Hussain & Anor, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This case concerns sexual offences against children, with the victims entitled to lifelong anonymity under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. Two victims, anonymized as C1 and C2, reported sexual exploitation by multiple men in the Rochdale area. After a lengthy Crown Court trial before Judge Landale and a jury, two defendants, referred to by their surnames as Defendant A and Defendant B, were convicted of multiple sexual offences against C1. Defendant A was convicted of three offences including rape and penetrative sexual activity with a child, receiving a total sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment. Defendant B was convicted of five offences of penetrative sexual activity with a child and sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment.

The defendants were among eight accused facing an indictment with 80 counts related to offences against C1 and C2. Various convictions and acquittals were recorded across the defendants. The complainant C1 gave detailed evidence of abuse beginning at age 12, including coercion, alcohol facilitation, and multiple sexual acts involving the defendants and others. Defendant A denied the allegations, challenging the complainant’s reliability and identification, and did not give evidence but called a witness. Both defendants appealed against their convictions and sentences, with some applications for leave to appeal refused by a single judge prior to this hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the conviction of Defendant A on the count of rape (count 30) was unsafe due to alleged inconsistency with other verdicts.
2. Whether all convictions against Defendant A were unsafe considering the totality of the circumstances.
3. Whether the sentences imposed on Defendant A and Defendant B were manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
4. Whether Defendant A should have received credit for time spent on remand for an unrelated offence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Defendant A argued that the conviction on count 30 was unsafe because it was inconsistent with acquittals on other rape counts involving more detailed evidence, suggesting a wholesale rejection of the prosecution case.
• He contended that count 30 was based on general evidence without detail, contrasting with acquittals on detailed allegations.
• Defendant A submitted that if the conviction on count 30 failed, the other convictions should also be considered unsafe.
• Regarding sentence, Defendant A argued miscategorisation of the lead offence under sentencing guidelines, suggesting a lower category with a lower starting point for sentencing.
• He also argued that credit should have been given for time spent on remand for an unrelated matter, citing a previous case as support.
• Defendant B argued that his 14-year sentence was manifestly excessive, exceeding the statutory maximum for the offence and failing to adequately reflect mitigation including good character, youth, and delay in proceedings.
• Defendant B contended the judge gave undue weight to aggravating factors and did not properly consider acquittals on related counts.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent submitted that the conviction on count 30 was not inconsistent with acquittals on other counts and that no reasonable jury could have reached a different verdict.
• It was argued that the judge gave proper legal directions, including separate consideration of each count and explanations of alternative counts, ensuring the safety of all convictions.
• The Respondent maintained that the sentencing judge correctly categorised the offences, took into account aggravating and mitigating factors, and imposed appropriate concurrent sentences.
• The Respondent opposed any credit for time spent on remand for an unrelated offence, relying on established principles limiting such discretion to exceptional circumstances.
• The Respondent opposed the argument that Defendant B’s sentence was excessive, noting the judge’s proper assessment of seriousness and mitigation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Durante (1972) 56 Cr App R 708	Test for inconsistent verdicts requiring that inconsistency be so strong as to demand appellate interference.	Applied to reject the appellant’s claim of unsafe conviction due to inconsistent verdicts, holding the jury’s verdicts could stand together.
R v Fanning [2016] EWCA Crim 550; [2016] 2 Cr App R 19	Clarification that a jury may accept credibility of a witness on one count and reject it on another, and the test for inconsistent verdicts.	Endorsed to support the conclusion that the jury’s differing verdicts on counts were permissible.
R v Williams [2021] EWCA Crim 1915	Consideration of credit for time spent on remand for unrelated offences.	Distinguished and limited by reference to later authorities emphasizing the exceptional nature of such credit.
R v Prenga [2017] EWCA Crim 2149	Principles limiting discretion to modify sentences for time spent on remand unrelated to the offence being sentenced.	Applied to reject appellant’s argument for credit for unrelated remand time, emphasizing statutory scheme and exceptional jurisdiction.
R v Dacres [2024] EWCA Crim 447	Reaffirmation of Prenga principles, stressing rarity of exceptions to statutory sentencing credit rules.	Applied to confirm the exceptional nature of modifying sentences for unrelated remand periods and to uphold the sentencing judge’s decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by addressing the alleged inconsistency in verdicts under well-established legal principles from R v Durante and R v Fanning. It held that the jury was entitled to accept some parts of the complainant’s evidence and reject others, particularly given the complexity of the indictment and the complainant’s history of multiple abuses. The court found it unrealistic to describe the jury’s verdicts as a wholesale rejection of the prosecution case. The conviction on count 30, though based on less detailed evidence, was consistent with the jury being sure that rape occurred at least once but uncertain about other incidents.

Regarding the general safety of convictions, the court found no merit in the appellant’s broader challenge, noting the jury’s entitlement to differentiate between counts and the absence of any reason to doubt the reliability of the convictions.

On sentencing, the court upheld the judge’s categorisation of the lead offence and the aggravating and mitigating factors considered. It rejected the argument that the sentence was manifestly excessive, emphasizing the appropriate concurrent sentencing structure. The court also rejected the submission that credit should be given for remand time on an unrelated offence, citing the statutory framework and the exceptional nature of such discretion as explained in R v Prenga and R v Dacres. The court noted the failure to bring these principles to the sentencing judge’s attention but confirmed that no injustice arose here.

In relation to Defendant B’s sentence, the court was satisfied that the sentencing judge properly balanced mitigation against the seriousness and cynical nature of the offending. The judge’s findings on aggravating factors and the overall sentence were not arguably excessive.

Holding and Implications

The court REFUSED Defendant A’s renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction and DISMISSED his appeal against conviction.

The court also REFUSED the renewed applications by both Defendant A and Defendant B for leave to appeal against sentence.

The direct effect is that the convictions and sentences imposed on the defendants stand as determined by the Crown Court. No new precedent was established, but the court granted permission for this judgment to be cited to highlight the principles relating to credit for remand time in unrelated matters as set out in R v Prenga and R v Dacres, emphasizing their importance for future cases.