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Angela Farrell v The Governor and Company of Bank of Ireland & ors
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant, a solicitor, had a banking relationship with Company A. In 2009 Company A issued special-summons proceedings seeking possession of properties over which it claimed security. In 2010 the Appellant started plenary proceedings raising broadly similar allegations against Company A. Although the two actions were initially consolidated, a subsequent “de-consolidation” order allowed the special-summons claim to proceed and, in February 2011, the High Court granted Company A an order for possession.
The Appellant filed nine separate appeals to the Supreme Court: seven concern interlocutory or procedural orders, one challenges the February 2011 possession order, and three challenge High Court orders quashing private criminal summonses that the Appellant had instituted against Company A’s officials and lawyer. Company A (joined by the three individuals) applied to the Supreme Court for security for the costs of all appeals (save two notices filed in error). The judgment of Judge [Clarke] addresses that application.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether “special circumstances” existed that justified ordering an impecunious individual Appellant to provide security for the costs of multiple Supreme Court appeals.
- If security were justified, what amount and on which appeals would constitute a proportionate order.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent’s (Company A’s) Arguments
- The Appellant’s conduct was vexatious and oppressive, amounting to special circumstances warranting security.
- Examples cited: persistent non-compliance with court directions; proliferation of interlocutory appeals (this was the 50th court appearance); initiation of private criminal prosecutions while civil litigation was pending; and correspondence allegedly intended to intimidate Company A’s counsel.
- Because of that conduct and the Appellant’s admitted inability to pay, the risk of unrecovered costs was significant.
- The court should depart from the usual one-third practice and require full security, or at least more than one-third.
Appellant’s Arguments
- The Appellant opposed any order for security for costs, asserting that her appeals were legitimate and raising serious allegations against Company A and various judges.
- She denied that her conduct was oppressive and contended that procedural directions had been wrongly made against her.
- She produced an extensive affidavit and oral submissions, but, according to the judgment, did not focus on the specific criteria relevant to security for costs.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| MacAuley v. Minister for Posts and Telegraphs [1966] I.R. 345 | Constitutional right of access to courts | Used to frame the balance between access and the need to prevent abuse of process. |
| Slattery v. An Taoiseach [1993] 1 I.R. 286 | Distinguishes denial of access from adverse procedural rulings | Illustrates that litigants heard on procedural matters are not denied access. |
| Barry v. Buckley [1981] I.R. 306 | Jurisdiction to dismiss proceedings bound to fail | Cited to show courts may terminate actions without infringing access rights. |
| Lismore Homes Ltd v. Bank of Ireland Finance Ltd [1999] 1 I.R. 501 | Security for costs against corporate plaintiffs | Contrasted with individual-litigant principles. |
| Proetta v. Niel [1996] 1 I.R. 102 & Pitt v. Bolger [1996] 1 I.R. 108 | Security rarely ordered against resident individual plaintiffs | Distinction drawn between first-instance trials and appeals. |
| Salthill Properties v. Royal Bank of Scotland [2010] IEHC 31 | Need for rule change before ordering security against personal plaintiffs at trial | Used in contrasting trial and appeal stages. |
| Midland Bank Ltd v. Crossley-Cooke [1969] I.R. 56 | Leading test for security for costs on appeal: poverty plus special circumstances | Framework adopted and applied to current facts. |
| Malone v. Brown Thomas & Co (Sup Ct, 1994) | High constitutional value of access to Supreme Court | Balanced against respondents’ rights. |
| Hidden Ireland Heritage Holidays v. Indigo Services Ltd [2005] 2 I.R. 115 | Improper litigant conduct may influence security orders | Supported reliance on oppressive behaviour. |
| Bula Ltd v. Tara Mines Ltd (Sup Ct, 1998) | Baseless serious allegations as abuse of process | Analogous to Appellant’s unsubstantiated claims. |
| In re Irish Life & Permanent Group Holdings [2012] IESC 32 | Appellate court slow to interfere with case-management orders | Exemplified that multiple procedural appeals can be oppressive. |
| Thalle v. Soares [1957] I.R. 182 & Fallon v. An Bord Pleanála [1992] 2 I.R. 380 | Traditional “one-third” practice for fixing security | Considered but departed from in amount ordered. |
| Harlequin Property (SVG) Ltd v. O’Halloran [2012] IEHC 13 | Questioning the origins of the one-third rule | Supported re-examination of quantum. |
| Tassan Din v. Banco Ambrosiano SPA [1991] 1 I.R. 569 | Setting aside judgments obtained by fraud | Referential when discussing alternative remedies to criminal proceedings. |
| Domican v. AXA Insurance Ltd [2007] IEHC 14 | Duties not to interfere with opposing party’s legal representation | Appellant’s letters to counsel treated as intimidation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge [Clarke] began by outlining the constitutional balance between an appellant’s right to fair process and a respondent’s right not to suffer unrecoverable costs. He distinguished:
- Corporate plaintiffs (where statutory security rules apply);
- Individual plaintiffs at first instance (security rarely appropriate); and
- Individual appellants (where the court may better gauge merits and litigant conduct).
The Court confirmed that poverty alone is insufficient; special circumstances must exist. It identified the following special circumstances, each generating a real risk that Company A would incur unrecoverable and inflated costs:
- A proliferation of procedural appeals contrary to the Supreme Court’s guidance that case-management orders are rarely appealable mid-stream.
- Persistent failure by the Appellant to comply with filing deadlines, causing adjournments and higher expense.
- Attempts to launch private criminal prosecutions against Company A’s officials and solicitor while related civil proceedings were still live, amounting to a collateral attack and abusive pressure.
- Correspondence sent to Company A’s counsel that the Court characterised as intimidating and a breach of the Appellant’s duties as an officer of the court.
- The manner of oral submissions and extensive affidavit material demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to focus on issues, foreshadowing continued procedural inefficiency.
Having found those factors proven, the Court held that ordering security was a proportionate response. It then considered quantum. Although earlier cases suggested a one-third figure, the Court noted that practice was not immutable. Given that the numerous appeals (rather than the single substantive appeal) stemmed from the oppressive conduct, the Court:
- Declined to order security for the appeal against the substantive possession order.
- Ordered security on all remaining appeals at 50 % of Company A’s cost estimates.
Holding and Implications
Ordered: The Appellant must lodge security for costs—calculated at 50 % of the Respondent’s estimated costs—for every appeal except the substantive appeal against the possession order. All affected appeals are stayed until security is provided.
Implications: The decision confirms that vexatious or oppressive litigation conduct can constitute “special circumstances” justifying security for costs against an impecunious individual appellant. It also signals that the Supreme Court may depart from the traditional one-third guideline where proportionality demands a different figure. No new rule of law was created, but the judgment offers detailed guidance on applying existing principles.
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