Riordan v. An Taoiseach

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant sought to challenge previous Supreme Court and High Court orders that had dismissed his constitutional claims concerning the Nineteenth Amendment and had imposed costs against him. After losing in both courts, he brought several subsequent applications accusing the judges of corruption and bad faith; each application was dismissed. In the present motion, he asked the Supreme Court to:

• Stay the costs orders made against him in both courts;
• Set aside the Supreme Court judgments delivered on 19 November 1998 and 20 May 1999 as “deliberately defective, unsafe and unjust”;
• Reinstate his appeal for hearing before what he termed “the full Supreme Court.”

The motion was heard by a three-judge division of the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether a three-judge division of the Supreme Court is constitutionally competent to hear and determine the Appellant’s motion and to have issued the earlier judgment of 29 June 2000.
2. Whether the earlier Supreme Court judgments and associated cost orders should be set aside as “deliberately defective, unsafe and unjust.”
3. Whether the Appellant’s appeal should be reinstated for hearing by the full complement of Supreme Court judges.
4. Whether the Appellant should be restrained, in the court’s inherent jurisdiction, from initiating further proceedings without prior leave.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The judgment of 29 June 2000 was invalid because it was delivered by only three judges.
• The present application likewise could not lawfully be heard by a three-judge panel.
• Earlier judgments were corrupt and rendered mala fide, necessitating their being set aside and the appeal reinstated before the full Supreme Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court rejected the Appellant’s core premise that every matter must be heard by the full bench. It undertook the following analysis:

• Constitutional framework: Article 34 creates a Supreme Court and allows justice to be administered by judges appointed according to law. Article 36 permits the Oireachtas (Entity A) to regulate the Court’s organisation and procedure.
• Statutory authority for divisions: Section 7 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, as amended, expressly empowers the Chief Justice to direct that appeals or other matters be heard by divisions of three or five judges, with a mandatory minimum of five only in specified instances (e.g., Articles 12 and 26 references or questions of constitutional validity).
• Limited constitutional requirements for larger panels: The Constitution mandates a five-judge panel only in the situations enumerated in Articles 12 and 26. The Court held that the existence of those explicit requirements negates any implied need for a full bench in all other cases.
• Application to present motion: The current motion did not raise a fresh question of constitutional validity and thus could properly be determined by three judges under the governing legislation.
• Presumption of statutory validity: No proceedings had challenged the relevant statutory provisions; therefore, the Court presumed them constitutional.
• Abuse of process: The Court noted the Appellant’s persistent attempts to reopen settled litigation, use of groundless claims, and scandalous allegations, concluding that continued unrestricted access would undermine the administration of justice and the rights of other parties.

Holding and Implications

The motion was DISMISSED.

In addition, exercising its inherent jurisdiction, the Court ordered that the Appellant is restrained from instituting any further proceedings—whether in the High Court or the Supreme Court—against any party to the present proceedings, any office-holders previously named, Entity A, Entity B, or the State, without first obtaining leave of the Supreme Court by written application to its Registrar.

The decision affirms the legality of three-judge divisions for ordinary appellate matters and underscores the Court’s willingness to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to curb vexatious litigation. No new substantive precedent was announced, but the ruling clarifies administrative practice regarding panel composition and the Court’s power to restrain abusive litigants.