Morris v An Bord Pleanala (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by the Applicant for leave to appeal a substantive judgment delivered by the High Court on 31 May 2024, pursuant to section 50A(7) of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended ("the PDA 2000"). The substantive judgment addressed a judicial review challenge against a decision of the Respondent. The current judgment addresses whether the Applicant should be granted leave to appeal the substantive judgment to the Court of Appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Applicant has raised a point of law of exceptional public importance arising out of the substantive judgment.
2. Whether it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s.50A(7) of the PDA 2000.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

• The Applicant relied on grounds of appeal advanced by a related group in separate proceedings, which the court declined to repeat in this judgment.
• Reason No. 1: The Applicant contended that the court erred in holding that one ground of challenge was not pleaded with sufficient specificity, asserting the pleading was clear and that the court could have sought clarification if necessary.
• Reason No. 2: The Applicant disputed the court’s suggestion that certain submissions appeared to be paraphrased from objections by third parties, arguing that the court had effectively "disqualified" this evidence.
• Reason No. 3: The Applicant disagreed with the finding that allegations of lack of curiosity and diligence on the part of the decisionmaker did not amount to legal errors justifying overturning the decision, asserting an equitable basis for such grounds.
• Reason No. 4: The Applicant challenged the characterization of some of his grounds as "generalised," arguing that as a lay litigant he had done his best to plead clearly and that the court’s expectations may have been excessive.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Glancré Teoranta v ABP [2006] IEHC 250	Principles governing applications for leave to appeal under s.50A(7) of PDA 2000, including the requirement for a point of law of exceptional public importance and public interest considerations.	The court applied the principles set out by McMenamin J to assess whether the Applicant met the high threshold for leave to appeal.
Arklow Holidays v ABP [2008] IEHC 2	Endorsement and application of the principles for leave to appeal under s.50A(7).	Referenced as part of the body of caselaw supporting the legal framework.
O'Brien v ABP [2018] IEHC 389	Further application of the leave to appeal principles.	Referenced to support the legal standard applied.
Northeast Pylon Pressure Campaign Limited v An Bord Pleanála [2018] IEHC 3	Application of leave to appeal principles in planning judicial review context.	Referenced as precedent for the legal framework.
Dublin Cycling Campaign v ABP [2021] IEHC 146	Application of exceptional public importance test for leave to appeal.	Referenced to support the court’s approach.
An Taisce v ABP [2021] IEHC 422	Application of the statutory test for leave to appeal.	Referenced as authoritative precedent.
Monkstown Road Residents Association v ABP [2023] IEHC 9	Emphasis on the high threshold for granting leave to appeal and the sparing exercise of such jurisdiction.	The court considered and applied the expanded principles from this case in its analysis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by affirming the well-established legal framework governing applications for leave to appeal under section 50A(7) of the PDA 2000, highlighting the requirement for a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it must be in the public interest for an appeal to proceed. The court noted that this jurisdiction is exercised sparingly and the threshold is high.

Regarding the Applicant’s reliance on grounds from related proceedings, the court declined to revisit those arguments, applying the same reasoning as in the related case. The court then addressed the Applicant’s specific grounds sequentially:

• Reason No. 1: The court held that disagreement with its finding on the specificity of pleadings does not meet the statutory threshold. Although the pleading was found insufficiently specific, the court nevertheless considered the merits of the ground, undermining the Applicant’s argument.
• Reason No. 2: The court rejected the notion that any evidence or submissions were disqualified or excluded, clarifying that it considered the merits of the relevant ground in the substantive judgment.
• Reason No. 3: The court found no legal basis for the Applicant’s assertion that a lack of curiosity or diligence by the decisionmaker could constitute grounds to invalidate the decision, noting that disagreement with the court’s findings is insufficient to establish a point of law of exceptional public importance.
• Reason No. 4: Although the court recognized the Applicant’s status as a lay litigant and his efforts, it maintained that the generalised nature of some challenges did not meet the legal standard, especially since the court addressed the merits fully before rejecting the grounds.

Overall, the court concluded that none of the grounds raised by the Applicant met the high statutory threshold for leave to appeal.

Holding and Implications

The court REFUSED the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal the substantive judgment under section 50A(7) of the PDA 2000.

This decision means that the substantive judgment stands as final and no appeal to the Court of Appeal will proceed. The refusal was based strictly on the absence of any point of law of exceptional public importance and the lack of public interest in permitting an appeal. No new precedent was established by this decision. The parties were given two weeks to submit written submissions on final orders and costs, with a hearing scheduled for final orders.