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Cameron v Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd
Factual and Procedural Background
On 26 May 2013 the Plaintiff was injured when her vehicle was struck by a Nissan Micra. The Micra’s driver left the scene and has never been traced. The vehicle’s registered keeper declined to identify the driver and was convicted for that failure. Although an insurance policy had been issued in respect of the Micra, neither the keeper nor the driver was covered under it.
The Plaintiff initially sued the registered keeper and sought a declaration that Company A (the vehicle’s insurer) would be liable to satisfy any judgment. Company A denied liability because there was no evidence that the keeper was the driver. The Plaintiff then sought to amend her pleadings so that the Defendant would be described only as “the person unknown driving vehicle registration number Y598 SPS …”. District Judge Wright refused that amendment and entered summary judgment for Company A. The Plaintiff’s first appeal was dismissed, but the Court of Appeal (by majority) allowed a further appeal, permitted the claim against the unnamed driver, ordered that service on Company A be good service on the unnamed driver, and entered judgment accordingly. Company A appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether English civil procedure permits the commencement and service of proceedings against a wholly unidentified motor-vehicle driver described only by reference to the accident.
- Whether CPR 6.15 (alternative service) or CPR 6.16 (dispensing with service) can be used so that service on the insurer constitutes service on, or may be dispensed with for, an unidentified defendant.
- Whether, in light of the Sixth Motor Insurance Directive 2009/103/EC, national law must allow a direct claim against an insurer in circumstances where the liable driver cannot be identified.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments (Company A)
- Civil procedure requires that defendants be identifiable so that service can reasonably be expected to bring proceedings to their attention; an unidentified hit-and-run driver cannot be sued as “persons unknown”.
- Alternative service on Company A would not reach the driver and therefore violates the fundamental principle of natural justice embodied in Porter v Freudenberg.
- The statutory motor-insurance scheme provides an alternative compensation route through the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (“MIB”), so extending procedure to unnamed defendants is unnecessary and contrary to Parliament’s intention that insurers need satisfy only judgments properly obtained against drivers.
- The Sixth Motor Insurance Directive does not compel recognition of a direct action against an insurer in these circumstances, nor does it override domestic procedural safeguards.
Respondent’s Arguments (Plaintiff)
- The policy underlying compulsory motor-insurance legislation is to ensure that victims receive compensation whenever a policy exists for the vehicle, irrespective of the driver’s identity; therefore justice requires permitting suit against an unnamed driver.
- The court enjoys a discretionary power to allow actions against “persons unknown” where appropriate, as recognised in Bloomsbury Publishing Group v News Group Newspapers and subsequent authorities.
- The Plaintiff is entitled to choose between remedies; she should not be compelled to proceed against the MIB when a valid policy exists.
- The Sixth Motor Insurance Directive confers a direct right of action against insurers which should be read into the Road Traffic Act 1988, making the insurer directly liable even where the driver is unidentified.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Friern Barnet UDC v Adams [1927] 2 Ch 25 | Traditional bar on proceedings against unnamed defendants. | Cited as historical basis for general rule that claim forms require named defendants. |
| In re Wykeham Terrace [1971] Ch 204 | Earlier view that squatters could not be sued if unnamed. | Discussed; later authorities regarded the decision as wrong. |
| EMI Records v Kudhail [1985] FSR 35 | Representative actions including some unnamed defendants. | Illustrated limited exceptions where some defendants are identifiable. |
| Bloomsbury Publishing v News Group Newspapers [2003] 1 WLR 1633 | Opened jurisdiction to sue “persons unknown” described with sufficient certainty. | Contrasted with present case; here description did not identify anyone. |
| Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown [2016] 4 WLR 69 | Alternative service by email on anonymous online publisher. | Example of service where defendant, though unnamed, was identifiable and contactable. |
| Smith v Unknown Defendant (“Likeicare”) [2016] EWHC 1775 | Same principle as Brett Wilson. | Cited for practicability of alternative service when identity unknown but contact possible. |
| Middleton v Person Unknown [2016] EWHC 2354 | Use of anonymous-defendant procedure in hacking context. | Illustrated modern expansion of jurisdiction. |
| PML v Persons Unknown [2018] EWHC 703 | As above; hacking/blackmail. | Part of survey of recent authorities. |
| CMOC v Persons Unknown [2017] EWHC 3599 | As above; cyber-fraud. | Same. |
| Hampshire Waste Services v Intending Trespassers [2004] Env LR 9 | Anonymous defendants in protest/trespass cases. | Illustrative only. |
| Ineos Upstream v Persons Unknown [2017] EWHC 2945 | Quia timet injunctions against unidentified protesters. | Illustrative only. |
| UK Oil & Gas Investments v Persons Unknown [2018] EWHC 2252 | Further protest-related anonymous defendant case. | Illustrative only. |
| South Cambridgeshire DC v Gammell [2006] 1 WLR 658 | Effect of injunctions on persons who later commit prohibited acts. | Supported distinction between identifiable and unidentifiable defendants. |
| Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119 | Service of process subjects defendant to jurisdiction. | Used to explain conceptual role of service. |
| Dresser UK v Falcongate Freight Management [1992] QB 502 | Court seized only upon service, not issue, of writ. | Cited to underline importance of service. |
| Porter v Freudenberg [1915] 1 KB 857 | Substituted service must be likely to bring proceedings to defendant’s attention. | Principal authority for requirement of notice; applied to reject alternative service on insurer. |
| Murfin v Ashbridge [1941] 1 All ER 231 | Comment (obiter) on possible service via insurer. | Discussed then distinguished. |
| Gurtner v Circuit [1968] 2 QB 587 | Substituted service and Motor Insurers’ Bureau. | Discussed then distinguished. |
| Clarke v Vedel [1979] RTR 26 | Court of Appeal refusal of substituted service on MIB where unlikely to reach driver. | Approved by Supreme Court. |
| Abbey National v Frost [1999] 1 WLR 1080 | Permitted substituted service on solicitors’ indemnity fund; treated as limited exception. | Supreme Court considered but declined to extend its reasoning to motor-insurance context. |
| Bovale v Secretary of State for Communities [2009] 1 WLR 2274 | Status of practice directions vs. rules. | Used to show PDs cannot override general law. |
| Abela v Baadarani [2013] 1 WLR 2043 | Purpose of service is to inform defendant. | Reinforced necessity for service bringing notice. |
| Anderton v Clwyd CC (No 2) [2002] 1 WLR 3174 | Dispensing with service only when defendant already aware. | Guided discussion on CPR 6.16. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Judge Sumption, delivering the unanimous judgment, distinguished between two categories of unnamed defendants:
- Anonymous but identifiable persons (e.g. squatters) who can in principle be located and therefore served, even by alternative methods.
- Persons who are both anonymous and unidentifiable (e.g. most hit-and-run drivers).
The Defendant fell into the second category. The Court held that:
- Service of originating process is the act by which jurisdiction is established; a conceptual—not merely practical—possibility of service is essential.
- Alternative service under CPR 6.15 is legitimate only if the chosen method can reasonably be expected to bring the proceedings to the defendant’s attention. Authority for this proposition is rooted in Porter v Freudenberg and remains a fundamental principle of natural justice.
- Service on Company A could not be expected to reach the unidentified driver, who was neither insured under the policy nor contractually represented by the insurer. Consequently, the Court of Appeal’s order authorising such service was wrong.
- Dispensing with service under CPR 6.16 is permissible only in exceptional situations where the defendant is already aware of the proceedings or is deliberately evading service. No evidence supported such findings here.
- The statutory motor-insurance framework, supplemented by compensation under the MIB’s Untraced Drivers Agreement, demonstrates Parliament’s conscious decision not to impose direct liability on insurers where the tortfeasor is unidentifiable. Extending procedure to unnamed, unidentifiable drivers would conflict with that scheme.
- The Sixth Motor Insurance Directive does not compel a different result; the Directive does not require member states to allow proceedings that bypass basic procedural fairness or national rules on service.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED. The order of the Court of Appeal is set aside and the order of District Judge Wright reinstated, refusing the amendment to sue the unnamed driver and entering judgment for Company A.
Implications: The judgment confirms that English courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims against wholly unidentified persons unless service can be effected or properly dispensed with in accordance with CPR 6.15–6.16. Victims of hit-and-run incidents must continue to seek redress through the Motor Insurers’ Bureau rather than through insurers of the relevant vehicles. No new cause of action or procedural shortcut was created; the decision reinforces established principles of natural justice and service.
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