Bell, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns the sentencing of the Appellant, who pleaded guilty on 5 December 2022 to multiple offences including stalking, breach of a restraining order, perverting the course of public justice, and forgery. The Crown Court at Teesside sentenced the Appellant on 5 June 2023 to a total of 4 years and 4 months' imprisonment, comprising concurrent and consecutive sentences across the offences. A restraining order was also imposed. The Appellant had a co-defendant, the Appellant's sister, who pleaded guilty to perverting the course of justice and received a suspended sentence.

The case involved a relationship breakdown between the Appellant and the complainant, which led to disputes over property and abusive communications. The Appellant forged a land transfer document related to the family home and engaged in conduct intended to pervert the course of justice by implicating a third party. The Appellant breached a restraining order by sending abusive messages after its imposition.

The Full Court granted leave to appeal against sentence on 14 May 2024, noting concerns about potential overlap between sentences imposed by the Magistrates' Court and the Crown Court. Subsequent clarifications confirmed no overlap in offending periods. The appeal focused on the appropriateness and proportionality of the sentences imposed, particularly for stalking and forgery offences.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising the culpability and harm in the stalking offence, resulting in a manifestly excessive sentence.
2. Whether the sentence for the forgery offence was excessive given the absence of financial loss and the completion of the property transfer with consent.
3. Whether the total sentence of 4 years and 4 months was just and proportionate, considering the principle of totality and the possibility of consecutive sentences.
4. Whether the suspended sentence order imposed by the Magistrates' Court should be activated and how it should be concurrent with other sentences.
5. Whether the breach of the restraining order offence was correctly charged and recorded under the appropriate statutory provisions following legislative changes.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The sentencing judge wrongly categorised the stalking offence as high culpability and very serious distress, whereas the conduct involved 20 messages over 116 days, which should be medium culpability and some distress.
• The judge erred in sentencing the forgery offence without a Newton hearing and should have sentenced on the basis that no financial loss was caused and the property transfer was ultimately consented to.
• The total sentence of 52 months was disproportionate and offended against the principle of totality.
• The judge incorrectly referred to a 2014 harassment conviction, which was conceded by the Crown.
• The offences were of some age, resolved between the parties, and there was no repetition of offending, which should have been considered in mitigation.

Respondent's Arguments

• The conduct was persistent and prolonged, justifying the judge's categorisation of the stalking offence and the assessment of very serious distress.
• The Appellant had a significant offending record including fraud, which was an aggravating factor.
• The sentence for forgery was not manifestly excessive even without financial loss, with reference to precedent sentencing ranges and the Appellant's recruitment of the co-defendant to assist in the forgery.
• The judge properly imposed consecutive sentences for distinct offences, and the total sentence was just and proportionate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Jowett [2022] EWCA Crim 629; [2022] 2 Cr App R(S) 46	Clarification on charging breaches of restraining orders post Sentencing Act 2020; transitional provisions allowing correction of charge to section 363(1) of the 2020 Act.	The Court applied the ruling to correct the record of the breach of restraining order offence to the appropriate statutory provision.
R v Cano-Uribe [2015] EWCA Crim 1824; [2016] 1 Cr App R(S) 36	Sentencing benchmarks for forgery offences, considering breach of trust and mitigating factors.	The Court distinguished the present case from Cano-Uribe, noting the absence of breach of trust here, and used it as a reference point in assessing the appropriateness of the forgery sentence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully considered the submissions on culpability and harm for the stalking offence, concluding that the offence fell within category 1B of the Definitive Guideline but towards the lower end. The Court disagreed with the Appellant's submission that the harm was only category 2, affirming the judge's finding of very serious distress, though accepting it was at the lower range of that category.

Regarding the forgery offence, the Court found the sentence of 10 months was excessive given the absence of financial loss and the eventual completion of the property transfer with consent. The Court determined that a significantly lower sentence was appropriate.

The Court noted that the breach of the restraining order was properly charged and that the suspended sentence order from the Magistrates' Court should be activated but served concurrently with other sentences.

The Court emphasized the principle of totality in sentencing, finding that the total sentence imposed was disproportionate. It adjusted the sentences for stalking and forgery downwards and activated the suspended sentence concurrently, resulting in a total sentence of 3 years' imprisonment.

Holding and Implications

The Court ALLOWED THE APPEAL IN PART by quashing the sentences for stalking and forgery and substituting reduced sentences of 22 months for stalking and 4 months for forgery. The sentence for breach of the restraining order remains concurrent at 3 months. The suspended sentence order imposed by the Magistrates' Court was activated to run concurrently.

The total effective sentence was reduced from 4 years and 4 months to 3 years' imprisonment.

The decision directly affects the Appellant's sentence but does not establish new legal precedent beyond the application of existing sentencing principles and statutory provisions.