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Z.P v Minister for Justice and Equality (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Applicant, a 44-year-old male from Georgia, applied for international protection in the State on 20 September 2021, claiming fear of persecution due to a car accident in Georgia and subsequent threats against his life. His application was denied by the International Protection Office (IPO) and this refusal was upheld on appeal by the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT). The Minister refused permission to remain, and a deportation order was made on 26 July 2023 following a consideration under section 50 of the International Protection Act 2015 (the 2015 Act) that no prohibition on refoulement arose.
After the deportation order was made but before it was notified to the Applicant, the Applicant’s solicitors submitted additional information concerning threats and protection applications made by the Applicant’s wife and child. The Minister acknowledged receipt of this information but did not reconsider the deportation order before notifying it to the Applicant on 8 August 2023. The Applicant subsequently applied for judicial review challenging the lawfulness of the Minister’s decision to notify and rely on the deportation order without considering the new information.
Leave to proceed by way of judicial review was granted ex parte on 15 January 2024. The Minister opposed the challenge, asserting that the decision was lawful as it was based on the information before the Minister at the time the deportation order was made, and denying any representation that the new information would be considered before notification of the deportation order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Minister acted unlawfully by relying on and notifying a deportation order made under section 51 of the 2015 Act without first considering additional information submitted pursuant to section 50(3) of the 2015 Act that was received after the decision was made but before notification of the order.
- Whether the Applicant is entitled to rely on the doctrine of legitimate expectation to require the Minister to withdraw the deportation order and reconsider refoulement issues under section 50(1) of the 2015 Act in light of the new information.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The Minister had a statutory duty under section 50(2)(a) and (3) of the 2015 Act to consider new information submitted regarding a relevant change of circumstances before notifying and relying on the deportation order.
- The Minister should have revoked the deportation order or withheld serving it pending fresh consideration of the new information under section 50(1).
- The Applicant relied on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, arguing that the Minister’s acknowledgement of receipt of the new information gave rise to an expectation that it would be considered before the deportation order was notified.
- Authorities cited included M.A.K v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] IESC 18, Y v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] IEHC 82, and J.I.D. v. Minister for Justice [2024] IEHC 164.
Minister's Arguments
- The Minister relied on the information before her at the time the deportation order was made, and a failure to consider information not submitted at that time does not render the decision unlawful.
- The delay by the Applicant in submitting new information meant the Minister was not obliged to reconsider the deportation order before notification.
- The Minister denied making any representation amounting to a legitimate expectation that the new information would be considered before notification of the deportation order.
- The Minister cited S.M. v. Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 611, arguing that there is no obligation to reconsider decisions based on information submitted after the decision is made.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| M.A.K v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2018] IESC 18 | Deportation order and notice must both be issued before order takes effect; procedural requirements in deportation process. | Applicant relied on it to argue that the deportation order should not have been notified without considering new information; Court rejected that it invalidated the order already made. |
| Y v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2021] IEHC 82 | Failure to consider new relevant information before making a decision under section 49(7) can render decision unlawful. | Court distinguished facts; in this case new information was not before the Minister at decision time and was submitted late. |
| J.I.D. v. Minister for Justice [2024] IEHC 164 | Application under section 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999 to revoke deportation order; lack of suspensive effect. | Court noted this case did not address post-decision new information; distinguished from current facts. |
| S.M. v. Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 611 | Failure to consider material not before the Minister at decision time does not invalidate decision. | Minister relied on this to justify not reconsidering decision based on late information. |
| Glencar Exploration p.l.c. v. Mayo County Council (No. 2) [2001] IESC 64 | Principles of legitimate expectation in public law. | Cited to explain requirements for legitimate expectation claims. |
| Lett & Co. v. Wexford County Council & Ors. [2012] IESC 14 | Principles of legitimate expectation in administrative decision-making. | Used to frame legal test for legitimate expectation. |
| Keogh v. CAB and the Revenue Commissioners [2004] IESC 32 | Legitimate expectation doctrine and its application. | Referred to in submissions on legitimate expectation. |
| Elder v. Minister for Defence & Ors. [2019] IEHC 716 | Clarification of legitimate expectation doctrine; requirement of clear representation as to future conduct or process. | Court applied this to conclude no legitimate expectation arose from mere acknowledgement emails. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court identified two central issues: whether the Minister was obliged to consider the new information submitted after the deportation order was made but before notification, and whether the Applicant had a legitimate expectation that the new information would be considered prior to notification.
The Court held that the statutory scheme under section 50 of the 2015 Act imposes a duty on the Applicant to notify any relevant change of circumstances "forthwith" and that the Minister must consider such information before giving effect to a deportation order. However, the obligation to consider new information does not require the Minister to revoke or quash a deportation order already lawfully made if the information was not submitted in time.
The Court found that the Applicant failed to comply with the duty to notify the Minister of relevant changed circumstances without delay, as the new information was known months before the deportation order was made but was only submitted after the order was signed. The Court rejected the Applicant's argument that the Minister should have revoked or withheld the deportation order pending consideration of the late information.
Regarding legitimate expectation, the Court held that mere acknowledgment emails do not amount to a clear representation that the Minister would reconsider the deportation order or the new information before notification. Therefore, no legitimate expectation arose to that effect.
The Court emphasized that the Minister’s obligation under section 50(1) continues until removal, but this does not negate the Applicant’s duty to submit information promptly or require the Minister to reconsider decisions based on late submissions absent an application for revocation under section 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999.
Holding and Implications
The Court REFUSED THE RELIEF SOUGHT, holding that the Minister did not act unlawfully in notifying and relying on the deportation order made under section 51 of the 2015 Act without considering the new information submitted after the decision but before notification.
The direct effect is that the deportation order remains valid and enforceable. The Court did not establish any new precedent but reaffirmed the importance of timely submission of information under section 50(3) and clarified the limits of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in this context. The Minister retains discretion to consider new information and revoke a deportation order under section 3(11) of the 1999 Act, but is not obliged to do so absent a proper application.
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