Director of Public Prosecutions v Bennett

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal by way of case stated pursuant to section 52(1) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, brought by the Defendant dissatisfied with a District Court Judge's determination alleged to be erroneous on a point of law.

The Defendant was convicted on three charges on 31 March 2015, including an allegation that on 8 July 2014, at Pembroke Road, Dublin 4, he wilfully prevented or interrupted the free passage of a vehicle in a public place without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, contrary to Section 9 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994.

The offence was considered when the Defendant was sentenced to a suspended five-month prison sentence for resisting a police officer acting in the execution of his duty.

The facts found by the trial judge include that the Defendant organised and participated in a political protest outside the Israeli Embassy motivated by opposition to Israeli military air strikes on Gaza City. During a short sit-down protest, the Defendant and another individual laid down on the public road to obstruct the Israeli ambassador’s car accompanied by an unmarked police vehicle.

The police directed the Defendant to desist under section 8 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994, outlining consequences of non-compliance. The sit-down protest lasted about twenty seconds before the Defendant was forcibly removed after passive resistance. The Defendant remained peaceful throughout and made no threats of violence. The police intervened promptly to remove the obstruction.

The trial judge held that while the right to peaceful assembly is guaranteed subject to public order and morality, in the particular circumstances, considering safety, security, and sensitivity concerns, the Defendant’s obstruction was without lawful authority or reasonable excuse.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a sit-down political protest that obstructs the passage of a vehicle for about twenty seconds, without threats of violence towards occupants, constitutes an act capable of lawful authority or reasonable excuse under section 9 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Proes v. Revenue Commissioners [1998] 4 I.R. 174	Principles for High Court review on case stated appeals, including deference to trial judge’s findings of fact and law.	The court applied the principle that findings of primary fact should not be disturbed if supported by evidence and that the trial judge’s conclusions should only be set aside if based on a wrong view of the law or unreasonable inferences.
Mara (Insp. of Taxes) v. Hummingbird Ltd. [1982] I.L.R.M. 421	Applied as precedent in Proes regarding standards of appellate review.	Referenced as part of the framework for reviewing case stated appeals.
Ó Clacháin v. McMullan Brothers Ltd. [1995] 2 I.R. 217	Applied as precedent in Proes regarding appellate review standards.	Referenced as part of the framework for reviewing case stated appeals.
G. v. Federal Republic of Germany No. 13079/87 (ECHR Commission decision, 6 March 1989)	Consideration of restrictions on freedom of expression and peaceful assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.	Used to illustrate that peaceful assembly may be lawfully restricted for public safety and order.
Lucas v. United Kingdom Application No. 39013/02 (ECHR, 18 March 2003)	Legitimacy of interference with freedom of expression and assembly for public safety and prevention of disorder.	Supported the view that arrest and conviction for peaceful obstruction of a public road can be justified as proportionate and necessary under the Convention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the question of whether the Defendant’s sit-down protest causing a short obstruction could be justified as lawful authority or reasonable excuse under section 9 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994.

The court noted that "lawful authority" means permission granted by law, which did not apply to the Defendant’s actions. The issue was whether the Defendant had a "reasonable excuse."

The Defendant accepted that the trial judge considered the reasonable excuse defence but contended that the judge did not accept the protest was capable of reasonable excuse and that an explicit legal ruling on this was required.

The court referred to constitutional protections guaranteeing the right to peaceful assembly subject to public order and morality, and to the European Convention on Human Rights Articles 10 and 11, which allow lawful restrictions for public safety and prevention of disorder.

Applying the principles from Proes v. Revenue Commissioners, the court held that the trial judge’s findings of fact were supported by evidence and that the judge did not adopt a wrong view of the law nor draw unreasonable inferences.

The trial judge considered the particular sensitivity of the protest location outside the Israeli Embassy, the timing during busy hours, and the security concerns inherent in obstructing the ambassador’s car. The judge found the Defendant’s protest was well organised and politically motivated but failed to consider possible dangers to the ambassador, embassy staff, police, and the public.

The court concluded that the obstruction was without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, noting the Defendant did not voluntarily desist when directed and was forcibly removed. The peaceful nature and short duration of the obstruction were factors but did not negate liability under section 9.

The court acknowledged there may be other cases where a peaceful protest causing obstruction could be excused, but this was not such a case.

Holding and Implications

The court's answer to the question posed was in the negative, holding that a sit-down political protest obstructing a vehicle’s passage for about twenty seconds, even without threats of violence, is not necessarily capable of lawful authority or reasonable excuse under section 9 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 in the circumstances of this case.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the trial judge’s decision. The direct consequence is the upholding of the Defendant’s conviction and sentence. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles to the facts.