Seer, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, a 38-year-old man, pleaded guilty on 3 January 2024 at the Crown Court at Cardiff to strangulation contrary to section 75 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, and assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Both offences were committed in September 2022. On 10 January 2024, he was sentenced to 2 years and 7 months for strangulation and 12 months concurrently for the assault, totaling 31 months' imprisonment.

The Appellant had a significant criminal history with 22 convictions for 42 offences between June 2002 and June 2019, including battery, affray, common assault, robbery, and conspiracy to supply Class A drugs, for which he received an 8-year sentence in June 2019. He was released on licence and was on licence at the time of the offences. His relationship with the complainant began while he was in prison, corresponding with her. Following the offences, he was recalled to prison in October 2022 and spent approximately 30 months on licence before sentencing.

The sentencing judge declined to discount the sentence to account for time served on recall, stating it was inappropriate as the Appellant was released on licence. The appeal focuses on whether the judge erred in not exercising discretion to consider the delay between the report of the offences and the commencement of prosecution.

Factual circumstances reveal the Appellant and complainant had a relationship initiated through correspondence during the Appellant’s imprisonment. After release on 8 September 2022, the complainant reported a change in the Appellant’s behaviour. On 19 September 2022, during a stay at a caravan park, the Appellant behaved aggressively, culminating in two episodes of strangulation causing bruising and pain to the complainant. The complainant initially did not report the matter to police due to the Appellant’s influence but later reported it following encouragement from her daughter. The Appellant surrendered to police on 4 October 2022, denied the allegations in interview, and was recalled to prison.

There was a delay of approximately 12 to 13 months between the initial police contact and the sending of a postal requisition in November 2023, with no explanation provided for this delay. The Appellant initially pleaded not guilty in Magistrates' Court, but later pleaded guilty at the Crown Court, entitling him to a 25% plea discount.

Regarding sentencing, the judge relied on R v Cook [2023] EWCA Crim 452 for the starting point of 18 months for strangulation, adjusted for aggravating and mitigating factors, resulting in a sentence of 3 years reduced to 2 years and 7 months after plea discount. The assault occasioning actual bodily harm was sentenced concurrently for 12 months. No discount was given for the recall period or prosecution delay.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentence imposed was excessive given the starting point of 18 months for strangulation and the guilty plea.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in refusing to exercise discretion to discount the sentence to account for the delay between the report of offences and the commencement of prosecution, particularly in light of the Appellant’s recall status.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Cook [2023] EWCA Crim 452; [2023] 4 WLR 71	Starting point for sentencing strangulation offences.	The court adopted the starting point of 18 months for strangulation, adjusting for aggravating and mitigating factors.
R v Castello [2010] EWCA Crim 371; [2011] 1 WLR 638	Sentencing principles relating to concurrent and consecutive sentences and the effect of continuing custody.	Emphasised that sentences start when pronounced and that a sentence cannot be consecutive to a continuing sentence; any term can only count towards one sentence.
R v Kerrigan [2014] EWCA Crim 2348; [2015] 1 Cr App R (S) 29	Discretion to reduce sentence for excessive delay despite recall status.	The court recognized that while recall is generally irrelevant, a judge may exercise discretion to reduce sentence for delay in prosecution.
R v Phillips [2015] 2 Cr App R (S) 9	Followed the approach in Kerrigan regarding delay and recall.	Supported the principle that delay can justify sentence reduction despite recall.
R v Christie [2019] EWCA Crim 1386; [2019] 2 Cr App R 54	Further confirmation of discretion to discount sentence for delay.	The court confirmed the judge’s discretion to reduce sentence for delay, but found no error in the judge’s refusal to do so in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged the serious nature of the offences, including the persistence of the strangulation, aggravating factors such as previous convictions, domestic setting, and the fact that the Appellant was on licence. The judge’s starting point for strangulation was based on established precedent (R v Cook) and adjusted for aggravating and mitigating factors, including the Appellant’s young children and efforts to address behaviour in prison.

The court considered the delay of 12 to 13 months between investigation conclusion and prosecution commencement. It recognized the statutory sentencing regime (R v Castello), which restricts consecutive sentencing to continuing sentences and prevents double counting of imprisonment terms.

Principles from R v Kerrigan and related cases establish that recall status generally does not affect sentencing for new offences, but a judge retains discretion to reduce sentence for excessive delay. The court found that the sentencing judge was entitled to exercise discretion not to discount the sentence for delay or recall, especially given the Appellant’s denial of guilt and the necessity of careful consideration before prosecution commenced.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion was not justiciably wrong, and the appeal was dismissed on this basis.

Holding and Implications

The appeal against sentence is DISMISSED.

The court upheld the original sentence of 2 years and 7 months for strangulation and 12 months concurrent for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The refusal to discount the sentence for time served on recall or prosecution delay was affirmed. This decision directly affects the parties by confirming the sentence imposed but does not establish new legal precedent beyond reaffirming existing principles governing recall and sentencing discretion.