Marouf, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant is a Palestinian refugee from the Syrian conflict who currently resides in Lebanon. Although she fulfils the vulnerability criteria for the United Kingdom’s Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (“the Resettlement Scheme”), the Scheme relies exclusively on referrals from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”). Because Palestinian refugees fall under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (“UNRWA”), the Appellant was in practice excluded from consideration.

The Appellant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the Secretary of State’s implementation of the Resettlement Scheme. At first instance, Judge [Last Name] dismissed the discrimination claim but held that the Secretary of State had breached the public sector equality duty (“PSED”) in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Appellant’s discrimination appeal and allowed the Secretary of State’s cross-appeal on the PSED issue. The Supreme Court granted permission to appeal solely on whether section 149 has extraterritorial effect; permission to challenge the substantive discrimination finding was refused.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the PSED in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 applies to the exercise of public functions that affect persons outside the United Kingdom.
2. If section 149 is not wholly extraterritorial, whether it nonetheless has limited extraterritorial effect co-extensive with any substantive provisions (in particular section 29(6) as extended by section 29(9)).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The presumption against the extraterritorial effect of legislation should carry little weight where Parliament is pursuing universally recognised equality goals.
• Section 149 should be construed as applying wherever a UK public authority exercises its functions, even if the impact is overseas; any practical difficulties are mitigated by the flexible concept of “due regard”.
• Alternatively, section 149(1)(a) should have extraterritorial scope at least to the same extent as section 29(6) (read with section 29(9)), because the duty of process must mirror the substantive discrimination prohibition.
• Precedents such as Bilta and Al-Skeini show that when necessary to fulfil legislative purpose, the court should interpret statutes to have extraterritorial reach.

Secretary of State's Arguments

• The well-entrenched presumption against extraterritoriality applies; nothing in the Equality Act 2010 displaces it for section 149.
• Requiring UK public bodies to take account of equality implications for persons worldwide would be impracticable and outside Parliament’s contemplated remit.
• The PSED is aimed at promoting equality within the United Kingdom; section 29(9) shows Parliament legislated narrowly when it wished to confer limited overseas reach.
• Divisional Court decisions in Hottak and Hoareau were wrong to assume extraterritorial effect without analysing the presumption; they should not be followed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge [Last Name] (writing for a unanimous panel) commenced with the long-standing presumption that UK statutes do not apply extraterritorially unless Parliament clearly indicates otherwise. Section 149 contains no express words rebutting that presumption. Unlike section 29(9), which grants a specific and limited overseas reach concerning entry clearance decisions, section 149 is framed in general terms and imposes process-oriented duties that are designed for domestic accountability.

The Court rejected the Appellant’s reliance on Bilta and similar cases, holding that the purpose of the Equality Act can be fully achieved within the United Kingdom. Extending the PSED worldwide would oblige a vast range of UK public bodies to consider how to eliminate discrimination, advance equality, and foster good relations in jurisdictions where they have no practical influence and where local norms may conflict with UK standards—an outcome Parliament cannot have intended.

Prior Divisional Court rulings (Hottak and Hoareau) were criticised for accepting extraterritorial effect without analysing the presumption or the practical incoherence that would follow. The Court endorsed the Court of Appeal’s view that the substantive discrimination prohibition in section 29(6) (as modified by section 29(9)) can, in limited circumstances, apply to decisions taken abroad that are integral to granting entry clearance, but drew a clear line between those substantive provisions and the PSED.

On the Appellant’s alternative submission—that section 149(1)(a) should apply overseas wherever section 29(6) does—the Court found no textual or purposive basis for such partial extension. Introducing a nuanced overseas reach for only one limb of section 149 would create serious uncertainty and would likely have been made explicit by Parliament had it been intended.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed.

The Supreme Court held that the public sector equality duty in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 does not apply extraterritorially. Consequently, public authorities are not required to have “due regard” to the statutory equality objectives when their functions affect individuals outside the United Kingdom. The decision overrules or disapproves earlier first-instance authority suggesting otherwise. The immediate effect is that the Secretary of State’s reliance on UNHCR referrals—despite excluding Palestinian refugees—does not breach the PSED. More broadly, the judgment clarifies that section 149 is a domestic accountability mechanism and sets no new precedent for overseas equality obligations.