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Petition of Dastan Ibrahimi (fe/la) for Judicial Review of an age assessment decision of Glasgow City Council (Court of Session)

Scottish Court of Session
Feb 6, 2025
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, an asylum seeker in the United Kingdom, initially resided in The City of Liverpool before travelling to The City of Glasgow prior to the consideration of his asylum claim. There, he sought accommodation from the Defendant local authority under section 25(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, asserting that he was under 18 years of age. In July 2023, the Defendant conducted an age assessment and determined that the Plaintiff was over 18. The Plaintiff challenges this age assessment decision by way of judicial review.

The Defendant made an offer to withdraw the age assessment decision in July 2024, on the basis that the Plaintiff had since turned 18 on 13 January 2024, rendering the assessment of no practical effect. The Defendant proposed dismissal of the petition without finding expenses, clarifying that any future support requests would be considered on their merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the age assessment decision made by the Defendant under Part 4 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 is amenable to judicial review.
  2. Whether the remedies sought by the Plaintiff have any practical effect given the Plaintiff’s age and the Defendant’s offer to withdraw the assessment.
  3. The substantive grounds of challenge to the age assessment decision, including adequacy of reasons, procedural fairness, irrationality, and failure to make adequate inquiries (the "Tameside duty").

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Plaintiff contended that the petition was not academic or hypothetical despite having turned 18, emphasizing that age is integral to identity and the incorrect age assessment could have ongoing adverse effects.
  • The Plaintiff argued that the age assessment might influence decisions by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, including credibility assessments in asylum claims and future age disputes, as Home Office guidance gives considerable weight to local authority assessments.
  • It was submitted that the assessment could affect immigration tribunals’ views and that the Plaintiff might wish to invoke section 25(3) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 for accommodation support between ages 18 and 21.
  • The Plaintiff relied on case law to argue that the proceedings were not academic, highlighting continuing duties local authorities owe to care-leavers and the importance of an accurate age determination.
  • On substantive grounds, the Plaintiff challenged the adequacy of reasons, procedural fairness (lack of notice of adverse points), irrationality of the decision, and failure to make adequate inquiries regarding relevant facts.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Defendant accepted that judicial review was competent but submitted that the petition was academic as the Plaintiff had turned 18, and the assessment no longer had practical effect.
  • The Defendant’s offer to withdraw the decision would remove any extant decision attributing the “wrong” age, negating any impact on future decisions by the Home Office or tribunals.
  • The Defendant argued that any future age disputes would be decided afresh, possibly by the National Age Assessment Board, and the withdrawn or reduced decision would not bear weight.
  • On substantive grounds, the Defendant maintained that the reasons given were adequate, relying on the appearance and demeanour of the Plaintiff as sufficient basis for the decision.
  • The Defendant contended that procedural fairness was observed by informing the Plaintiff of the gist of the adverse case, and no further procedural requirements arose given the nature of the assessment.
  • The Defendant denied irrationality and argued that no unreasonable failure to inquire occurred, as facts not relied upon in the decision did not require further investigation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdullah v Aberdeenshire Council [2024 SLT 143] Consideration of judicial review competency for age assessments under different statutory regimes. Distinguished as the assessment here was under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022; supervisory jurisdiction available.
R (SB) v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2024] 1 WLR 2613 Whether an age assessment decision is live or academic when the individual is now over 18 and never looked after by the council. The court found the present facts analogous and held the petition academic.
Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2019 SC 111] Principle that a remedy should have practical effect to be granted. Applied to refuse remedy as reduction would have no practical effect.
R v Birmingham City Council ex p. B [1999] ELR 305 Requirements for adequate reasons in administrative decisions. Used to assess adequacy of reasons given for age assessment decision.
R (B) v Merton London Borough Council [2003] EWHC 1689 (Admin) Age assessment based on appearance and behaviour where documentary evidence lacking; judicialisation to be avoided. Supported the view that the decision based on appearance and demeanour alone was open and sufficient.
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 Requirement to inform a person of the gist of adverse case to ensure procedural fairness. Applied to determine adequacy of notice to Plaintiff of adverse factors.
R (Z) v Croydon London Borough Council [2011] EWCA Civ 59 Disclosure of inconsistencies or adverse points relevant to credibility. Considered in relation to procedural fairness and notice requirements.
R (NA) (Afghanistan) v London Borough of Croydon [2009] EWHC 2357 Requirement to allow applicant to respond to inconsistencies affecting credibility. Referenced regarding procedural fairness principles.
R (HAM) v Brent London Borough Council [2022] PTSR 1779 Fairness requires explanation of adverse credibility conclusions. Supported the distinction that appearance-based assessments do not require such explanation.
R (MVN) v London Borough of Greenwich [2015] EWHC 1942 (Admin) Local authority duties to care-leavers beyond age 18; relevance to whether proceedings are academic. Distinguished due to different statutory duties under English law.
Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014 Duty on decision-maker to make reasonable inquiries before deciding. Applied to assess whether Defendant made adequate inquiries in age assessment.
Plantagenet Alliance Ltd v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] 3 All ER 261 Restatement of Tameside duty as reasonableness of inquiries. Referenced in relation to scope of inquiries required.
Scottish Ministers, Petitioners [2023] CSOH 89 Application of Tameside duty in Scottish context. Applied to affirm the reasonableness standard of inquiries.
R (Nash) v Chelsea College of Art and Design [2001] EWHC 538 (Admin) Consideration of ex post facto reasoning in administrative decisions. Referenced regarding affidavits submitted post-decision.
Chief Constable, Lothian and Borders Police v Lothian and Borders Police Board 2005 SLT 315 Judicial review principles concerning reasons and procedural fairness. Referenced regarding status of affidavits and reasoning.
Swan v Secretary of State for Scotland 1998 SC 479 Assessment of whether proceedings are academic based on particular circumstances. Applied to analyse whether petition was academic or had practical effect.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first considered the competency of the judicial review application, distinguishing the present case from prior authority on age assessments and confirming the court’s supervisory jurisdiction was available under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

Regarding the practical effect of the remedies sought, the court analyzed whether the petition was academic given that the Plaintiff had turned 18 and the Defendant’s offer to withdraw the assessment. The court found the facts analogous to precedent where no live issue remained, concluding that the petition was academic or hypothetical and therefore not justiciable.

In the alternative, the court examined the substantive grounds of challenge. On adequacy of reasons, it held that the decision letter sufficiently identified the factors relied upon—appearance, demeanour, and a brief enquiry—consistent with established case law that in clear cases prolonged inquiry or detailed explanation is unnecessary.

On procedural fairness, the court recognized the requirement to inform the Plaintiff of the gist of adverse factors but found that where the decision was based on appearance and demeanour alone, the rationale for detailed notice of adverse points relating to credibility did not arise. The decision was a “clear case” that did not depend on the Plaintiff’s explanations.

Regarding irrationality, the court noted that a challenge must show the decision was unreasonable when considering all factors together. The court rejected arguments focusing on individual physical characteristics without considering the overall assessment. No heightened standard of review was warranted absent specific submissions on significant adverse consequences.

On the duty to make inquiries (the "Tameside duty"), the court applied the reasonableness standard and found no failure to inquire unreasonably, particularly as certain facts were not relied upon in making the decision. The court emphasized that another decision-maker might have made different inquiries but that does not render the decision unreasonable.

Ultimately, had the petition not been academic, the court would have refused the remedy on the merits, sustaining the Defendant’s relevant pleas in law and rejecting others.

Holding and Implications

The court held the petition to be academic or hypothetical and therefore not justiciable, sustaining the Defendant’s plea that the petition should be refused on that basis.

In the alternative, the court held that on the substantive merits, the Plaintiff’s challenge to the age assessment decision would fail on grounds of adequacy of reasons, procedural fairness, irrationality, and failure to make adequate inquiries.

The petition was accordingly refused, with no new precedent established. The direct effect is the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s judicial review challenge to the age assessment decision, and the Defendant’s offer to withdraw the decision removes any practical impact of the challenged assessment going forward.