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Framus Ltd & Ors v C.R.H Plc & Ors (Approved)
Factual and Procedural Background
The present case concerns four motions brought by several respondent companies seeking to have the appeals of three appellant companies struck out due to inordinate and/or inexcusable delay and/or want of prosecution. The underlying proceedings, initiated on 4 December 1996 by the appellant companies, alleged anti-competitive and cartel activities by the respondents dating back approximately thirty years, primarily between 1990 and 1993. The appellants claimed that the respondents colluded in the construction sector in Ireland to the detriment of the appellant companies.
The High Court, in 2012, dismissed the appellants' proceedings for inordinate and inexcusable delay. The appellants appealed this decision, but the appeals have experienced significant procedural difficulties, including questions over the authority of liquidators to pursue appeals on behalf of two of the appellant companies, Amantiss Enterprises Limited and Wilbury Limited, both in voluntary liquidation. The Supreme Court struck out the appeals of these two companies in 2013, with a stay of execution that expired in July 2014, effectively ending those appeals.
The appeal of the first appellant, Framus Limited, remains extant but has been subject to prolonged inactivity and delay. The appellants' solicitors came off record in June 2021, and an application by a director and creditor of the appellant companies, Mr. Seamus Maye, to independently represent the appellant companies was refused by the Court of Appeal in December 2021.
The respondents have applied to the Court of Appeal to strike out the appeals on grounds of delay and want of prosecution. The Court considered extensive affidavit evidence from both parties regarding the history, delay, and alleged prejudice arising from the protracted litigation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appeals of the appellant companies should be struck out due to inordinate and inexcusable delay and/or want of prosecution.
- Whether the Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to strike out the appeals in the interests of justice and basic fairness of procedures under Bunreacht na hÉireann.
- Whether leave should be granted to a director and creditor of the appellant companies to independently represent them in the appeal proceedings.
- Whether any preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is warranted concerning the compatibility of the Maintenance and Embracery Act 1634 with EU law.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellants contended that the delay was excusable due to financial difficulties (impecuniosity) and health issues affecting Mr. Seamus Maye.
- They alleged that the respondents employed procedural tactics and threats, including threatening the liquidator with personal liability for costs, which frustrated efforts to progress the proceedings.
- They argued that the complexity of the proceedings deterred solicitors from representing them and that the appellants had difficulty accessing justice as laypersons.
- The appellants claimed that the respondents' conduct weighed against striking out the appeals and that there were strong grounds for the appeal to succeed, particularly regarding alleged bias of the High Court judge.
- They submitted that prejudice should not be heavily weighed in the balance of justice at this stage, as the appeals had not been heard and any prejudice would be addressed at trial.
- They sought a preliminary reference to the CJEU regarding the Maintenance and Embracery Act 1634 and its compatibility with EU law.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents submitted that the delay in prosecuting the appeals, particularly of the first appellant, was inordinate and inexcusable, spanning several years of inactivity.
- They contended that impecuniosity and health issues do not constitute exceptional circumstances to excuse delay or justify independent representation by a non-lawyer.
- They argued that the appellants had ample opportunity and legal representation for many years and that the delay was a conscious decision not to progress the appeals.
- The respondents emphasized the significant prejudice arising from the delay, including the unavailability, death, or poor health of key witnesses and the complexity of the economic analysis required for the claims.
- They maintained that the appeals of the second and third appellants stand struck out as of July 2014 and that there is no jurisdiction to revive them.
- The respondents denied any improper conduct or threats in their dealings with the liquidators and asserted that their actions were proper steps to protect their interests.
- They submitted that the balance of justice favors striking out the appeals to prevent further delay and prejudice, consistent with constitutional and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) principles.
- They opposed any preliminary reference to the CJEU, noting no properly framed question was before the Court and that the issue was raised too late.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Desmond v. MGN Ltd. [2009] 1 I.R. 737 | Delay in commercial litigation and tolerance of delay periods. | Used to analogize the delay in the present case as excessive and inordinate. |
| Anglo Irish Beef Processors v. Montgomery [2002] 3 I.R. 510 | Principles on delay and want of prosecution. | Supported the finding of inordinate delay and the need for expeditious prosecution. |
| Stephens v. Flynn Ltd. [2005] IEHC 148 | Delay in prosecution and consequences. | Referenced in assessing the nature of delay in the proceedings. |
| O'Connor v. John Player [High Court Record No. 1997 15903P] | Delay and procedural fairness. | Considered in relation to delay and fairness of trial. |
| Battle v. Irish Art Promotion Centre Ltd. [1968] I.R. 252 | Representation of companies by non-lawyers only in exceptional circumstances. | Applied to refuse leave for independent representation by a director. |
| Allied Irish Banks Plc v. Aqua Fresh Fish Ltd. [2019] 1 I.R. 517 | Impecuniosity does not constitute exceptional circumstances for independent representation. | Reaffirmed the rule against non-lawyer representation except in exceptional cases. |
| Gaultier v. Registrar of Companies, Gaultier v. Allied Irish Banks Plc [2019] IESC 89 | Confirmed the principles regarding company representation and impecuniosity. | Supported refusal of independent representation absent exceptional circumstances. |
| Gallagher v. Letterkenny General Hospital & Ors [2019] IECA 156 | Distinction between understandable and excusable delay; impecuniosity not excusing delay. | Applied to reject impecuniosity as a valid excuse for delay in prosecution. |
| Millerick v. Minister for Finance [2016] IECA 206 | Delay presumed prejudicial; moderate prejudice sufficient for dismissal. | Used to support the conclusion that delay caused prejudice warranting dismissal. |
| Manning v. Benson and Hedges Ltd. [2004] IEHC 316 | Delay and prejudice to fair trial. | Referenced in relation to evidential difficulties caused by delay. |
| Gorman v. Minister for Justice [2015] IECA 41 | Delay and its impact on trial fairness. | Supported findings of prejudice due to delay. |
| Clare Manor Hotel v. Dublin City Council [2018] IESC 41 | Long delay as grounds for dismissal. | Reinforced the principle that lengthy delay can justify dismissal. |
| Kenny v. Motor Network Ltd. t/a Jennings Truck Centre & J Harris Assemblers [2020] IECA 114 | Delay and prejudice in oral evidence cases; constitutional obligations on timely justice. | Applied to confirm dismissal for delay where prejudice to fair trial was evident. |
| McNamee v. Boyce [2017] 1 I.L.R.M. 168 | Unavailability of witness and fair trial. | Considered in relation to witness unavailability prejudicing trial fairness. |
| Leech v. Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd [2017] IECA 8 | Impact of witness unavailability on fair trial. | Referenced in support of prejudice arguments. |
| Cassidy v. The Provincialate [2015] IECA 74 | Prejudice from death of key witness. | Applied to demonstrate significant prejudice to defendant. |
| Primor plc v. Stokes Kennedy Crowley [1996] 2 I.R. 459 | Test for striking out proceedings for want of prosecution; balance of justice approach. | Primary test applied to determine dismissal of appeal for delay. |
| Hay v. O'Grady [1992] 1 I.R. 210 | Appellate court's deference to trial court's findings of fact. | Referenced to affirm trial court's findings on delay and dismissal. |
| Department of Transport v. Chris Smaller (Transport) Ltd. [1989] A.C. 1197 | Seriousness of dismissal for want of prosecution. | Referenced to caution against light use of dismissal orders. |
| Comcast International Holdings v. Minister for Public Enterprise [2012] IESC 50 | Consideration of bias/perception of bias in judicial proceedings. | Raised by appellants but found not determinative of dismissal for delay. |
| McFarlane v. Ireland, App no. 31333/06 (ECtHR, 2010) | Reasonableness of length of proceedings under Article 6 ECHR. | Referenced in assessing delay and fairness of proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court acknowledged the extensive procedural history and the serious allegations underlying the proceedings, noting that the High Court had previously found the delay in prosecuting the original proceedings to be inordinate and inexcusable. The Court examined the delay in prosecuting the appeals, particularly focusing on the period from May 2014 to February 2020, during which no substantive steps were taken to progress the appeal of the first appellant.
The Court found that the delay was clearly inordinate and that the excuses proffered by the appellants—difficulty in procuring evidence, financial difficulties, and health problems of a director—did not constitute excusable reasons. The Court rejected the argument that difficulty in obtaining evidence justified suspension of proceedings, emphasizing the obligation to prosecute cases expeditiously.
The Court also reaffirmed settled law that impecuniosity does not excuse delay and that a company cannot be represented in court by a non-lawyer except in exceptional circumstances, none of which were found here. The health issues of the director were not sufficient to excuse the delay, particularly given his involvement in other business activities during the period of inactivity.
The Court gave significant weight to the prejudice faced by the respondents as a result of the delay, including the death and ill-health of key witnesses, the passage of nearly four decades since the events, and the complexity of the economic issues involved. It held that these factors rendered a fair trial unlikely.
The Court considered the conduct of the parties and found no culpable acquiescence by the respondents in the delay. The respondents were under no obligation to take steps to progress the appeal and their silence or inactivity did not amount to acquiescence.
Regarding the appeals of the second and third appellants, the Court held that the Supreme Court's 2013 Order striking out those appeals with a stay of execution had expired in July 2014, and no steps had been taken to regularise or revive those appeals. Accordingly, those appeals stand struck out.
The Court further declined to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU on the question of the Maintenance and Embracery Act 1634, finding no properly framed question of EU law was before it requiring such a reference.
In balancing all factors, including the nature of the underlying claims, the lengthy delay, the lack of excusable reasons, the prejudice to respondents, and the conduct of the parties, the Court concluded that the justice of the case requires dismissal of the appeal of the first appellant.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED the appeal of the first named appellant company, Framus Limited, on grounds of inordinate and inexcusable delay and want of prosecution. The appeals of the second and third named appellants, Amantiss Enterprises Limited and Wilbury Limited, stand struck out with effect from 9 July 2014 pursuant to the Supreme Court's earlier Order.
The Court refused leave for Mr. Seamus Maye to independently represent the appellant companies, applying settled legal principles that only in exceptional circumstances may a non-lawyer represent a company in court, none of which were present here.
The Court ordered that the respondents are entitled to costs of their motions to dismiss, subject to any differing costs applications within 21 days.
No new precedent was established; the decision applies established principles concerning delay, want of prosecution, company representation, and procedural fairness. The direct effect is the termination of the appeals, effectively ending the litigation initiated by the appellant companies.
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