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Regina v McNeill
Factual and Procedural Background
On 14 December 2018, following a trial at Southwark Crown Court before Her Honour Judge Cahill QC and a jury, the Appellant was convicted of four offences of stalking causing serious alarm or distress under section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1977, and six offences of breaching a restraining order under section 5(5) of the same Act. The Appellant was sentenced on 9 January 2019 to a total of nine years' imprisonment and has appealed against that sentence with leave of a single judge.
The offences arose from a prolonged campaign of intimidation and harassment over more than three years, beginning after the Appellant offered services as a McKenzie Friend to a woman involved in family proceedings in the High Court. The woman, referred to as Ms D, and her new partner fabricated false and malicious allegations against Ms D's former partner, Mr D, including claims of satanic ritual abuse involving children at a school in Hampstead. These allegations were investigated by the police, resulting in the children being taken into temporary care and subsequent High Court proceedings in which the Appellant acted as McKenzie Friend.
Despite judicial warnings, the Appellant published case materials, including videos of the children, on the internet, reaching an audience of approximately four million people. The High Court judge, Pauffley J, found the allegations to be entirely false and the children to have been subjected to torture by the mother and her partner. Nonetheless, the Appellant continued to disseminate these false allegations online, using her technical skills to evade attempts to remove the material.
The Appellant also published personal details of other families falsely accused of involvement in the alleged abuse, causing those families to suffer harassment, threats, and significant lifestyle disruptions. The stalking offences each involved a different family subjected to fear and intimidation, including malicious communications and physical threats by third parties encouraged by the Appellant.
The Appellant repeatedly breached restraining orders and continued her campaign even after surrendering internet-enabled devices on bail, resorting to leaflet distribution and telephone harassment targeting members of the clergy. The sentencing judge described the case as one of the most serious stalking cases involving breaches of restraining orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the sentences imposed for the stalking offences were manifestly excessive.
- Whether the sentencing judge properly took into account mitigating factors including the Appellant's age, health, lack of previous convictions, and claimed remorse.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant's counsel submitted that the sentencing judge failed adequately to consider mitigating factors, specifically the Appellant's advanced age and ill-health.
- It was argued that the Appellant's lack of previous convictions should have been given more weight as mitigation.
- The Appellant claimed to have shown remorse, which should have been reflected in a reduced sentence.
Respondent's Arguments
- The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Millberry [2002] EWCA Crim 2891; [2003] 1 WLR 546 | Limited weight to be given to age as a mitigating factor; discretionary mercy for offenders of advanced years. | The court applied the principle that age mitigation is discretionary and limited, noting that the sentencing judge had already given generous allowance for the Appellant's age. |
| Clarke [2017] EWCA Crim 393 | Extreme cases of age (e.g., centenarians) may warrant greater mitigation. | The court distinguished the Appellant’s age (74 years) from extreme cases and considered age mitigation minimal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court affirmed the sentencing judge’s categorisation of the offences as Category 1A, representing the highest level of culpability and harm under the Sentencing Council guidelines for intimidatory offences and breaches of restraining orders. The judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s conduct as deliberate, prolonged, and sophisticated was upheld. The court noted the serious psychological harm and lifestyle disruption caused to victims, justifying the severe sentences imposed.
Regarding mitigating factors, the court found no merit in the claim that the Appellant’s age and ill-health warranted a significant reduction. It emphasised that age mitigation is discretionary and typically limited, and that the sentencing judge had already made allowances accordingly. The Appellant’s previous good character was substantially undermined by her continued offending after conviction for breach of a restraining order.
The court rejected the assertion of remorse, observing that the sentencing judge’s finding of no remorse was based on direct evidence and was not open to appellate challenge. The limited actions taken by the Appellant late in the process to remove material or not oppose a Criminal Behaviour Order were deemed insufficient indicators of genuine remorse.
Overall, the court concluded that the sentence was proportionate and, if anything, lenient in light of the Appellant’s conduct and the harm caused.
Holding and Implications
The appeal against sentence was DISMISSED.
The court’s decision upheld the total sentence of nine years' imprisonment, reflecting the gravity of the stalking offences and breaches of restraining orders. The ruling confirms the judiciary’s firm stance on serious stalking and harassment offences involving breaches of court orders and the use of the internet to propagate false allegations. No new legal precedent was established; the decision serves to reinforce existing sentencing guidelines and principles regarding mitigation and the assessment of remorse.
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