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Abdraman Ali Ahmat against Aberdeenshire Council (Court of Session)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff seeks a declarator that his date of birth is 10 November 2006. In July 2023, social workers employed by the Defendant conducted a brief age assessment and concluded that the Plaintiff was clearly over 18 years old at that time, which relieved the Defendant of any duty to accommodate him as a child. The proceedings began as a petition for judicial review, but the court converted them into an ordinary action following concerns about the petition's competence. The Plaintiff averred that if he had been accommodated as a child before turning 18, he would be entitled to remain in accommodation until age 21 under relevant legislation.
The case proceeded to proof on 26 November 2024, by which time the Plaintiff was, by his own account, already 18 years old. The court considered whether the action was academic but found the age dispute relevant to the future exercise of the Defendant's discretion under section 25(3) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. The Plaintiff is a national of Chad who arrived in the United Kingdom on 12 June 2023, was detained and interviewed by Home Office officials, and subsequently accommodated by the Defendant in Aberdeenshire. The Plaintiff challenged the Defendant’s age assessment, which was conducted via a brief enquiry rather than a full assessment.
The Plaintiff testified about his background, including his family history, education at a religious institution, and journey from Chad to the UK. He presented a birth certificate which was lost by the Home Office. The Defendant's social workers conducted a brief enquiry age assessment in July 2023, concluding the Plaintiff was over 18 based primarily on physical appearance and demeanour. Both parties led evidence from witnesses including Home Office officials and social workers involved in the assessment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Plaintiff’s date of birth is 10 November 2006, making him a child for the purposes of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.
- Whether the Defendant’s brief enquiry age assessment was sufficient and lawful.
- The role and extent of the court’s supervisory jurisdiction in determining the precedent fact of age in this context.
- The applicable burden of proof and standard for determining the Plaintiff’s age.
- The implications of the Plaintiff’s age for the exercise of the Defendant’s powers and duties under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, including accommodation obligations.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff asserted his date of birth as 10 November 2006 and denied statements attributed to him suggesting an earlier birth year.
- He argued that the Defendant’s brief enquiry age assessment did not comply with best practice and statutory guidance, lacking procedural safeguards such as private interviews, appropriate adult support, and a trauma-informed approach.
- The Plaintiff submitted that the social workers’ evidence should be given limited weight due to their lack of independence and limited experience.
- He contended that a full Merton-compliant age assessment was required for reliability and fairness.
- He relied on case law indicating that the court’s role is to determine the age on a balance of probabilities without applying a formal burden of proof on either party.
Defendant's Arguments
- The Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff’s evidence was not credible or reliable, highlighting inconsistencies and the absence of corroborating evidence from family members.
- The Defendant maintained that the brief enquiry was lawful and appropriate given the clear indication that the Plaintiff was over 18 years old.
- They emphasized the credibility and reliability of the social workers’ evidence based on their experience and observations of the Plaintiff’s physical appearance and demeanour.
- The Defendant argued that there was no need for an extensive or full age assessment because the evidence clearly suggested the Plaintiff was an adult.
- The Defendant relied on the Home Office officials’ assessment and the social workers’ report to support their conclusion on age.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Abdullah v Aberdeenshire Council [2024] CSOH 8 | Competence of judicial review petition and approach to age assessment challenges. | Referenced regarding initial procedural considerations and competence of petition. |
| R (GE (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR 4123 | Discretionary powers of local authorities to remedy unlawful past treatment; approach to age determination where claimant has turned 18 during proceedings. | Guided the court’s approach to whether the age question was academic and the discretionary powers available. |
| Section 25(3), Children (Scotland) Act 1995 | Local authority’s power to provide accommodation to persons aged 18 to 21 if it promotes welfare. | Relevant to the Defendant’s discretion and the continuing importance of determining the Plaintiff’s age. |
| R (B) v Merton London Borough Council [2003] EWHC 1689 (Admin) | Requirements for a full age assessment (Merton-compliant assessment). | Referenced to distinguish between brief enquiry and full age assessment standards. |
| Kennedy v Cordia Services LLP [2016] UKSC 6 | Weight to be given to evidence from interested witnesses. | Considered in assessing the credibility of social workers’ evidence. |
| R (HAM) v Brent London Borough Council [2022] EWHC 1924 (Admin) | Persuasiveness of different types of age assessments. | Supported the Plaintiff’s argument that Merton-compliant assessments are more persuasive than brief enquiries. |
| R (AB) v Kent County Council [2020] PTSR 746 | Reliability of assessments based solely on physical appearance and demeanour. | Used to caution against reliance on physical appearance alone in age assessments. |
| R (CJ) v Cardiff City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1590; [2012] PTSR 1235 | No formal burden of proof in determining precedent fact of age; court’s inquisitorial role. | Adopted for the approach to burden of proof and court’s role in this case. |
| West v Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 SC 385 | Tri-partite relationship in supervisory jurisdiction over local authority decisions. | Supported the characterization of the court’s supervisory jurisdiction in this case. |
| R (A) v Croydon London Borough Council [2009] UKSC 8; [2009] 1 WLR 2557 | Age as a precedent fact for local authority duties. | Confirmed that age is a precedent fact determinable by the court in supervisory jurisdiction. |
| L v Angus Council [2011] CSOH 196; 2012 SLT 304 | Jurisdictional approach to age determination in supervisory proceedings. | Distinguished and not followed; court affirmed supervisory jurisdiction approach. |
| U v Glasgow City Council [2017] CSOH 122; 2017 SLT 1109 | Reservations on jurisdictional approach to age determination. | Rejected court’s reservations, affirming supervisory jurisdiction. |
| R (FZ) v London Borough of Croydon [2011] EWCA Civ 59 | Subsuming judicial review challenges into factual age determination. | Referenced regarding efficiency and scope of judicial review in age disputes. |
| R (SB) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2023] EWCA Civ 924 | Cost and delay implications of splitting age disputes between courts. | Noted for the preference to transfer full cases to Upper Tribunal after permission granted. |
| R (BG) v London Borough of Hackney [2022] UKUT 00388 (IAC) | Duty of candour in judicial review proceedings on age assessment. | Mentioned but not relied on by the court in this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court recognized that the Plaintiff’s age is a precedent fact relevant to the supervisory jurisdiction over the Defendant’s exercise of statutory powers under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. The court rejected the notion of an independent jurisdiction to determine age outside this supervisory context. It emphasized that the burden of proof does not rest on either party; rather, the court must determine on the balance of probabilities whether the Plaintiff was born on the claimed date.
The court carefully assessed the evidence from both parties. It accepted the Plaintiff’s testimony regarding cultural practices around birthdays but found his evidence on critical age-related matters vague, unsatisfactory, and lacking corroboration. The absence of evidence from family members, particularly the Plaintiff’s uncles, was noted as significant. The loss of the birth certificate by the Home Office was acknowledged but did not advance the Plaintiff’s case.
The court found that the Defendant’s social workers were credible and had relevant experience and training, but their age assessment was limited in scope, relying heavily on physical appearance and demeanour, factors which the court regarded with caution. The court noted deficiencies in the assessment process, including lack of privacy, absence of an appropriate adult, and insufficient exploration of the Plaintiff’s background, which diminished the weight of the social workers’ opinion on age.
The court did not rely on the Home Office officer’s skepticism about the birth certificate due to the document’s unavailability and limited recollection. Overall, the evidence did not positively support the Plaintiff’s claim to be born on 10 November 2006. The court found it more probable that the Plaintiff’s date of birth was earlier than that date but could not positively determine what the actual date was.
Holding and Implications
The court GRANTED DECREE OF ABSOLVITOR, dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim for declarator of his date of birth as 10 November 2006.
This decision means that the Plaintiff’s asserted date of birth was not established on the balance of probabilities, and accordingly, the Defendant’s conclusion that he was over 18 years old at the time of the age assessment stands. The court did not set any new precedent but reaffirmed the supervisory jurisdiction’s role in determining precedent facts such as age and the approach to the burden of proof in such cases. The ruling leaves unresolved the precise date of birth but confirms that the Plaintiff is not entitled to the accommodation rights afforded to children under the relevant legislation based on the claimed birth date.
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