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Just Digital Marketplace Ltd (enforcement - controlled goods agreements - taking control of goods)

England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Jan 8, 2021
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a claim for declaratory relief brought by Company A, which provides enforcement services overseen by High Court Enforcement Officers (HCEOs). The claim seeks declarations on whether enforcement steps, specifically entering into a Controlled Goods Agreement (CGA), can be validly conducted by way of a virtual visit via video appointment rather than physical attendance at the debtor’s premises. The procedural context involves the interpretation of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA) and associated Regulations, focusing on whether the legislation permits such "non-entry" CGAs. The court heard detailed adversarial argument and evidence from Company A, the High Court Enforcement Officers Association (HCEOA), the Civil Enforcement Association (CIVEA), and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), among others.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, subject to the consent of the judgment creditor and debtor, a High Court Enforcement Officer is prevented by the legislation from conducting a virtual visit (as opposed to a physical visit) at the debtor’s property pursuant to a Writ of Control.
  2. Whether a High Court Enforcement Officer can enter into a Controlled Goods Agreement with the judgment debtor during such a virtual visit.
  3. Whether, having entered into a CGA via a virtual visit, the agreement constitutes valid "taking control of goods" under the relevant legislation.

Arguments of the Parties

Claimant's Arguments

  • The Act and Regulations do not expressly require physical attendance for entering into a CGA; the legislation refers to an agreement and does not mandate physical presence.
  • The CGA is defined as an agreement with specific terms unrelated to physical entry, and remote means can satisfy these requirements.
  • The Fees Regulations allow that fees for the first enforcement stage are optional, and Company A proposes not charging this fee when a CGA is entered remotely, reducing debtor burden.
  • Information provided to debtors can be effectively communicated virtually, including written and verbal explanations.
  • National standards and guidance do not legally prohibit remote CGAs; some recent guidance encouraged contactless visits during the Covid pandemic.
  • Virtual visits do not impede assessment of debtor vulnerability since checks are often done prior to contact and via phone assessments.
  • Company A contends that the Writ commands taking control of goods, which may be done by CGA, and that physical entry is not always necessary.

Arguments by HCEOA and CIVEA

  • The legislation requires physical entry to premises for a valid CGA; a CGA without prior entry is not a valid exercise of the enforcement power.
  • Statutory construction and legislative history support the requirement of physical entry.
  • Prior case law under the previous enforcement regime indicated entry was necessary for seizure and agreements akin to CGAs.
  • Headings in the legislation (e.g., "re-entry") and references to notices and visits imply physical entry is mandatory.
  • Regulations and forms require physical presence for leaving notices, especially when the CGA is entered into by a third party.
  • Physical entry is necessary to ensure the goods are indeed on the premises subject to the enforcement.
  • Virtual visits cannot satisfy the statutory requirements for entry, which is understood as physical presence, not electronic or remote contact.

Ministry of Justice's Position

  • The MoJ remains neutral but does not see anything in Company A’s proposals necessitating opposition.
  • The MoJ acknowledges that virtual visits were unlikely contemplated by drafters of the Regulations and that further policy work and stakeholder consultation would be required before any legislative amendment.
  • The MoJ considers it a matter for government to decide whether to expressly permit or prohibit virtual CGAs and to provide statutory guidance if permitted.
  • The MoJ does not oppose the claim but does not support the assertion that HCEOs have an absolute duty to enforce under a writ as claimed by Company A.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Evans v South Ribble Borough Council [1992] 1 QB 757 Physical entry is required for seizure; external inspection and posting notices insufficient for legal distress. Used to show that prior common law required physical entry for enforcement and that non-entry methods were generally invalid.
McLeod v Butterwick [1998] 1 WLR 1603 (CA) Following initial entry and seizure, re-entry is permitted; physical presence is assumed at outset. Supports the orthodox view that initial physical entry is necessary before subsequent enforcement steps.
365 Business Finance Ltd v Bellagio Hospitality WB Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 588 Taking control of goods presupposes physical securing; CGA presupposes ability to remove goods if agreement fails. Reinforces that CGA presupposes physical control and securing of goods, implying physical presence.
Flora v Wakom [2006] EWCA Civ 1103 Explanatory notes can be used as an aid to statutory interpretation but do not override clear statutory language. Guided the court’s approach to considering explanatory notes in interpreting the TCEA 2007.
Hanlon v Law Society [1981] AC 124 Regulations made under an Act can inform interpretation but do not control the meaning of the Act itself. Used to assess the relevance of the 2013 Regulations to the interpretation of the 2007 Act.
Britt v Buckinghamshire CC [1964] 1 QB 77 Interpreting statutory provisions in light of contemporaneous regulations when they form a composite instrument. Distinguished because the Regulations here were not contemporaneous or part of a composite instrument with the Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed statutory construction analysis of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and relevant Regulations. It emphasized three principles of interpretation: the primacy of the plain statutory language, avoidance of absurd results, and consideration of the legislative intent or "mischief" targeted by the legislation.

The Act’s language was found to use "power to enter" rather than requiring physical entry, and the provision for entering into a CGA (Schedule 12, para 13(1)(d)) does not expressly mandate physical presence. The court noted that while other methods of taking control (securing or removing goods) clearly imply physical entry, the CGA is distinct and defined as an agreement permitting the debtor to retain custody with restrictions.

The court considered headings such as "re-entry" and provisions relating to use of force and notices, which imply prior physical entry, but held that headings do not override clear statutory text and that the wording of paras 14, 16, and 19A does not explicitly require physical entry before a CGA. It found that the Act permits the possibility of a CGA entered without physical entry, though enforcement options if breached would be limited absent regulations addressing this scenario.

The 2013 Regulations were found to be inconsistent with the Act in that they assume physical visits and re-entry procedures, including notice requirements, which do not contemplate a "non-entry" CGA. The court concluded that while the Act does not forbid remote CGAs, the Regulations do not currently provide procedural mechanisms to support them fully.

The court reviewed prior common law and legislative history, including the Beatson Report and White Paper, which generally upheld the requirement for physical entry under the previous regime but did not conclusively address virtual CGAs under the new statutory framework. The court noted that prior case law is less persuasive given the 2007 Act replaced the common law regime.

Regarding the Covid-19 context and recent guidance discouraging physical entry, the court acknowledged these factors but held they do not alter the statutory interpretation.

Ultimately, the court found no statutory prohibition on entering into a CGA without physical entry, but also recognized that existing Regulations do not enable full enforcement of such agreements without physical entry. The court emphasized that policy considerations and further legislative or regulatory action lie with the Ministry of Justice and Parliament.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court declared that an enforcement agent may enter into a controlled goods agreement within the meaning of Schedule 12 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 with a debtor whether or not the enforcement agent has physically entered the premises on which the goods are located.

Implications: This decision clarifies that the statute does not prohibit virtual or "non-entry" CGAs, allowing for less intrusive enforcement methods. However, the current regulatory framework does not fully support enforcement of such agreements without physical entry, limiting practical enforcement options if breached. The ruling does not establish new enforcement procedures but leaves it to the Ministry of Justice and Parliament to consider policy and regulatory amendments. The decision may facilitate the use of virtual enforcement visits, particularly relevant during the Covid-19 pandemic, but does not compel their adoption or affect the existing fee structure unless changed by regulation.