Jones v R.

Factual and Procedural Background

On 17 July 2008, at the Crown Court at The City, the Appellant was convicted of the murder of the deceased. He was sentenced to detention at Her Majesty's Pleasure with a specified minimum term under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The Appellant was 17 years old at the time. The Appellant was granted leave to appeal against his conviction in March 2009, but the full court dismissed the appeal in October 2009. The Appellant died in February 2019.

At trial, the Appellant denied involvement in the killing, which was characterized as brutal and random. In October 2019, the Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the conviction to the Court of Appeal based on new expert psychiatric evidence concerning the Appellant's mental state at the time of the offence and his subsequent acceptance of responsibility, contradicting his trial testimony. The deceased's mother was authorized to pursue the appeal.

On the morning of 27 September 2007, the deceased was murdered after leaving a garage with her dog. Her body was found days later in a river, with multiple injuries consistent with a violent attack and defensive wounds. A 2.5 kilogram barbell weight was found near the body, linked to the deceased by DNA, though not directly to the Appellant. An incomplete set of similar weights was found at the Appellant's home, missing three weights of the same kind.

The Crown relied on evidence placing the Appellant near the scene on the day of the murder, including sightings and forensic evidence linking the deceased's blood to the Appellant's clothing and trainers, as well as a shoe mark matching the Appellant's trainers near the riverbank. The Appellant claimed no contact with the deceased and offered innocent explanations for the forensic evidence.

During police interviews, the Appellant consistently denied involvement but later suggested possible accidental contact with blood. He described walking a dog and encountering a woman on a bridle path on the day of the murder. He admitted to hiding a blood-stained dog lead in his attic and gave various explanations for physical injuries and forensic findings. Two psychiatrists at the time did not diagnose any mental illness.

The Appellant was later diagnosed with schizophrenia during detention at a hospital, with new psychiatric evidence suggesting he suffered from prodromal schizophrenia at the time of the offence, potentially substantially impairing his responsibility.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Court of Appeal should admit fresh psychiatric evidence not available at trial concerning the Appellant's mental state at the time of the offence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
2. Whether the fresh evidence establishes that the Appellant's responsibility was substantially impaired at the time of the offence for the purposes of diminished responsibility under section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957.
3. Whether the Appellant's conviction is unsafe in light of the new evidence and the Appellant's changed account accepting responsibility.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• New expert psychiatric evidence from Dr Qurashi indicates the Appellant suffered from prodromal schizophrenia at the time of the offence, substantially impairing his responsibility.
• The Appellant's failure to disclose his mental state at trial is explained by his then-untreated mental illness and paranoia.
• It is in the interests of justice to admit this fresh evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
• The Appellant now accepts responsibility for the killing, contradicting his earlier denial.

Respondent's Arguments

• The psychiatric evidence from Dr Cumming challenges the diagnosis of mental illness at the time of the offence, attributing symptoms to drug use and later developments.
• The Appellant's account of hallucinations and witches is not credible and was given retrospectively, with no independent corroboration.
• The Appellant's explanations for the circumstances of the killing and behaviour are inconsistent and lack credibility.
• Without the opportunity to test the Appellant's recent account under oath, the court should not find the conviction unsafe.
• The Appellant told significant lies in his accounts, and the court must decide credibility, not the expert.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Dial v Trinidad and Tobago [2005] UKPC 45	Test for admitting fresh evidence on criminal appeal: whether it raises reasonable doubt about guilt and the ultimate responsibility of the Court of Appeal to decide if the conviction is unsafe.	The court applied this test to evaluate the new psychiatric evidence and the Appellant's changed account.
R v Pendleton [2002] 1 WLR 72	Guidance on assessing the impact of fresh evidence on the safety of a conviction.	Referenced as part of the framework for assessing fresh evidence and the role of the jury versus the court.
R v Hakala [2002] EWCA Crim 730	Emphasizes that the essential question is whether the conviction is safe in light of fresh evidence.	Supported the court's approach to the safety of the conviction.
R v Erskine; R v Williams [2009] EWCA Crim 1425	Caution against permitting a defence of diminished responsibility on appeal when not raised at trial, absent contemporaneous evidence of unfitness to plead.	Guided the court's caution in admitting diminished responsibility evidence post-trial.
Walton v R (1978) 66 Cr App R 25; [1978] AC 788	Jury's role in assessing medical evidence and the overall facts in diminished responsibility cases.	Supported the principle that credibility and weight of evidence are for the court/jury to decide, not experts alone.
R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61	The jury decides whether the elements of diminished responsibility are satisfied based on proper evidence.	Emphasized the necessity of a proper factual basis for diminished responsibility to be accepted.
R v Borthwick [1998] Crim LR 274; R v Gilfillan (unreported); R v Weekes [1999] 2 Cr App R 520	Examples where fresh evidence of diminished responsibility was accepted due to clear and undisputed evidence at trial.	Distinguished from the present case where evidence is disputed and untested.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully considered the fresh psychiatric evidence presented by Dr Qurashi, who diagnosed the Appellant with prodromal schizophrenia at the time of the offence, substantially impairing his responsibility. This evidence was weighed against the contrary opinion of Dr Cumming, who disputed the presence of mental illness at that time and attributed symptoms to drug use and retrospective interpretation.

The court acknowledged the unusual circumstances that led to the referral by the Criminal Cases Review Commission and the detailed psychiatric reports. However, it emphasized the critical importance of testing the credibility of the Appellant's recent account, which formed the factual basis for Dr Qurashi's conclusions. Given the Appellant's death and the lack of opportunity for cross-examination or further investigation, the court found the evidence untested and the Appellant's explanations inconsistent and partially fabricated.

The court applied established legal principles concerning fresh evidence on appeal, including the requirement that the evidence must be capable of belief, likely to affect the safety of the conviction, admissible at trial, and have a reasonable explanation for its late emergence. It also noted the caution against permitting diminished responsibility defences on appeal when not raised at trial absent contemporaneous evidence.

Ultimately, the court held that the new psychiatric evidence did not satisfy these criteria sufficiently to render the conviction unsafe. The conflicting expert opinions, lack of corroboration, and the Appellant's untested and partially discredited account prevented the court from accepting the fresh evidence as a basis for overturning the conviction.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Appellant's conviction for murder remains upheld despite the introduction of fresh psychiatric evidence and a changed account accepting responsibility. The court did not find the new evidence sufficient to undermine the safety of the conviction. No new legal precedent was established, as the decision adhered to established principles governing fresh evidence and diminished responsibility appeals.