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Ewing v Ireland & anor

Supreme Court of Ireland
Oct 11, 2013
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1982 the Appellant’s late father (“Third Party B”) contracted to sell certain lands to a neighbour (“Third Party A”). Title transferred in 1983. Disputes concerning trespass and rights of way led Third Party A to initiate two actions in the Circuit Court in 1987-1988. After considerable delay, judgment issued in 1996 in favour of Third Party A and against Third Party B and the Appellant (who did not appear).

Third Party B appealed to the High Court; the Appellant’s separate appeal was struck out. In 1997 Judge Kelly upheld the Circuit Court decision, ending the dispute between the land-owner and the Ewing family. Subsequent efforts by the Appellant to reopen the matter in 1999 were struck out by Judge O’Sullivan in 2000, a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2001.

In 2006 the Appellant launched the present, third set of proceedings, this time naming only “Ireland and the Attorney General” (“Respondents”). The Statement of Claim alleged constitutional wrongs, State negligence and sought wide-ranging reliefs, including inquiries, declarations that earlier High Court and Supreme Court judgments were void, and compensation. Judge Dunne struck out the action in 2008 under Order 19 Rule 27/28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The instant appeal is against that strike-out order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Statement of Claim disclosed any reasonable cause of action against the Respondents under Order 19 Rule 27 or 28.
  2. Whether the proceedings constituted an impermissible collateral attack on final judgments of competent courts, contrary to the principle of finality and Article 34.4.6 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether, in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, the courts should strike out the proceedings as an abuse of process.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The State failed to provide a “reasonable environment” for him to litigate between 1987 and 2001, causing loss and reputational harm.
  • Earlier court determinations arose from negligence and should be deemed null and void under Article 34.4.6 of the Constitution.
  • The Respondents are responsible under Article 40.3 for vindicating his rights and for costs previously awarded against him.
  • Sought recommendations for a government inquiry and declarations voiding earlier High Court and Supreme Court judgments.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The pleadings disclosed no cause of action against the State; no duty of care was owed in relation to the historic litigation.
  • The claim was vexatious, frivolous and an abuse of process, re-litigating matters already conclusively determined.
  • Any relief sought was non-justiciable (e.g., compelling government inquiries) or barred by the doctrine of finality.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Aer Rianta v Ryanair [2004] 1 IR 506 Order 19 Rule 28 empowers the court to strike out entire pleadings disclosing no cause of action. Confirmed that an entire action, not merely portions, may be struck out when hopeless.
Barry v Buckley [1981] IR 306 Inherent jurisdiction to strike out proceedings as an abuse of process. Relied upon as foundational authority for exercising inherent jurisdiction.
Sun Fat Chan v Osseous Ltd [1992] IR 425 Scope of the inherent power to prevent abusive litigation. Cited to illustrate the breadth of the court’s power beyond formal rules.
Riordan v Ireland (No. 5) [2001] 4 IR 463 Criteria indicative of vexatious proceedings. Applied to show the present action met multiple vexatious indicators (issue re-litigation, hopelessness, improper purpose).
Dykun v Odishaw (Alberta QB, 3 Aug 2000) Foreign persuasive authority on vexatious litigation factors. Adopted to reinforce the Riordan criteria.
Re Lang Michener and Fabian (1987) 37 DLR (4th) 685 Canadian authority listing hallmarks of vexatious actions. Referenced through Dykun to support striking-out standards.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge MacMenamin, delivering judgment for the Supreme Court, reviewed the pleadings and prior litigation history. He noted that:

  • The Respondents had no actionable duty toward the Appellant in relation to the original land sale, subsequent litigation or costs orders.
  • The reliefs sought aimed to invalidate final High Court and Supreme Court decisions, directly contravening Article 34.4.6 which makes Supreme Court judgments “final and conclusive.”
  • Applying the criteria in Riordan v Ireland (No. 5), the case replicated issues already determined, lacked any prospect of success, and sought to harass parties through repeated litigation.
  • Even crediting all allegations at their highest, no amendment could cure the fundamental defects; thus the action was “entirely misconceived.”
  • Order 19 Rule 27/28 thresholds were satisfied: the pleadings were unnecessary, embarrassing, and failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action. Independently, the inherent jurisdiction justified dismissal as an abuse of process.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED; PROCEEDINGS STRUCK OUT.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s order, ending the third set of proceedings and underscoring the constitutional and common-law imperative of finality in litigation. The decision reiterates that attempts to re-litigate matters finally determined, or to seek non-justiciable reliefs against the State, will be summarily struck out. No new legal principles were established; the ruling reinforces existing doctrine on abuse of process and judicial economy.