DPP v M.R.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to two counts of sexual assault under the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990, as amended. The alleged offences occurred on 15 May 2006 against the complainant. The trial commenced before a judge and jury in February 2008. After hearing evidence, the jury retired to deliberate and subsequently returned a unanimous guilty verdict on Count No. 1 and a majority guilty verdict (10 to 2) on Count No. 2. Issues arose during deliberations when a juror expressed difficulty due to needing to collect her child from a crèche by 6 p.m. The trial judge addressed this by suspending deliberations temporarily and arranging for uniformed Garda officers to collect the child while the juror remained in court. The jury then resumed deliberations and returned the verdicts as noted. The appellant subsequently appealed on multiple grounds including alleged errors in the trial judge’s directions, irregularities in jury deliberations, and prosecutorial conduct.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to withdraw the prosecuting case at the close of evidence.
2. Whether the jury’s verdict was rendered unsatisfactory due to a material irregularity involving jury deliberations in the absence of one juror and pressure on that juror to leave to collect her child.
3. Whether the trial judge erred in his charge by failing to direct the jury that unanimity was required as to the specific act constituting the offence in Count No. 1.
4. Whether the conviction was unsafe due to prosecuting counsel expressing opinions on the complainant’s truthfulness in closing speech.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The trial judge erred in law and fact by not withdrawing the case at the close of evidence.
• The jury’s verdict was unsatisfactory because deliberations occurred while a juror was absent and under pressure to leave, potentially influencing the verdict.
• The trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury that they must be unanimous as to the specific act forming the basis of Count No. 1, especially given that one act was admitted by the appellant.
• The conviction is unsafe because prosecuting counsel improperly expressed his personal opinion on the credibility of the complainant during closing submissions.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that prosecuting counsel is entitled to express his view on evidence and witness credibility, provided the jury is reminded to form its own view.
• The trial judge acted reasonably and with common sense in addressing the juror’s difficulty regarding collecting her child and managing jury deliberations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R. v. Brown [1984] 79 Cr.App. R. 115	Each ingredient of an offence must be proved to the satisfaction of all jurors (subject to majority direction). Where several matters constitute one ingredient, unanimity is required on the specific matter proved.	The Court applied the principle that the jury must be unanimous as to the specific act underlying the offence. The trial judge’s failure to direct on this rendered the verdict unsafe.
R. v. Carr [2000] 2 Cr. App. R 149	Clarification that minor factual differences need not be unanimous, but significant differences related to distinct forms of assault require unanimity or clear direction.	The Court noted that the case at hand fell within the principles requiring clear jury direction on unanimity for distinct acts, reinforcing the need for particularisation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the adequacy of the trial judge’s charge, particularly regarding Count No. 1. The appellant admitted touching the complainant’s breast, yet the jury was not directed that they must be unanimous on whether the offence involved touching the breast only or both the breast and vagina. This failure led to a risk that the jury’s verdict might not be based on a unanimous factual foundation, undermining fairness and rendering the conviction unsafe.

The Court referenced established case law emphasizing the necessity for unanimity on the specific act constituting the offence, especially when one act is admitted, to avoid confusion and ensure a safe verdict.

Regarding the jury deliberations, the Court acknowledged that a juror was separated temporarily due to childcare issues but remained in court. The trial judge took reasonable steps to address the issue by arranging Garda assistance and suspending deliberations. The Court found that the separation itself did not render the verdict unsafe.

However, the Court expressed concern about the pressure on the juror and potentially on the jury as a whole, given the juror’s distress and the time constraints related to the child’s collection. A jury must deliberate free from any form of time pressure or stress on its members, and the circumstances here raised a real likelihood of undue pressure affecting the verdict.

On prosecutorial conduct, the Court recognized that while counsel may express views on witness credibility if properly qualified, it is inappropriate to personalize such opinions. Nonetheless, in this case, the Court was satisfied the remarks did not lead to an unfair trial.

Holding and Implications

The Court QUASHED the convictions on both counts for the reasons given, particularly the unsafe verdict on Count No. 1 due to the trial judge’s inadequate jury direction and the concerns about pressure on the jury during deliberations.

The Court declined to order a retrial, finding it would not be appropriate or just in the circumstances. No new precedent was established, but the decision underscores the importance of clear jury directions on unanimity concerning specific acts and the necessity to ensure jurors deliberate without undue pressure.