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Petition of James Walker and others for Judicial Review (Court of Session)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners, comprising two individuals referred to as the First and Second Petitioners and a company referred to as the Third Petitioner, sought judicial review of the Scottish Ministers' decision dated 23 April 2024. This decision granted consent under section 37 of the Electricity Act 1989 for the installation and retention of approximately 9.3 kilometres of 123kV overhead electricity transmission line in the planning authority area of Dumfries and Galloway.
The First and Second Petitioners are spouses owning Drumbuie Farm near Sanquhar, with longstanding family farming interests, while the Third Petitioner is a company associated with the family, owning land at Kelloholm. The proposed development was intended to be constructed on and over the petitioners' land, subject to a compulsory purchase process initiated by the interested party, a company involved in the application for consent.
A consultation process began in 2019 to establish a preferred route for the overhead line. The First Petitioner raised environmental concerns during pre-application consultation, while the Second and Third Petitioners did not. The formal application was submitted on 16 January 2023, accompanied by an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report. Advertisements invited representations by 31 March 2023, though late representations received after this date were considered at the discretion of the Scottish Ministers.
The petitioners raised concerns about environmental impacts and alternative routing options. They also expressed, through a letter dated March 2024, concerns regarding the effect of the proposed development on their existing, consented, and proposed windfarms and quarry operations. This letter was submitted nearly a year after the advertised deadline and was not brought to the attention of decision-makers until after the decision was made.
The petitioners challenged the decision on grounds that it was unreasonable, illogical, failed to take into account relevant material considerations, and failed to provide proper and intelligible reasons.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Scottish Ministers were legally obliged to take into account the petitioners' late representations contained in the March 2024 letter when determining the application for consent.
- Whether the Scottish Ministers failed to consider relevant material considerations, particularly the impact of the proposed development on the petitioners' existing and proposed land uses.
- Whether the reasons provided by the Scottish Ministers for their decision were proper, adequate, and intelligible.
- Whether any error in the decision-making process warranted the court exercising its discretion to reduce the decision.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The March 2024 letter, although late, was accepted by the respondents and they assured the petitioners it would be processed as a representation, giving rise to a legitimate expectation that its contents would be considered.
- The decision was ultra vires for failing to take into account relevant material considerations, specifically the impact on existing and proposed windfarms and quarry operations, including incompatibility issues and the effect on access tracks.
- The decision did not provide proper, adequate, or intelligible reasons, leaving an informed reader in substantial doubt about how key issues were resolved.
- Partial undergrounding of the overhead line was a material consideration that was not addressed.
- Had the respondents properly considered these matters, there was a real possibility the decision might have differed.
Respondents' Arguments
- The application was accompanied by a compliant EIA report, which the respondents took into account along with consultee responses and representations.
- The respondents considered the route, traffic, and access issues, concluding the project was compatible with the local development plan and national policy (NPF4).
- The late March 2024 letter was not seen by the decision-makers before the decision but its issues were addressed in the decision in any event.
- It is for the decision-maker alone to determine which considerations are material and how much weight to give them; no legal error was identified.
- Unconsented planning applications (such as for the proposed Herds Hill windfarm) and expiring planning permissions (such as for the quarry) are not material considerations.
- The letter was vague and lacked essential specification; the decision provided adequate reasons and was intelligible to an informed reader familiar with the EIA report and the consenting process.
- Even if an error had been made, there was no real possibility it affected the outcome, and the court should exercise discretion to refuse reduction of the decision.
Interested Party's Arguments
- The March 2024 letter raised no new material considerations that required the respondents' attention.
- The reasons given for the decision were adequate.
- Any issues raised would not have materially affected the outcome.
- The court should exercise discretion to refuse reduction of the decision.
- The application followed a thorough consultation process, and the letter was submitted long after the consultation period had closed.
- It was reasonable for the respondents to conclude all relevant issues had been brought to their attention before decision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Wordie Property Co Ltd v Secretary of State for Scotland (1984 SLT 345) | Failure to take into account relevant and material considerations renders a decision ultra vires. | Established the principle that material considerations relate to the use and development of land; the court applied this to assess whether the respondents considered existing land uses. |
| Westminster City Council v Great Portland Estates plc [1985] AC 661 | Definition of material considerations as those serving a planning purpose related to land use. | Applied to determine whether the petitioners' concerns about land use compatibility were material. |
| Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 | Materiality requires relevance; weight given to considerations is for the decision-maker. | Supported the court's analysis that compatibility with existing land uses may be material but weight is discretionary. |
| Ricketts and Fletcher v Secretary of State for the Environment [1988] JPL 768 | Incompatibility of land uses can justify refusal of permission. | Used to assess whether the respondents failed to consider incompatibility with existing and proposed windfarms. |
| South Buckinghamshire DC v Porter [2004] 1 WLR 1953 | Reasons for decision must be intelligible and adequate, enabling understanding of conclusions on principal issues. | Applied to evaluate adequacy of reasons provided by the respondents. |
| Friends of the Earth Ltd v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52 | Materiality of considerations tested by Wednesbury irrationality; decision-makers have discretion on what to consider. | Guided the court in determining whether the matters raised were so obviously material that failure to consider them was unlawful. |
| R (ex parte Samuel Smith Old Brewery) v North Yorkshire County Council [2020] UKSC 3 | Legal obligation to consider a matter must be established before failure to do so is unlawful. | Supported the respondents' position on discretion and materiality of considerations. |
| R (Fiske) v Test Valley Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 1495 | Unconsented planning applications are not material considerations. | Applied to exclude the proposed Herds Hill windfarm as a material consideration. |
| Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44 | Assessment of whether error of law affected the outcome and whether reduction should be granted. | Considered in relation to the court's discretion to refuse reduction despite procedural irregularities. |
| Moray Council v Scottish Ministers [2006] CSIH 4 | Decision-makers entitled to concise reasons; not every issue must be addressed in detail. | Used to assess the adequacy of the respondents' decision letter. |
| Uprichard v Scottish Ministers [2013] UKSC 21 | Contextual approach to reasons; no need for elaborate reasoning if not substantive. | Supported the respondents' argument on the adequacy of reasons. |
| Sinclair v Scottish Ministers [2022] CSIH 49 | Weight to be given to public benefits in planning decisions. | Referenced to support the respondents' consideration of renewable energy benefits. |
| Rhodes v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1963] 1 WLR 208 | Objections must be sufficiently clear and specific. | Applied to critique the petitioners' March 2024 letter as vague. |
| Simson v Aberdeenshire Council 2007 SC 366 | Decision-maker decides determining issues and amount of information required. | Supported the respondents' discretion in materiality and consideration of evidence. |
| Macpherson v City of Edinburgh Council 2003 SLT 1112 | Court's discretion to withhold reduction of decision despite procedural irregularity. | Referenced in relation to discretion to refuse remedy. |
| CREEDNZ Inc v Governor General [1981] NZLR 172 | Categories of considerations: mandatory, prohibited, and discretionary; materiality assessed accordingly. | Used to frame the materiality analysis of considerations in this case. |
| Baroness Cumberlege of Newick v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2018] PTSR 2063 | Materiality tested by Wednesbury irrationality; decision-maker's discretion respected. | Applied to clarify limits of materiality and decision-maker discretion. |
| Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759 (Lord Hoffmann) | Decision-maker may lawfully give no weight to a consideration, subject to rationality. | Supported the principle that weight is for the decision-maker. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first addressed whether the respondents were legally bound to consider the petitioners' March 2024 letter. The letter was submitted nearly a year after the advertised deadline for representations, which was a soft deadline but intended to ensure timely decision-making. The court found it would be contrary to efficient public administration to require consideration of such a late representation absent exceptional circumstances. The petitioners did not demonstrate that the letter contained any determinative matter that no reasonable person could ignore.
The petitioners argued that the respondents had given assurances that the letter would be processed, giving rise to personal bar or legitimate expectation. The court rejected these arguments, concluding that the respondents' acknowledgment did not amount to a clear, unambiguous promise to consider the letter's contents substantively. Moreover, the respondents did not make a positive decision to disregard the letter; rather, the administrative system failed to bring it to the decision-makers' attention in time. The court found no unlawfulness in the system itself, and thus no legal obligation arose to consider the letter.
On materiality, the court applied established principles distinguishing mandatory, prohibited, and discretionary considerations. The statute governing the consent required regard only to specified environmental and related factors. The petitioners' concerns about impacts on existing and proposed windfarms and quarry operations were not expressly required to be considered. While such land use matters can be material in planning decisions, they are not necessarily so. The court held that none of the petitioners' concerns were so obviously material that failure to consider them was irrational. In particular, unconsented planning applications and expiring permissions were not material considerations.
The court also found the petitioners' March 2024 letter lacked sufficient specificity to require further inquiry or consideration. Since the respondents were not obliged to consider the letter, the question of its detail was largely academic.
Regarding the adequacy of reasons, the court found the decision letter was proper, adequate, and intelligible. It addressed principal issues, including environmental impacts, policy compliance, and public benefits related to renewable energy transmission. While the decision did not address the petitioners' late concerns about their own land uses, those concerns were not material considerations the respondents were obliged to take into account. The decision was consistent with the EIA report and relevant policies, and the reasons provided were sufficient for an informed reader.
Finally, the court commented on the discretion to refuse reduction of decisions despite errors of law. It noted that such discretion involves planning judgment and that courts should be cautious in interfering. Since no legal error was found here, the issue did not arise substantively.
Holding and Implications
The court's final decision was to REFUSE THE PETITION.
The petitioners' challenge to the Scottish Ministers' decision was dismissed. The court held that the Ministers were not legally obliged to consider the late representations contained in the March 2024 letter, that the matters raised were not so obviously material as to require consideration, and that the reasons provided for the decision were adequate and intelligible. No legal error was established warranting intervention. The decision confirms the discretion of decision-makers in determining materiality and the weight of considerations in planning and consent decisions under the Electricity Act 1989. The ruling does not establish new precedent beyond affirming established principles of materiality, legitimate expectation, and adequacy of reasons in this context.
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