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Riley v Murray
Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns a libel action initiated by the Plaintiff, a well-known television presenter with a significant social media following, against the Defendant, who was the Stakeholder Manager for a prominent political figure and also active on Twitter. The dispute arose from a tweet posted by the Defendant alleging that the Plaintiff had stated that the political figure deserved to be violently attacked. The Plaintiff had earlier posted a tweet (the "Good Advice Tweet") referencing a previous tweet by a third party, which was ambiguous and provoked mixed reactions. The Defendant posted a tweet (the "Defendant’s Tweet") asserting that the Plaintiff endorsed violence against the political figure, which the Plaintiff contended was defamatory.
At trial, the court determined the natural and ordinary meaning of the Defendant’s Tweet and found it to contain both factual allegations and expressions of opinion. The Defendant’s statutory defences of truth, honest opinion, and publication on a matter of public interest were rejected by the trial judge. Damages were awarded to the Plaintiff but reduced due to the ambiguous nature of the Plaintiff’s original tweet. The Defendant was granted permission to appeal against the rejection of the statutory defences, while the Plaintiff filed a respondent’s notice seeking to uphold the trial decision on alternative grounds.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Defendant’s Tweet was substantially true, engaging the defence of truth under section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013.
- Whether the Defendant’s Tweet constituted an honest opinion under section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013, including whether the statement indicated the basis of the opinion and whether an honest person could have held that opinion.
- Whether the Defendant’s publication was on a matter of public interest and whether the Defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement was in the public interest under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25 | Single meaning rule in defamation; determination of natural and ordinary meaning of words. | Applied to determine that the Defendant’s Tweet conveyed a single defamatory meaning comprising factual allegations and an opinion. |
| Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157 | Recognition of artificiality in single meaning rule due to possible multiple interpretations by readers. | Referenced to support the approach to meaning and ambiguity of the Good Advice Tweet. |
| Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd [2000] EWCA Civ 338, [2001] 1 WLR 579 | Conduct of claimant as relevant background for damages assessment in defamation cases. | Applied to reduce damages due to the Plaintiff’s provocative conduct in posting the ambiguous Good Advice Tweet. |
| Begg v BBC [2016] EWHC 2688 (QB) | Approach to truth defence; substantial truth and flexibility beyond the single meaning rule. | Considered but distinguished; court held that the present case differs in that the defamatory allegation was an express statement, not an implied meaning. |
| Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17, [2020] AC 593 | Deference to trial judge’s findings on meaning in defamation cases. | Applied to uphold trial judge’s findings on the meanings reasonably drawn from the Good Advice Tweet. |
| Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 AC 852 | Common law defence of fair comment; conditions for honest opinion defence. | Used to interpret the Basis Condition and Objective Honesty Condition under section 3 of the 2013 Act. |
| Burki v SeventyThirty Ltd [2018] EWHC 2151 (QB) | Requirement that honest opinion defence cannot succeed if the factual basis is false. | Discussed as persuasive authority supporting the trial judge’s interpretation of section 3. |
| Serafin v Malkiewicz [2020] UKSC 23, [2020] 1 WLR 2455 | Use of explanatory notes and context in statutory interpretation of Defamation Act 2013. | Referenced to justify considering explanatory notes when construing section 3(4)(a). |
| Economou v de Freitas [2018] EWCA Civ 2591, [2019] EMLR 7 | Elements of the public interest defence under section 4; reasonableness of belief. | Applied to analyse whether the Defendant reasonably believed publication was in the public interest. |
| Riley v Sivier [2021] EWCA Civ 713, [2021] 4 WLR 84 | Scope of public interest in defamation; public conduct of public figures. | Applied to confirm that the Plaintiff’s conduct on Twitter was a matter of public interest. |
| Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 | Definition of matters of public interest; limits on private and personal matters. | Referenced to support broad definition of public interest encompassing public life and conduct. |
| Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 AC 273 | Approval of Reynolds principles on public interest. | Referenced in support of public interest analysis. |
| Bonnick v Morris [2002] UKPC 31, [2003] 1 AC 300 | Reasonableness of journalist’s perception of meaning in public interest defence. | Considered regarding ambiguity’s impact on reasonableness of belief in public interest defence. |
| Banks v Cadwalladr [2022] EWHC 1417 (QB) | Application of Bonnick principles to public interest defence in context of ambiguity. | Applied to support that a reasonable belief must consider obvious alternative meanings. |
| Yeo v Times Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWHC 3375 (QB), [2017] EMLR 1 | Editorial judgment and fairness in public interest defence. | Distinguished on facts; court confirmed that misrepresentation may undermine public interest defence. |
| Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5, [2014] FSR 29 | Standards for appellate review of factual and evaluative decisions. | Applied to assess the standard for overturning the trial judge’s evaluative decision on reasonableness. |
| Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3, [2022] 2 WLR 343 | Use of contextual materials including explanatory notes in statutory interpretation. | Referenced to support use of explanatory notes in construing Defamation Act 2013 provisions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court of Appeal undertook a detailed analysis of the statutory defences under the Defamation Act 2013 in light of the facts and findings at trial. It began by affirming the trial judge’s application of the single meaning rule to determine the defamatory meaning of the Defendant’s Tweet, which included a factual allegation that the Plaintiff had publicly stated that the political figure deserved to be violently attacked, and an opinion that the Plaintiff was dangerous and stupid.
On the defence of truth, the court held that the Defendant’s Tweet was not substantially true because it presented an unequivocal factual statement that the Plaintiff had made, whereas the original Good Advice Tweet was ambiguous and capable of multiple reasonable interpretations. The Defendant’s Tweet misrepresented this ambiguity by asserting one interpretation as an undisputed fact, which materially increased the harm to the Plaintiff’s reputation. The court rejected the Defendant’s argument relying on the Begg case, distinguishing the present case on the basis that the defamatory allegation was an express statement rather than an implied meaning.
Regarding the defence of honest opinion, the court analysed the statutory conditions: the statement must be an opinion, indicate the basis of the opinion, and an honest person must be able to hold that opinion based on facts existing at the time. The court agreed with the trial judge that the Defendant’s Tweet satisfied the first two conditions, but not the third. The opinion was expressly premised on the truth of the factual allegation, which was false. The court considered the common law background and explanatory notes, concluding that the factual basis indicated in the statement must be true or privileged for the defence to succeed. The court rejected the Defendant’s argument for a literal interpretation that would allow an honest opinion defence based on unrelated facts, emphasizing the need to preserve coherence with common law principles.
On the defence of publication on a matter of public interest, the court held that the Defendant’s Tweet concerned a matter of public interest given the Plaintiff’s public profile and the political context. The Defendant honestly believed publication was in the public interest. However, the court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that this belief was unreasonable because the Defendant’s Tweet misrepresented the Good Advice Tweet by omitting its ambiguity and presenting a misleading, unequivocal factual allegation. The court emphasized that it was unreasonable for the Defendant to disregard the obvious alternative interpretation and to omit the original tweet or accurate context, which was a deliberate editorial choice. The court also rejected arguments that proper allowance was not made for editorial judgment or the provocative nature of the Plaintiff’s conduct, finding the Judge’s reasoning cogent and unassailable.
Holding and Implications
The Court of Appeal DISMISSED the Defendant’s appeal, thereby upholding the trial judge’s rejection of the statutory defences of truth, honest opinion, and publication on a matter of public interest.
The direct consequence of this decision is that the Defendant remains liable for defamation based on the Defendant’s Tweet as published. The Plaintiff’s reputation is vindicated in respect of the defamatory imputation that she publicly endorsed violence against the political figure. The ruling does not establish new legal precedent but confirms the application of established principles concerning ambiguity, the requirements of truth and honest opinion defences under the Defamation Act 2013, and the standards for reasonableness in the public interest defence in the context of social media publications by public figures.
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