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Arksey v Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust

England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Mar 21, 2019
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff initiated a negligence claim against Company A, a hospital, for failing to admit her on 3 November 2012 after she suffered a sentinel bleed from a cerebral aneurysm. The Plaintiff contended that had she been admitted, a major re-bleed the following day causing significant disability could have been avoided. The Defendant admitted negligence in failing to admit and conduct a CT scan but argued this did not causally affect the re-bleed outcome. The Plaintiff also alleged negligent delay in treatment related to the insertion of a ventriculo-peritoneal (VP) shunt for hydrocephalus, with the Defendant admitting some delay but disputing its extent. The court was tasked solely with determining liability and causation; damages quantification was reserved for later.

The facts reveal that the Plaintiff, aged 59 at the time, experienced an initial bleed on 3 November 2012, was discharged from hospital the same day, and suffered a major re-bleed on 4 November 2012. Medical records and witness statements detailed her condition, ambulance attendance times, hospital assessments, imaging results, and subsequent treatment including coiling of the aneurysm and later VP shunt insertion. The Plaintiff’s recovery trajectory, ongoing symptoms, and care arrangements were also described. The Defendant admitted negligence regarding admission and CT scanning but maintained that the re-bleed was inevitable. The delay in VP shunt insertion was partially admitted, with disagreement on the precise duration and its clinical impact.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Defendant’s failure to admit the Plaintiff and perform a CT scan on 3 November 2012 caused or materially contributed to the major re-bleed on 4 November 2012.
  2. Whether the delay in inserting the VP shunt between January and May 2014 constituted a breach of duty and whether it causally affected the Plaintiff’s outcome.
  3. The applicability of the 'but for' test versus the doctrine of material contribution in establishing causation in this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The Plaintiff argued that had she been admitted and a CT scan performed on 3 November 2012, the aneurysm would have been diagnosed and treated earlier, preventing the re-bleed on 4 November.
  • She contended that the delay in the insertion of the VP shunt was longer than admitted by the Defendant and that this delay contributed materially to her ongoing disability and suffering.
  • The Plaintiff’s expert opined that re-bleed risk would have been reduced with hospital management and that misdiagnosis increased the risk of poor outcome.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The Defendant admitted negligence in failing to admit and scan the Plaintiff but argued that this did not causally affect the timing or occurrence of the re-bleed.
  • They maintained that the subarachnoid haemorrhage protocol and hospital care would not have prevented the re-bleed, which was likely inevitable.
  • Regarding the VP shunt, the Defendant accepted delay only from end of January to May 2014 and argued this was consistent with standard medical practice and did not worsen the long-term outcome.
  • They emphasized the necessity of proving causation under the 'but for' test and submitted that increased risk alone was insufficient.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 AC 76 Burden of proof in causation; causality must be established, not inferred from gaps in evidence. Reaffirmed that claimant bears the burden of proving causation and that lack of knowledge does not relieve this burden.
Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 Doctrine of material contribution to harm where multiple causes exist. Referenced as part of the framework for when material contribution can substitute 'but for' causation.
McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 Distinction between increase in risk and material contribution to injury. Clarified that increased risk does not necessarily equate to material contribution; used to reject Plaintiff’s causation argument.
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32 Broader view of causation allowing inference of material contribution from increased risk in exceptional cases. Applied to explain limits of material contribution doctrine; Court found this case did not meet those exceptional circumstances.
Chester v Afshar [2004] 3 WLR 297 Exception to 'but for' causation in specific medical negligence context. Confirmed that material contribution doctrine is generally confined and that 'but for' causation remains main test.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed factual analysis, concluding the initial bleed occurred around 9am on 3 November 2012 and that the Plaintiff’s activity post-discharge was consistent with hospital protocol compliance, negating any increased risk from activity differences. The Court assessed medical evidence on the aneurysm, subarachnoid haemorrhage, hydrocephalus, and treatment protocols.

The Defendant’s admission of negligence in failing to admit and scan was accepted but the central causation issue was whether this negligence caused or materially contributed to the re-bleed on 4 November. The Court examined expert evidence, noting deficiencies in the Plaintiff’s expert reports, including failure to consider key medical evidence such as lumbar puncture results and statements from treating clinicians.

The Court emphasized the primacy of the 'but for' test in causation, referencing authoritative precedents that increased risk alone does not establish causation unless it can be shown on the balance of probabilities that the breach caused the harm. The Court found no credible evidence that hospital admission and treatment would have prevented or delayed the re-bleed, particularly given the timing and nature of the coiling procedure and the rapid progression of the haemorrhage.

Regarding the delay in VP shunt insertion, the Court accepted the Defendant’s concession of breach from end of January to mid-May 2014 but found the timing and clinical decisions around the shunt insertion were consistent with accepted medical practice. The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that the delay was longer or causally worsened the long-term outcome, concluding the delay only postponed the recovery process.

The Court also critically evaluated the conduct and reliability of the Plaintiff’s expert witness, finding his evidence deficient and less credible than that of the Defendant’s expert.

Holding and Implications

The Court’s final decision was to allow the claim only in part. The Court held that the Plaintiff’s claim failed on the primary issue of causation regarding the failure to admit and scan on 3 November 2012, as the negligence did not cause or materially contribute to the re-bleed on 4 November 2012.

However, the Court found in favour of the Plaintiff on the admitted breach concerning the delay in inserting the VP shunt between 31 January 2014 and 14 May 2014. The Court recognized this breach but considered that the delay did not affect the ultimate long-term outcome, only postponing the recovery process.

The claim is therefore dismissed except for the admitted breach concerning the VP shunt insertion delay, for which judgment is granted in favour of the Plaintiff.

The decision’s direct effect is to limit liability to the admitted delay in treatment rather than the initial failure to admit and diagnose. No new legal precedent is established; the ruling reinforces established principles on causation and the limits of material contribution doctrine in medical negligence.