Masterson & Ors v Coras Iompair Eireann [No.2] (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

The proceedings concern the interpretation of a superannuation scheme ("the scheme") established for clerical, supervising, and executive staff of the respondent, Company A. A substantive judgment was delivered on 19 April 2024 addressing the interpretation of the scheme. Following that judgment, the court urged the parties to agree on appropriate orders reflecting the findings, but agreement was not reached.

The applicant committee responsible for representing members of the scheme became inquorate due to resignations and retirements, with the responsibility to appoint new members resting with Company A. This lack of quorum prevented the applicants' solicitors from taking formal instructions. Despite ongoing discussions and correspondence, the parties remained unable to agree on the terms of the orders or on costs.

The court convened a hearing on 29 July 2024 to determine the terms of the orders to be made, proceeding on the basis that submissions would be heard de bene esse (without formal instructions) from those representing the applicant committee. Counsel for both parties appeared, and the parties' positions were presented primarily through prior correspondence and authorities rather than written submissions at the hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the obligation imposed on the Board by rule 20 of the 1951 scheme "to support and maintain the solvency of the fund" requires, at a minimum, that contributions satisfy the statutory funding standard.
2. Whether the obligation imposed on the Board by rule 20 of the 1951 scheme "to support and maintain the solvency of the fund" is compatible with reductions in the benefits of members in accordance with the scheme's recommendations.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

• The applicants contended that the Board's obligation to support and maintain the solvency of the fund requires contributions that satisfy the statutory funding standard.
• They strongly argued that Company A bears sole responsibility for any increased contributions necessary to maintain solvency, and that members' benefits could not be reduced under any circumstances.
• On costs, the applicants submitted that they were successful on the main issues, particularly regarding the trigger for reviewing contributions, and thus should be awarded costs under section 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.

Respondent's Arguments

• Company A denied fault for the applicant committee becoming inquorate, citing efforts made to appoint new members despite difficulties.
• The respondent argued that the dispute was a genuine legal disagreement requiring opposing positions, and thus the matter should not be treated as an adversarial lis inter partes for cost purposes.
• On costs, the respondent submitted that the committee's costs had already been discharged and that, as is common in trust scheme supervisory cases, parties should bear their own costs.
• Reference was made to precedent where trustees' costs were borne by the scheme fund, with each party bearing its own costs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Vodafone v Kavanagh [2024] IEHC 280	Illustration that in trust scheme disputes, parties often bear their own costs, with trustees' costs borne by the scheme's fund.	The court referenced this case to support the position that parties in supervisory jurisdiction matters frequently bear their own costs, influencing the decision on costs in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court recognized the complexity of the issues raised by the parties and the difficulty in formulating concise orders reflecting the judgment's findings. The court emphasized that the review of contributions under rule 20(3) of the scheme is triggered only if Company A's contribution under rule 20(1) exceeds 3.6 times the members' contributions.

Given the absence of a quorum in the applicant committee and the resultant inability to obtain formal instructions, the court accepted submissions de bene esse and proceeded to make orders accordingly.

Regarding costs, the court carefully considered section 169(1) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, which generally entitles a wholly successful party to costs unless the court orders otherwise based on the nature and conduct of the proceedings. The court found that the dispute was a genuine legal disagreement requiring opposing positions and that neither party was entirely successful: the applicants succeeded on the first question but were largely unsuccessful on the second.

The court also noted that the scheme rules entitle the applicant committee to be indemnified from the scheme fund for its legal costs, but this did not preclude an order for costs against Company A if such were appropriate. Ultimately, the court concluded that each party should bear its own costs, reflecting the adversarial nature of the dispute and the supervisory jurisdiction context.

The court ordered corrections to typographical errors in the original judgment and directed that the final order incorporate the full text of the court's answers to the parties' questions as set out in the substantive judgment to preserve clarity and context.

Holding and Implications

The court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The court's decision clarified the interpretation of the scheme's funding obligations, particularly confirming that a review of contributions is triggered only when Company A's contributions exceed 3.6 times those of the members. The holding balanced the interests of both parties, resulting in a "score-draw" outcome on the substantive issues.

The order directs that the full context of the court's answers to the parties' questions be included in the final order to ensure clarity. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles governing costs and trust scheme supervisory jurisdiction. The decision resolves the immediate dispute without awarding costs to either party, reflecting the complexity and bona fide nature of the disagreement.