Suleman, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, aged 28 at the time of sentencing, pleaded guilty on 14 April 2023 at the Central Criminal Court to one offence of preparation of terrorist acts contrary to section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006. This was in connection with his travel from the United Kingdom to join the so-called Islamic State ("IS") in Syria. Two other terrorism-related counts were allowed to lie on the file but properly taken into account in sentencing. On 26 May 2023, the Appellant was sentenced by the Recorder of London to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 9 years and 6 months, reduced by 596 days spent in custody. He appealed against the sentence on two grounds: (i) the judge incorrectly categorised the offence under the applicable Sentencing Guideline, and (ii) the judge erred in concluding that the Appellant met the criteria for dangerousness warranting a life sentence.

The offence was committed in August 2014 when the Appellant was 18 years old. While on a family holiday in Turkey, he attempted to cross into Syria to join IS with the ambition of becoming a sniper. Although detained by Turkish authorities, he deliberately chose to be part of a prisoner swap with IS rather than being deported to the UK. Analysis of his computers showed extensive engagement with IS propaganda prior to departure, including sharing extremist material on social media and encouraging others to view violent jihadist content.

The Appellant communicated with his family about his plans, expressing his intention to join IS and become a sniper. Upon reaching Syria, he joined IS, undertaking roles including Military Police and armed guard duty, which required him to demonstrate willingness to use violence. He was also active on social media, disseminating IS propaganda and encouraging others to join. After 5 to 6 months, he became disillusioned and sought to leave but was prevented from doing so. He was eventually captured by a faction of the Free Syrian Army, transferred to Turkey, then Pakistan, and finally arrested upon arrival in the UK in September 2021.

In his plea, the Appellant accepted knowledge of IS as a proscribed violent organisation, admitted weapons training and guard duties, but denied active fighting. He stated he was imprisoned by IS for refusing to fight and for suspected ideological divergence. At sentencing, he was 27, with no previous convictions. The offence under section 5 focused on preparation to engage in terrorism, specifically the intention to become a sniper for IS, and included his deliberate actions to achieve this despite detention and other obstacles.

The Crown identified aggravating factors including the Appellant's conduct in Syria, prior extremist contacts, use of encrypted communications, possession and sharing of extremist material, and failure to heed police warnings. Mitigating factors included his youth at the time of the offence, good character, and voluntary distancing from IS. The judge applied the applicable Sentencing Guideline effective from 1 October 2022, categorising the offence as culpability B and harm level 2 (category B2), which the Appellant challenged on appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising the offence under the Sentencing Guideline, specifically whether harm should have been assessed as level 3 rather than level 2.
2. Whether the judge erred in concluding that the Appellant met the criteria for dangerousness justifying a life sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The offence was wrongly categorised; harm level should be 3, not 2, because the likelihood of multiple deaths was low.
• The judge failed to consider the Appellant’s immaturity and bravado, the fact that no combat duties were carried out, and that no harm actually occurred.
• The sentencing guidelines are primarily aimed at preparatory acts within the jurisdiction, not acts committed abroad.
• The judge should not have found the Appellant dangerous due to his immaturity at the time and his voluntary return to the UK, which indicated maturation and reduced risk.
• The judge failed to properly explain why mitigating factors did not outweigh the dangerousness finding, warranting a determinate sentence rather than life imprisonment.

Prosecution's Arguments

• The categorisation as harm level 2 was correct, based on the Appellant’s intention to become a sniper and the risk of multiple deaths if the plan had succeeded.
• By analogy to cases where terrorism preparation is thwarted by law enforcement, culpability and harm should be assessed based on intended harm, not on whether the offence was completed.
• The judge applied the correct legal test for dangerousness and was entitled to conclude the Appellant posed a significant risk of serious harm.
• Precedent establishes that findings of dangerousness will not be disturbed unless the judge applied incorrect principles or reached an unjustifiable conclusion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Boular and Boular [2019] EWCA Crim 798	Assessment of culpability based on offender's intended actions and consequences, not on whether offence was prevented.	The court adopted the approach that culpability and harm assessment focus on intended actions and risk, supporting the categorisation of harm level 2 despite the offence not being completed.
R v Lang	Consideration of future conduct and maturation in sentencing young offenders for life sentences.	The Appellant’s youth and potential for maturation were relevant mitigating factors in assessing dangerousness, but did not outweigh the risk found by the judge.
R v Choudhury [2016] EWCA Crim 1341	Appellate courts will not interfere with dangerousness findings unless incorrect principles applied or conclusions unjustified.	The court found the sentencing judge applied correct principles and reached a justified conclusion on dangerousness, thus refusing to interfere.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully analysed the sentencing judge’s categorisation of the offence under the Sentencing Guideline, focusing on culpability and harm. The judge correctly placed the offence in category B2, reflecting culpability B and harm level 2, because the Appellant intended to become a sniper, a role involving the risk of multiple deaths. The court accepted the analogy to thwarted terrorism preparations, emphasising that culpability and harm are assessed based on the offender’s intention and the risk posed if the plan had succeeded, rather than the actual outcome.

The court found the judge’s approach to be impeccable, having considered all defence submissions including the Appellant’s immaturity, lack of combat engagement, and eventual disillusionment with IS. The judge’s categorisation was justified and consistent with the guideline’s definitions.

Regarding dangerousness, the court noted the judge applied the correct legal test, considering the detailed pre-sentence report and all available evidence, including the Appellant’s varying accounts of his time in Syria and motivations. The judge acknowledged the Appellant’s youth and immaturity but balanced these against concerns about his mindset, attitude to violence, and lack of full disclosure.

The court emphasised that the judge conducted a holistic assessment, weighing positive and negative factors, including character references and the pre-sentence report author’s concerns about the Appellant’s risk to the public. The judge’s finding of dangerousness was supported by the material and was not shown to be erroneous or unjustified.

The appellate court declined to interfere with the judge’s assessment, endorsing the conclusion that the Appellant posed a significant risk of serious harm and that a life sentence was appropriate.

Holding and Implications

The appeal against sentence is DISMISSED.

The court upheld the life sentence imposed by the sentencing judge, confirming the categorisation of the offence as category B2 under the Sentencing Guideline and the finding of dangerousness. The direct effect is that the Appellant remains subject to life imprisonment with the minimum term set by the Recorder of London. No new precedent was established; the decision reinforces established principles regarding sentencing for terrorism offences committed abroad, assessment of harm and culpability based on intention, and the approach to dangerousness findings in sentencing young offenders.