REGINA v A

Factual and Procedural Background

On 17 October 2017, the Appellant, then aged 16, and a co-accused arranged to meet a 15-year-old boy in a street in The City. The co-accused was armed with a knife and the Appellant with a metal pole or cosh. CCTV footage showed the Appellant and co-accused intimidating the boy, who was then stabbed twice by the co-accused without provocation. The boy died three days later. Both were arrested and charged with murder; the co-accused pleaded guilty to murder, and the Appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, accepted by the Prosecution.

The Appellant was remanded initially in youth detention accommodation for 8 days and subsequently remanded to local authority accommodation for 192 days, subject to an electronically monitored curfew and various restrictive conditions. At sentencing before the Honorary Recorder of The City on 11 May 2018, the Appellant was sentenced to 5 years' detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. The parties failed to inform the judge about the distinct types of remand or the significance of the electronic curfew, resulting in an incorrect calculation of credit for time spent on remand.

On 15 January 2019, after referral by the Registrar, permission to appeal against sentence was granted out of time due to late discovery of the credit issue. The Court quashed the original sentence and substituted a reduced sentence reflecting appropriate credit for time on electronically monitored curfew during local authority remand.

Legal Issues Presented

1. The responsibility of practitioners, especially prosecutors, to provide accurate assistance to judges on sentencing issues.
2. The extent to which time spent on remand in local authority accommodation under section 91(3) of the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 can be credited in sentencing.
3. If such time can be credited, the appropriate mechanism for applying any reduction in sentence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The sentencing judge erred by not adjusting the sentence to account for time spent on remand in local authority accommodation, which was not automatically credited.
• Alternatively, the judge should have adjusted the sentence to reflect the period under an electronically monitored curfew during local authority remand.
• The combination of conditions imposed during local authority remand amounted to a significant restriction on liberty warranting credit for the entire period.
• Credit of approximately half the time spent on qualifying curfew during local authority remand should be applied, consistent with the analogy in prior case law.

Respondent's Arguments

• It was inappropriate to give credit for the entire period of local authority remand but appropriate to give credit for half the time spent on qualifying curfew.
• Neither the Crown Court nor the appellate court has power to order authorities to give credit for time spent on local authority remand or qualifying curfew; such credit must be reflected in the calculation of sentence with the sentence imposed net of any credit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the statutory framework governing remands and sentence credit, focusing on sections of the Bail Act 1976, the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. It distinguished between remands to youth detention accommodation (s.91(4)) and local authority accommodation (s.91(3)). The former qualifies for automatic credit towards sentence under the administrative system, while the latter does not.

The Court noted that the sentencing judge was misled by inaccurate assistance from the parties regarding the credit for time spent on remand and electronic curfew. The Court acknowledged the statutory anomaly whereby local authority remand with electronic curfew does not amount to remand in custody for automatic credit purposes.

Drawing on the precedent in R v D & H, the Court accepted that time spent on qualifying electronically monitored curfew during local authority remand should be credited analogously when calculating sentence length, typically amounting to half the time spent under such conditions. However, credit for the entire period of local authority remand is not appropriate as this is not custody in the statutory sense.

The Court emphasised that neither the Crown Court nor the appellate court has power to order the authorities to give credit for time spent on local authority remand or qualifying curfew; such credit must be accounted for in the sentence calculation itself, with the sentence pronounced being net of any credit.

In the present case, the Court concluded that the interests of justice did not require credit beyond the 96 days for qualifying curfew. The 8 days spent in youth detention accommodation were automatically credited by the authorities.

Holding and Implications

The Court QUASHED the original sentence of 5 years' detention and substituted a sentence of 4 years and 269 days' detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. This substituted sentence reflected credit of 96 days for time spent on qualifying electronically monitored curfew during local authority remand.

The Appellant continues to receive automatic credit for the 8 days spent in youth detention accommodation.

The decision clarifies that while automatic administrative credit is only available for remand in youth detention accommodation, credit for qualifying curfew during local authority remand should be reflected in the sentence calculation. The Court reaffirmed that courts lack power to compel authorities to grant credit administratively for local authority remand periods; such credit must be incorporated into sentencing decisions. No new precedent was established beyond affirming existing statutory interpretation and case law.