Kelly v University College Dublin

Factual and Procedural Background

This ruling arises from a motion brought by the Plaintiff based on his affidavit sworn on 25th December 2008, heard on 17th February 2009. The Plaintiff sought an order to set aside a judgment delivered on 31st July 2008 by Mr Justice [Last Name], alleging it was obtained by fraud. Alternatively, the Plaintiff sought an order applying the principle that a person who procures a judgment by fraud should not profit from it, and an order directing the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff's expenses related to this application.

The substantive dispute originates from a decision by The University communicated to the Plaintiff on 15th March 2002, informing him he was not offered a place on a Masters course. The Plaintiff challenged this on grounds of gender discrimination, but his complaint was dismissed by a written decision on 2nd November 2006. An appeal is pending in the Circuit Court.

As part of the appeal, the Plaintiff sought an order for inspection of documents submitted by successful applicants to the course, which The University opposed citing confidentiality of sensitive personal information. The Circuit Court initially refused disclosure, a decision upheld in a ruling on 31st July 2008 by this Court, which found the documents contained personal and sensitive information that could identify individuals even if anonymized.

The Plaintiff contends that a witness for the Defendant, Ms. Quin, who is Head of the School of Applied Social Science at The University, gave false evidence (perjury) regarding the contents of the application forms. The Plaintiff argues that Ms. Quin admitted during cross-examination that she had not fully reviewed the applications and that examples cited were not necessarily from the relevant year. The Plaintiff claims this fraudulent evidence tainted the judgment.

Ms. Quin filed a Supplemental Affidavit denying the allegations of perjury and requesting the Court prevent the Plaintiff from repeating such accusations. The Plaintiff opposed this request, citing public interest and constitutional protections on freedom of expression.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the judgment dated 31st July 2008 should be set aside on the ground that it was obtained by fraud.
2. Whether the substantive rule that a person who procures a judgment by fraud should not profit from it applies in this case.
3. Whether the Defendant should be ordered to pay the Plaintiff's expenses related to the motion.
4. Whether allegations of perjury against a witness, and the witness's agency status, affect the validity of the judgment.
5. The extent and application of privilege concerning allegations of perjury made against witnesses in judicial proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The judgment of 31st July 2008 was obtained by fraud due to alleged perjured evidence from Ms. Quin, which materially affected the decision.
• Case law establishes that a judgment obtained through fraud is a nullity and must be set aside.
• Ms. Quin is an agent of the Defendant, so any fraudulent acts by her should be imputed to the Defendant.
• The Plaintiff contends the Court must ensure justice is administered in public and opposes any order restraining him from making allegations of perjury.

Defendant's Arguments

• The University opposed disclosure of documents based on confidentiality of sensitive personal information.
• Ms. Quin filed a Supplemental Affidavit denying perjury allegations and requested the Court to prevent repetition of such accusations.
• The Defendant relies on the principle of absolute privilege protecting witnesses from civil actions based on evidence given in court or affidavits.
• The Defendant denies any knowledge or instigation of perjury and maintains the judgment was properly obtained.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
P v. P [2001] IESC 76	A judgment obtained by fraud is a nullity.	Supported Plaintiff's contention that fraudulent judgment must be set aside.
Tassan Din v. Banco Ambrosiano SPA [1991] I.R. 569	Judgment tainted by fraud must fail in its entirety.	Cited by Plaintiff; Court rejected automatic setting aside without proof of knowledge.
Hip Foong Hong v. J. Neotia & Co [1918] 1 A.C. 888	Fraud taints the whole judgment.	Referenced by Plaintiff; Court emphasized requirement of knowledge by successful party.
Fagan v. Burgess [1999] 3 IR 306	Absolute privilege protects witnesses from civil actions for statements made in court.	Supported Court's view on privilege against perjury claims in civil proceedings.
Looney v. Bank of Ireland [1996] 1 I.R. 157	Immunity from suit for witnesses and judges regarding evidence given in court.	Reinforced the principle of absolute privilege in Irish law.
Meek v. Fleming [1961] 2 Q.B. 366	Judgment obtained by deliberate material misrepresentation may be set aside.	Used to outline the principle that fraud justifies setting aside judgment.
Sphere Drake Insurance plc and Alexander Howden Holdings plc v. The Orion Insurance Company plc [1999] EWHC 286	Setting aside judgments for perjury is restricted to protect finality of judgments; requires knowledge by successful party.	Guided Court’s analysis on the requirement of actual knowledge of perjury for setting aside judgment.
Re H [1996] AC 563	Serious allegations require cogent evidence; standard of proof is balance of probabilities but more cogent for serious claims.	Supported Court’s rigorous standard for proving perjury.
Boodoosingh v. Ramanarace [2005] UKPC 9	Perjury is serious but does not automatically vitiate entire judgment.	Used to emphasize that perjury must materially affect judgment and be known by successful party.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the Plaintiff's allegations of perjury and fraud in light of established legal principles and case law. It acknowledged the general rule that judgments obtained by fraud may be set aside; however, it emphasized that not all fraud or perjury justifies such relief. The Court underscored the importance of the finality of judgments and public policy considerations restricting collateral attacks.

The Court relied on precedent requiring that for a judgment to be set aside due to perjury, it must be proven on the balance of probabilities that the perjury was material to the decision and that the successful party knowingly procured or relied on such perjured evidence. Mere unreliability or error in evidence does not suffice.

Regarding the alleged perjury by Ms. Quin, the Court found no cogent evidence that the Defendant knowingly procured false evidence. It observed that Ms. Quin’s affidavit statements were made in good faith and that cross-examination did not establish deliberate falsehood. The Court further clarified that the phrase "on behalf of" in an affidavit does not automatically establish agency, though Ms. Quin’s position might justify imputing her statements to The University. However, without evidence of knowledge of perjury by the Defendant, this was immaterial.

The Court also addressed procedural issues, cautioning against repetitive collateral challenges that undermine the principle of finality and the efficient administration of justice. It noted that submissions should be succinct and limited to avoid protracting proceedings.

Finally, the Court declined to make any restraining order against the Plaintiff regarding publication of perjury allegations, citing the absence of a proper motion and the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, but warned that further unfounded allegations could amount to defamation.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the Plaintiff's application to set aside the judgment of 31st July 2008 on grounds of fraud and perjury.

The direct effect is that the judgment stands and the Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud and perjury were not substantiated to the required legal standard. The Court did not find evidence that the Defendant knowingly procured or relied upon perjured evidence. No new precedent was established. The decision reinforces the strict requirements for setting aside judgments on fraud grounds and the protection afforded to witnesses under the privilege doctrine.