AB v Public Prosecution Service

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a prosecution by the Public Prosecution Service ("PPS") against the Defendant/Appellant ("the appellant"), who was 16 years old at the time of the hearing on 25 February 2021. The appellant faced two charges: disorderly behaviour contrary to Article 18(1)(a) of the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987, and resisting a constable in the execution of his duty contrary to section 66(1) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998. Following a contested trial, the Youth Court found the appellant guilty on both counts and subsequently dealt with sentencing. The appellant’s solicitor applied for a case stated pursuant to Article 146 of the Magistrates’ Court (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, challenging the legal correctness of the Youth Court’s determination that the police were acting in the due execution of their duty at the relevant time.

The case stated summarized the facts: On 5 August 2020, two police constables were tasked to locate the appellant, reported missing from a children’s home in Lurgan and considered at high risk of child sexual exploitation. The officers found the appellant at an address in Lurgan and decided it was unsafe for her to remain there. Initially compliant, the appellant’s behaviour escalated outside the property, leading to the use of force to place her into a police vehicle. Body-worn camera footage showed the appellant’s resistance and the officers’ restraint. The officers applied handcuffs and limb restraints for safety and transported the appellant first with the intention to return her to the children’s home, and later to the police station. The officers did not caution the appellant during these events and were unclear about the timing or communication of her arrest. The officers asserted they relied on an unspecified "common law" power to restrain and detain the appellant but could not identify its source. The Youth Court panel found that despite some procedural shortcomings, the officers acted in the best interests of the appellant and under their general duty to protect the public, specifically a vulnerable youth, and concluded that the restraint and detention were lawful.

The legal question posed to the Court of Appeal was whether the Youth Court was correct in law to determine that the police were acting in the due execution of their duty at the time the offences were allegedly committed.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the police officers were acting in the due execution of their duty when they required the appellant to get into the police car and transported her against her will.
2. Whether the officers had lawful authority, statutory or common law, to restrain and detain the appellant under the circumstances.
3. Whether the charges of disorderly behaviour and resisting arrest were sustainable if the police were not acting in the execution of their duty.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The police officers had no statutory or identifiable common law power to restrain and detain the appellant forcibly.
• The officers claimed to act under an unspecified common law power but failed to identify or justify it.
• There was no evidence from the body-worn footage that the appellant had been lawfully arrested.
• The officers did not reassess their initial plan to take the appellant to a place of safety in accordance with Article 65 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995.
• Therefore, the officers were not acting in the due execution of their duty, and the charges should be dismissed under the first limb of R v Galbraith.
• The appellant was entitled to resist the officers if they acted outside their lawful authority.

Prosecution's Arguments

• The officers acted in the due execution of their duty to protect a vulnerable youth.
• The escalation of the appellant’s behaviour necessitated the use of force and restraint.
• Although the officers could not explicitly cite Article 65 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, their actions were consistent with the powers it confers.
• The officers assessed the risk of significant harm to the appellant and acted accordingly to remove her to a place of safety.
• The officers’ general duty under section 32(1) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 to protect life and property, preserve order, and prevent offences supported their actions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeal carefully examined the limited factual record provided by the case stated and the body-worn camera footage. It recognized the appellant’s status as a vulnerable young person reported missing from a children’s home and the police officers’ concerns about significant risk of harm, including child sexual exploitation.

The Court noted the absence of clear statutory or common law authority cited by the officers for their coercive actions, but found that Article 65 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 was the most relevant statutory provision. Article 65 empowers a constable, where there is reasonable cause to believe a child is at risk of significant harm, to remove the child to suitable accommodation and keep them there.

The Court acknowledged a possible textual difficulty with the phrase "and keep him there" in Article 65(1)(a) but rejected a restrictive interpretation that would exclude returning the appellant to the children’s home. The Court considered the circumstances an emergency justifying the officers’ actions within the spirit and purpose of Article 65.

Additionally, the Court rejected reliance on section 32(1) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 as conferring specific powers, emphasizing it only sets out general police functions rather than individual coercive powers.

Regarding common law powers, the Court considered the doctrine of breach of the peace, as elucidated in R v Howell and R (Laporte), and concluded that the facts did not support the police acting under such powers because the appellant was not engaged in or about to engage in conduct amounting to a breach of the peace. The police’s intention was protective rather than punitive or preventive of public disorder.

The Court further endorsed a purposive interpretation of Article 65, supported by the English case Langley v Liverpool City Council, to allow police to act swiftly to protect a child at risk outside normal office hours.

The Court also recognized that a common law power analogous to Article 65 likely exists, permitting police to act to protect vulnerable children in emergency situations.

Ultimately, the Court held that the police officers had lawful authority to require the appellant to enter the police car and transport her to the children’s home, and that the officers were acting in the due execution of their duty at the material time. The Court noted that issues of the use of force and lawful arrest were not before it for determination.

Holding and Implications

The Court of Appeal answered the question posed in the affirmative, holding that the police officers were acting in the due execution of their duty when they required the appellant to enter the police car and transported her to the children’s home.

The Court upheld the convictions for disorderly behaviour and resisting a constable in the execution of his duty. It confirmed that resistance by the appellant under these circumstances was not justified, given the lawful authority of the police.

The decision directly affects the parties by affirming the lawfulness of the police actions and the resulting convictions. No broader precedent beyond the facts of this case was established, and the Court clarified that issues relating to the use of force or the lawfulness of arrest remain open for separate civil proceedings if pursued by the appellant.