The Humane League UK, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the dismissal of the Appellant's judicial review claim challenging the Secretary of State's policy permitting the keeping of fast-growing breeds of meat chickens and the system for monitoring their welfare. The claim was based on an alleged misinterpretation of Paragraph 29 of Schedule 1 to the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007, which restricts keeping animals for farming purposes unless it can reasonably be expected that they can be kept without detrimental effect on their health or welfare due to their genotype or phenotype.

The Appellant is a charity focused on ending abuse of animals raised for food, supported by a major animal welfare charity. The Respondent is the Secretary of State for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, responsible for animal welfare legislation and codes of practice. The proceedings concern fast-growing meat chickens, which reach slaughter weight faster than slow-growing breeds, and the welfare implications of their genetic selection.

The case involves consideration of the relevant EU Directives, the Animal Welfare Act 2006, the 2007 Regulations, the Secretary of State's Code of Practice issued in 2018, and the "trigger system" for monitoring welfare conditions at slaughterhouses. The lower court judge dismissed the claim, declining to issue a declaration on the meaning of Paragraph 29, and rejected challenges to the Code of Practice and the trigger system. The appeal focuses on the interpretation of Paragraph 29 and the lawfulness of the policy and monitoring system.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the court should grant declaratory relief on the meaning of Paragraph 29 of Schedule 1 to the 2007 Regulations.
2. The proper interpretation of Paragraph 29, specifically whether it constitutes a prohibition subject to a proviso allowing keeping only if it can reasonably be expected that there is no detrimental effect on health or welfare due to genotype or phenotype.
3. Whether the Secretary of State erred in the Code of Practice by failing to articulate the correct meaning of Paragraph 29 or by allowing productivity considerations to weigh against welfare detriment.
4. Whether the trigger system and its thresholds are lawful.
5. Whether the Secretary of State failed to discharge the duty of inquiry under the Tameside principle regarding scientific evidence about fast-growing breeds.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The court erred in refusing declaratory relief on the meaning of Paragraph 29.
• Paragraph 29 should be read as a permission subject to a proviso, meaning animals may only be kept if the proviso is satisfied.
• The Secretary of State misinterpreted Paragraph 29 in the Code of Practice and wrongly suggested productivity could be weighed against welfare detriment.
• The Secretary of State failed to prosecute breaches of Paragraph 29 and failed to interpret related monitoring provisions to give effect to it.
• The trigger system and its thresholds are unlawful.
• The Secretary of State failed to discharge the duty of inquiry by not referring to scientific evidence underpinning his position.
• The Appellant sought a declaration defining key terms of Paragraph 29, including that any detrimental effect more than de minimis prohibits keeping the breed.

Secretary of State's Arguments

• The court cannot determine the lawfulness of keeping fast-growing breeds due to contested scientific issues.
• Paragraph 29 prohibits keeping breeds that cannot be kept without detriment regardless of environmental conditions.
• No scientific consensus shows fast-growing breeds cannot be kept without detriment; environmental conditions can mitigate welfare issues.
• The Secretary of State is under no duty to explain Paragraph 29 in the Code of Practice, which does not misstate the law.
• No evidence supports unlawfulness of the trigger system or failure to prosecute.
• The duty of inquiry was not pursued on appeal and was properly discharged.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by acknowledging the contested scientific evidence precludes judicial determination of the lawfulness of keeping fast-growing breeds. The central issue was the interpretation of Paragraph 29 of Schedule 1 to the 2007 Regulations, which prohibits keeping farmed animals unless it can reasonably be expected, based on genotype or phenotype, that they can be kept without detrimental health or welfare effects.

The court noted the paragraph's origin in EU law and its close alignment with Directive 98/58/EC. It distinguished between the breeding process itself (addressed in Paragraph 28) and the consequences of breeding (Paragraph 29). The court held that Paragraph 29 constitutes a prohibition subject to a proviso: animals may only be kept if the no detriment condition is met.

The court disagreed with the lower court judge's narrower reading that the prohibition could not be subject to a proviso due to the criminal offence context. It observed that the burden of proof and onus in criminal proceedings were not argued and that the prosecution likely bears the burden.

The court explained that the prohibition concerns inherent detrimental effects caused by genotype or phenotype that cannot be mitigated by environmental conditions. Effects mitigable by environment do not trigger the prohibition. For example, susceptibility to cold that can be addressed by heating does not prohibit keeping.

The court held the test of reasonable expectation is objective and depends on what a reasonable person responsible for the animals would know, informed by good practice and scientific knowledge. It rejected the assumption that animals would be kept only in ordinary farming conditions, emphasizing the focus on inherent breed characteristics.

Regarding "any detrimental effect," the court held the phrase should not be read literally to prohibit keeping for minimal or momentary detriments or effects occurring in an insignificant proportion of animals. A holistic view of health and welfare is required, and productivity advantages cannot justify detriment.

On the Code of Practice, the court found no misstatement or omission of law that rendered it unlawful. The Secretary of State is under no duty to explain Paragraph 29 in detail. The challenged paragraphs on leg health do not suggest that productivity can override welfare concerns.

The court rejected challenges related to prosecutions and interpretation of related monitoring regulations, finding no evidence of unlawful failure. The trigger system's lawfulness was not pursued on appeal and was not considered further.

The duty of inquiry challenge was abandoned on appeal.

In discretion, the court declined to grant the declaratory relief sought by the Appellant, noting the need for expert scientific judgment and the absence of a clear factual matrix.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL.

The court held that Paragraph 29 of Schedule 1 to the 2007 Regulations is a prohibition on keeping farmed animals unless it can reasonably be expected, based on genotype or phenotype, that they can be kept without detrimental effect on their health or welfare. This prohibition is subject to a proviso and requires an objective assessment informed by scientific knowledge and good practice. The court clarified that minimal or momentary detriments, or detriments affecting only an insignificant proportion of animals, do not trigger the prohibition. The court emphasized that welfare concerns cannot be outweighed by commercial productivity considerations.

The court found no unlawfulness in the Secretary of State's Code of Practice or the trigger system and declined to grant declaratory relief, noting the scientific complexity and the need for factual context. The decision leaves the existing policy and monitoring framework intact and does not establish new precedent beyond clarifying the interpretation of Paragraph 29.