In the Matter of BD [A Ward of Court] (Approved)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application pursuant to section 55 of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (as amended) brought by the General Solicitor in respect of the Respondent, who is a ward of court. The Respondent, born in 1985, has a diagnosis of moderate intellectual disability and diabetes, and was admitted to wardship in 2020. He currently resides in a supported residence managed by a service provider that offers 24-hour care for persons with special needs. The application was initiated by motion on 10 January 2024, supported by affidavits detailing the Respondent's diagnosis, living situation, care arrangements, medical evidence, assets, and the procedural steps taken. The court’s role was to determine whether the Respondent lacks capacity in certain decision-making areas and whether he should be discharged from wardship with or without a decision-making representative (DMR) appointed.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Does the Respondent lack capacity in relation to health, personal welfare, and property and financial affairs?
2. If the Respondent lacks capacity, is there a suitable person available to act as a co-decision-maker under the 2015 Act?
3. Should the Respondent be discharged from wardship with the appointment of a decision-making representative due to the absence of a suitable co-decision-maker?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered uncontroverted medical evidence from the Consultant Psychiatrist, Dr H, who assessed the Respondent and concluded that he lacks capacity in relation to health, welfare, and financial decisions unless assisted by a suitable co-decision-maker. The Respondent’s inability to understand or manage his health conditions, finances, and daily activities was noted, alongside the high level of care he receives. The court also considered the independent social worker’s report, which highlighted the Respondent’s capabilities in certain household tasks but confirmed his difficulty understanding the wardship process and decision-making frameworks. Despite the Respondent’s expressed preference for a co-decision-maker employed by the service provider, such an appointment is prohibited under section 18(1)(f) of the 2015 Act. No other suitable co-decision-maker was available or willing to act. Given these circumstances and pursuant to sections 55(1)(b)(i), 55(4)(a), and 55(4)(ii) of the 2015 Act, the court determined that the Respondent should be discharged from wardship and a decision-making representative (DMR) appointed to manage his affairs, subject to statutory obligations ensuring joint decision-making where possible.

Holding and Implications

The court ordered that the Respondent be discharged from wardship pursuant to section 55(1)(b)(i) of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 and that Ms A, an experienced solicitor and qualified mediator, be appointed as decision-making representative pursuant to sections 55(4)(a) and 55(4)(ii).

The DMR is authorized to manage the Respondent’s assets, including monies held by the Accountant of the Courts of Justice, the General Solicitor’s committee account, and the Respondent’s bank and credit union accounts. The DMR must account to the Director of the Decision Support Service in accordance with section 46(6) of the Act. The Respondent’s Department of Social Protection payments are to be arranged to be paid directly to him, subject to review by the DMR within twelve months. The DMR is not entitled to remuneration or reimbursement of expenses from the Respondent’s assets under sections 42(1) and 42(2) of the Act, allowing alternative arrangements for fees and expenses. The Respondent’s capacity is to be reviewed by the Circuit Court within three years. The court emphasized that this decision will not affect the Respondent’s day-to-day care or social life, and acknowledged the Respondent’s strengths and the dedicated support provided by his care team. No new legal precedent was established; the ruling implements statutory provisions to balance protection and autonomy for the Respondent.