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Electronic Collar Manufacturers Association & Anor v The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court)
Oct 24, 2019
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This judicial review arises from a decision by the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs ("the Secretary of State") dated 27 August 2018 to ban the use of hand-held remote-controlled electronic collars ("e-collars") for cats and dogs in England. The decision followed a consultation process conducted between 12 March and 27 April 2018. The Claimants, comprising an unincorporated trade association representing e-collar manufacturers and a manufacturer and supplier of e-collars, challenge the lawfulness of the consultation process and the substantive decision, arguing it was flawed, irrational, disproportionate, and unlawful. The Secretary of State defends the decision as a high-level policy judgment made after extensive consultation with over 7,000 responses, including detailed submissions from the Claimants.

The devices at issue include hand-held e-collars operated remotely by owners, containment systems designed to keep animals within boundaries, and bark control collars activated by the animal's own behavior. The ban applies only to hand-held e-collars, exempting containment systems.

Prior to the consultation, Defra's position was that existing evidence did not justify a ban, but this shifted in early 2018 towards proposing a ban, leading to the consultation. The consultation document proposed a ban, invited responses, and was followed by further meetings with stakeholders. The Secretary of State announced the decision to ban hand-held e-collars, excluding containment systems, on 27 August 2018.

The Claimants issued proceedings seeking judicial review, challenging multiple grounds including consultation flaws, predetermination, breach of duty of inquiry, irrationality, and disproportionate interference with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and EU law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the consultation process complied with the legal requirements of fairness, including consultation at a formative stage, sufficiency of reasons, adequate time, and conscientious consideration of responses.
  2. Whether the Secretary of State unlawfully pre-determined the decision prior to consultation.
  3. Whether the Secretary of State breached the duty of inquiry under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 and related case law.
  4. Whether the decision to ban hand-held e-collars was irrational or Wednesbury unreasonable.
  5. Whether the decision constituted a disproportionate interference with the Claimants' rights under Article 1 Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Arguments of the Parties

Claimants' Arguments

  • The consultation was unlawful as it was conducted at a stage when the Secretary of State had already made up his mind to ban e-collars, thus failing the requirement to consult at a formative stage.
  • The Consultation Document was brief, biased, and failed to provide sufficient information or consider alternatives such as regulation or licensing, depriving consultees of the opportunity to respond intelligently.
  • The consultation period of six weeks was too short for a complex issue affecting businesses and animal welfare.
  • The Secretary of State failed to conscientiously consider consultation responses, ignoring the majority opposition and substantive points raised.
  • The decision was irrational, relying unreasonably on the Lincoln research, failing to consider the benefits of e-collars, and ignoring potential harms from alternatives or euthanasia of uncontrollable dogs.
  • The ban disproportionately interfered with the Claimants' property rights and trade under ECHR Article 1 Protocol 1 and EU law Article 34, without adequate justification or proportionality assessment.
  • The Secretary of State breached the duty of inquiry by failing to investigate relevant matters such as alternative products, regulatory models, and welfare implications.

Secretary of State's Arguments

  • The consultation complied with statutory requirements and was properly conducted on a preferred policy option without unlawful predetermination.
  • The Consultation Document provided sufficient reasons and allowed consultees to make representations on the principle of the ban and its implementation.
  • The six-week consultation period was proportionate and adequate given the nature of the proposal and number of responses received.
  • The Secretary of State conscientiously considered all consultation responses, including those opposing the ban, and materially changed the proposal by exempting containment systems.
  • The decision to ban hand-held e-collars was a rational policy judgment supported by evidence of harm, including Defra-funded research, and concerns about misuse and animal welfare.
  • The decision was within the range of reasonable responses, involving moral and ethical considerations entrusted to the Secretary of State under the Animal Welfare Act 2006.
  • The decision did not disproportionately interfere with property rights or trade, and was justified as a legitimate measure to promote animal welfare under ECHR and EU law.
  • The duty of inquiry was satisfied as the Secretary of State had sufficient information and was not obliged to commission new scientific evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Council [1977] AC 1014 Duty of inquiry by decision-makers to take reasonable steps to inform themselves of relevant facts. Applied to assess whether the Secretary of State fulfilled the duty of inquiry regarding relevant considerations before the ban decision.
R v Brent London Borough, ex parte Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168 Consultation must be fair, including consultation at a formative stage and adequate time. Referenced in establishing general principles of lawful consultation.
R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 2131 Four elements of fair consultation: formative stage, sufficient reasons, adequate time, conscientious consideration. Framework applied to assess the consultation process in this case.
R (Moseley) v Haringey London Borough Council [2014] UKSC 56 Clarification of consultation duties; importance of statutory context; when to disclose alternative options. Considered in determining the scope and content of the consultation required under the Animal Welfare Act 2006.
R (Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Foundation Trust) v Joint Committee of Primary Care Trusts [2012] EWCA Civ 472 Consultation fairness and content. Referenced in consultation principles.
R (Langton) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2018] EWHC 2190 (Admin) Statutory consultation duties and the interplay with common law procedural fairness. Considered in the analysis of the consultation duty under the 2006 Act.
R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin) Consultation fairness and procedural requirements. Applied in assessing the consultation process.
R (Spurrier) v Secretary of State for Transport [2019] EWHC 1070 (Admin) Consultation and judicial review principles. Referenced in consultation analysis and Wednesbury review.
R (British Homeopathic Association) v NHS Commissioning Board [2018] EWHC 1359 (Admin) Appearance of predetermination test. Applied to assess whether a fair-minded observer would perceive predetermination.
R (Petsafe Limited) v The Welsh Ministers [2010] EWHC 2908 (Admin) Proportionality and reasonableness of e-collar bans under animal welfare legislation. Used as a precedent supporting the rationality and proportionality of banning e-collars.
R (Mott) v Environment Agency [2018] UKSC 10 Interference with possessions under ECHR Article 1 Protocol 1. Applied in assessing whether the ban interfered with the Claimants' property rights.
Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39 Proportionality test under ECHR Article 1 Protocol 1. Framework applied to assess proportionality of the ban.
Hutten-Czapska v Poland (2006) 45 EHRR 4 Fair balance test under ECHR Article 1 Protocol 1. Considered in weighing the ban's impact against animal welfare benefits.
R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2016] AC 697 Proportionality under EU law Article 34 TFEU. Referenced in assessing the ban's compliance with EU law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed examination of the consultation process, the Secretary of State's decision-making, and the legal principles governing judicial review, statutory consultation, and proportionality.

On consultation, the Court found that the statutory duty under section 12(6) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 required consultation on the proposed regulations, i.e., the ban itself, rather than a wider policy consultation. The consultation was intended to ensure procedural fairness for those affected. The Secretary of State was entitled to have a pre-disposition towards the ban and to consult on that preferred option. The Court concluded there was no actual or apparent predetermination, as consultees were able to make representations on whether the ban should be introduced and on its implementation.

The Consultation Document, while brief and somewhat biased in tone, provided sufficient reasons to allow consultees to respond intelligently. Although it did not refer explicitly to alternative regulatory options, such alternatives were raised by consultees and considered in the Government Response and Ministerial Submission. The six-week consultation period was proportionate and adequate, with no evidence of prejudice or unfairness to consultees, including the Claimants.

The Secretary of State conscientiously considered the consultation responses, including the majority opposition and detailed arguments from the Claimants and others. The Government Response and Ministerial Submission demonstrated thorough analysis and material changes to the proposal, notably exempting containment systems.

Regarding the duty of inquiry under Tameside, the Court found no breach. The Secretary of State had sufficient information and was not obliged to commission new scientific evidence. The consultation responses and other material adequately informed the decision.

On irrationality and Wednesbury unreasonableness, the Court acknowledged the policy-laden nature of the decision and the broad discretion granted under section 12 of the 2006 Act. The decision was supported by evidence, including Defra-funded research demonstrating that hand-held e-collars can cause negative welfare impacts in some dogs. The distinction between hand-held e-collars and containment systems was rationally justified by differing welfare implications and practical considerations. The Court found no serious flaw in the reasoning or that the decision was outside the range of reasonable responses.

The Court addressed the Secretary of State's change of position in early 2018, from opposing a ban to proposing one. Although the rationale was disclosed late in proceedings, the Court held that the change did not render the decision irrational, as it reflected evolving societal attitudes rather than new evidence.

On proportionality under ECHR Article 1 Protocol 1 and EU law Article 34, the Court accepted that the ban interfered with the Claimants' possessions and trade rights. However, the promotion of animal welfare was a legitimate aim, and the ban was rationally connected to this aim. The Court was not persuaded that less intrusive measures such as regulation would achieve the objective effectively. The burden imposed by the ban was not disproportionate when balanced against the benefits to animal welfare. The decision complied with both ECHR and EU law.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the Claimants' application for judicial review.

The decision to ban hand-held remote-controlled electronic collars for cats and dogs in England, as made by the Secretary of State, was lawful, rational, proportionate, and made following a fair consultation process. The Secretary of State was entitled to adopt a policy decision based on the evidence and societal attitudes, and to exclude containment systems from the ban. No breach of procedural fairness, duty of inquiry, or proportionality was found.

This ruling upholds the Secretary of State's discretion under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 and confirms that consultation duties must be interpreted in their statutory context, allowing for consultation on preferred policy options without unlawful predetermination. The judgment does not establish new precedent beyond applying established principles to the facts of this case.