Company A and Keon v Gibbs, to affirm that the statutory time limit is absolute and not subject to judicial extension. The Court rejected the Appellant's argument that delays in registration by the Central Office or errors in stamp duty justified extending the time limit.

Additionally, the Court distinguished the present case from others where inherent jurisdiction to extend time exists, noting that the right of appeal here is purely statutory and not constitutionally guaranteed. Procedural rules cannot contravene the statutory limitation.

The Court also noted that the Appellant's purported notice of motion was only issued by the Central Office on 17 June 2024, well after the 27 February 2024 deadline. Therefore, the appeal was issued out of time, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final ruling is that the Appellant's purported appeal was not issued within the statutory 21-day time limit prescribed by section 123(8) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004 (as amended), and that this time limit is absolute and cannot be extended by the Court.

As a result, the Appellant's application must fail in limine. The Court indicated that costs will generally follow the event in favor of Company A unless exceptional circumstances arise. No new legal precedent was established; the decision affirms existing statutory interpretation and case law regarding the non-extendability of statutory appeal periods in this context.