Chilvers, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Applicant was convicted on 1 November 2019 in the Crown Court at Manchester before Judge Field Q.C. and a jury of three offences: controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship contrary to section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (count 1), assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (count 7), and damaging property contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (count 8). The offences related to conduct towards the Complainant between December 2015 and August 2017, involving a pattern of controlling and abusive behaviour, physical assault, and property damage.

The Applicant was sentenced on 19 December 2019 to 18 months' imprisonment on count 1, with concurrent sentences of three months and one month on counts 7 and 8 respectively. He was acquitted on other counts including rape and assault by penetration. An application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused. The Applicant subsequently applied for an extension of time to appeal against conviction on count 1, contending that a critical legal direction (a Brown direction) was omitted from the jury summing up.

The factual background details a complex intimate relationship between the Applicant, a professional pilot, and the Complainant, a cabin crew member, beginning in 2010 and involving episodes of controlling and coercive behaviour, physical and sexual abuse, financial control, and emotional abuse. The relationship included periods of cohabitation in various locations, pregnancies, and ultimately culminated in the offences charged. The Complainant also suffered severe mental health consequences following a tragic incident involving their child.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the conviction on count 1 for controlling or coercive behaviour is unsafe due to the absence of a Brown direction in the jury summing up.
2. Whether the particulars of count 1 required the jury to be unanimous on specific elements of the offence or whether unanimity on the overall actus reus was sufficient.
3. The proper application and scope of the Brown direction in cases involving multiple particulars or alternative bases for an offence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The conviction is unsafe because the jury was not directed with a Brown direction, which is necessary when multiple alternative particulars constitute one ingredient of the offence.
• The particulars of count 1, spanning 20 months and nine different types of behaviour (some with internal alternatives), required the jury to be unanimous on the specific behaviour proved.
• The absence of a Brown direction risked the jury convicting without unanimity on any single particular, potentially violating the burden and standard of proof.
• Given the acquittals on other counts, it was likely the jury rejected many allegations, increasing the risk of non-unanimity on particulars.

Respondent's Arguments

• The actus reus of the offence was the repeated engagement in controlling or coercive behaviour as a whole, with the particulars serving only as examples, not separate ingredients requiring unanimity.
• The jury was properly directed that they did not have to be sure about each and every aspect of the behaviour, only that the overall behaviour amounted to controlling or coercive conduct.
• The case did not present distinct or separate sequences or different defences that would necessitate a Brown direction.
• The jury was entitled to consider the cumulative effect of the behaviour rather than individual isolated acts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Brown (1984) 79 Cr App R 115	Jury unanimity required on essential ingredients of an offence when multiple alternative particulars are specified; Brown direction instructs jury to be unanimous on the particular matter establishing the ingredient.	Considered central to determining whether a Brown direction was required; court concluded it was not necessary as particulars were examples, not distinct ingredients.
R v Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App R 1	Clarifies that jury unanimity is required on the essential element but not on the specific evidence or route to that conclusion.	Supported the view that unanimity on the actus reus sufficed without unanimity on specific particulars.
R v More 1987 1 WLR 1578	Jury directions must be clear and comprehensible; necessity of Brown direction depends on the nature of the charge and live issues.	Emphasized that unnecessary directions should be avoided; applied in assessing the appropriateness of a Brown direction here.
R v Smith [1997] 1 Cr App R 14	Brown direction required when offence involves distinct and separate sequences each constituting the offence.	Distinguished from present case; no distinct sequences alleged here.
R v Mitchell (1994) 26 HLR 394	Brown direction necessary if jury might not be unanimous on the particular act constituting the offence.	Held that Brown direction was needed only in rare cases; applied to conclude it was not needed here.
R v Boreman [2000] 2 Cr App R 17	Brown direction required when different acts at different times constitute the offence, requiring jury unanimity on which act led to conviction.	Applied to confirm the distinction from present case where offence was continuous course of conduct.
R v Leslie Joseph Carr [2000] 2 Cr App R 149	Brown direction required when different means of committing offence give rise to different defences.	Found not applicable here as defence was denial of all allegations, not different defences to different particulars.
R v D [2001] 1 Cr App R 13	Jury must be unanimous on at least one type of conduct relied on for indecent assault; failure to direct accordingly is error.	Distinguished as the present case involved cumulative conduct, not discrete acts requiring unanimity.
R v Sinha [1995] Crim LR 68	No Brown direction needed where multiple alternative particulars relate to one ingredient and conviction can rest on any one.	Supported conclusion that no Brown direction was required here.
R v Ibrahima [2005] EWCA Crim 1436	Brown direction unnecessary when jury can convict on any of several alternative factual bases without unanimity on which.	Applied to affirm that the jury need not agree on each particular in the present case.
R v Budniak [2009] EWCA Crim 1611	Brown direction rare in dangerous driving cases; jury evaluates conduct in the round.	Illustrated principle of evaluating conduct cumulatively, analogous to present case.
R v Hancock [1996] 2 Cr App R 554	Particulars specifying nature of offence do not necessarily constitute essential ingredients requiring jury unanimity.	Supported view that particulars here were illustrative and not separate ingredients.
R v Young (1993) 97 Cr App R 280	Brown direction not required in continuous course of conduct offences.	Applied to confirm no Brown direction needed for continuous coercive behaviour.
R v Asquith and others [1995] 1 Cr App R 492	Single course of conduct involving multiple methods does not require Brown direction where defence does not distinguish between methods.	Analogous to present case where multiple behaviours formed a single course of conduct.
R v Jones (Douglas Leary) The Times, 17 February 1999	Jury unanimity required on basis of guilt but not necessarily on basis for verdict when multiple bases exist.	Supported approach that jury unanimity on actus reus sufficed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed review of the legal principles governing jury unanimity and the necessity of a Brown direction, drawing extensively on binding precedents. The Brown direction requires that where multiple alternative particulars constitute one essential ingredient of an offence, the jury must be unanimous on which particular matter establishes that ingredient. However, the court emphasized that such directions are only necessary in comparatively rare cases.

Applying these principles, the court found that the actus reus of the offence under count 1 was the Applicant's repeated engagement in controlling or coercive behaviour as a whole. The nine particulars listed in the indictment were illustrative examples to assist the jury in understanding the nature of the conduct alleged, not separate essential ingredients requiring unanimity.

The court distinguished the present case from those involving distinct and separate sequences or different means of committing an offence that might give rise to different defences. Here, the jury was required to evaluate the cumulative impact of the behaviour over the relevant period. The defence was a complete denial of the allegations, not different defences to different particulars.

Therefore, there was no realistic danger that the jury misunderstood the unanimity requirement or convicted without agreement on the essential elements. The jury was properly directed that they did not need to be sure of each particular but only that the overall behaviour amounted to controlling or coercive conduct. Consequently, the absence of a Brown direction did not render the conviction unsafe.

Holding and Implications

The court granted the Applicant an extension of time and leave to appeal but ultimately DISMISSED THE APPEAL.

The holding confirms that in offences involving a continuous course of conduct with multiple illustrative particulars, a Brown direction is not required unless the particulars each constitute distinct essential ingredients or give rise to different defences. The jury need only be unanimous on the overall actus reus, not on each particular. This decision affirms established principles and does not create new precedent.

The direct effect is that the Applicant's conviction on count 1 stands. No broader legal implications beyond the application of existing case law were established.