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Coroner for the Birmingham Inquests v Hambleton & Ors
Factual and Procedural Background
After over forty years since the events of 21 November 1974, when bombs exploded in two crowded public houses in The City causing multiple deaths, the Senior Coroner for Birmingham agreed to reopen the inquests into those deaths following an application by family members of some of the deceased. A former Chief Coroner ("the Coroner") was appointed to conduct the resumed inquests. The central issue in the appeal concerned the Coroner's decision not to investigate the "Perpetrator Issue," meaning whether to call evidence identifying those who planned, planted, procured, and authorised the bombs.
In January 2018, the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division quashed the Coroner's decision on the basis that he had not posed the correct question regarding the connection of the identity of the bombers to the deaths. The Court remitted the decision back to the Coroner but refused to mandate inclusion of the Perpetrator Issue or declare a breach of article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention").
The Coroner appealed with permission, and the Respondents sought permission to cross-appeal against parts of the High Court’s order. The Chief Constable of West Midlands Police was an interested party supporting the Coroner’s position.
The original inquests had been opened in late 1974 but adjourned in 1975 due to criminal proceedings against six defendants ("the Birmingham Six"), who were convicted but later had their convictions quashed in 1991 due to flawed scientific evidence and police misconduct. An application to resume the inquests was made in 2015, supported by three main arguments: alleged state advance warning of the bombings, a police cover-up to protect an informer, and inadequacies in emergency response.
The Senior Coroner rejected the cover-up and emergency response issues but allowed reopening on the advance warning issue. The current Coroner held pre-inquest reviews, identifying four potential issues for the inquests: Forewarning, Agent/Informant involvement, Emergency Response, and the Perpetrator Issue. He decided to include Forewarning, deferred Agent/Informant, limited Emergency Response to individual evidence, but excluded the Perpetrator Issue from scope.
The Coroner’s ruling emphasized the statutory purpose of inquests, which is to answer who the deceased were and how, when, and where they died, not to conduct criminal trials or identify perpetrators. He cited statutory prohibitions against determining criminal liability and highlighted practical difficulties given the passage of time and prior investigations.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Coroner’s decision not to investigate the identity of the perpetrators ("Perpetrator Issue") in the resumed inquests was lawful.
- Whether the scope of the inquests should include evidence directed to identifying those responsible for the bombings, given statutory limitations and article 2 of the Convention.
- Whether article 2 of the Convention imposes a procedural obligation requiring the inquests to investigate the Perpetrator Issue.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Coroner’s decision involved an exercise of judgment and discretion regarding the scope of the inquests, challengeable only on Wednesbury unreasonableness grounds.
- The Coroner correctly limited the scope to matters necessary to answer the four statutory questions, excluding the Perpetrator Issue as it would amount to a proxy criminal trial.
- The statutory prohibitions against determining criminal liability at inquests justify excluding the Perpetrator Issue from scope.
- Article 2 procedural obligations do not require investigation into the identity of perpetrators through inquests when extensive criminal investigations have already been undertaken.
Respondents' Arguments
- The High Court's approach was correct in holding that the Coroner lacked broad discretion to exclude the Perpetrator Issue.
- It is impossible to answer "how the deceased came by their deaths" without exploring the identity of those responsible.
- The Coroner is obliged to investigate the Perpetrator Issue in all suspected homicide cases.
- Evidence about perpetrators should be called and considered, even if the jury cannot name individuals in conclusions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v McIlkenny & others [1992] 2 All ER 417 | Grounds for quashing convictions due to unreliable scientific evidence and police deception. | Established the context of the quashed convictions of the Birmingham Six, relevant to the scope of the inquests. |
| R v North Humberside Coroner, ex parte Jamieson [1995] QB 1 | Definition of "how" the deceased came by death as "by what means" and the duties of coroners to investigate relevant facts. | Supported the Coroner's interpretation of the statutory questions and limitations on findings relating to criminal liability. |
| R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] 2 AC 182 | Expanded meaning of "how" under article 2 procedural obligation to include "by what means and in what circumstances". | Confirmed that in article 2 inquests, the scope may be broader but does not require identification of perpetrators. |
| R v Inner West London Coroner, ex parte Dallaglio [1994] 4 All ER 139 | Coroner’s discretion in setting the scope of inquests and judicial review standards. | Referenced to affirm the Coroner's broad discretion and the limited grounds for judicial interference. |
| Jordan v The Lord Chancellor and another [2007] 2 AC 226 | Coroner’s duty to determine how widely the inquiry should extend to facts pertinent to death circumstances. | Used to support the notion that scope involves judgment rather than conventional discretion. |
| R v Secretary of State for Defence, ex parte Smith [2011] 1 AC 1 | Recognition of coroners’ considerable discretion in setting inquiry scope. | Supported the principle of broad discretion in inquest scope decisions. |
| R (Sreedharan) v HM Coroner for the County of Greater Manchester [2013] EWCA Civ 181 | Coroner’s broad discretion as to nature and extent of inquiry. | Reinforced the wide latitude afforded to coroners in managing inquests. |
| R (Maguire) v Assistant Coroner for West Yorkshire (Eastern Area) [2018] EWCA Civ 6 | Judicial review of a coroner’s decision on witnesses to call is limited to Wednesbury unreasonableness. | Confirmed that decisions on evidence and scope are fact-finding exercises subject to limited review. |
| R v South London Coroner, ex parte Thompson (1982) 126 SJ 625 | Inquests are fact-finding, not guilt-assigning exercises. | Supported the distinction between inquests and criminal trials. |
| R (Mack) v HM Coroner for Birmingham and Solihull [2011] EWCA Civ 712 | Wide area of judgment for coroners in deciding who to call as witnesses. | Used to underline the coroner’s discretion in evidentiary decisions. |
| Jordan v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 2 | Article 2 procedural obligation does not require inquests to identify perpetrators when police investigations exist. | Supported rejection of mandatory inclusion of Perpetrator Issue on article 2 grounds. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court carefully analysed the statutory framework governing coroners’ investigations, focusing on the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. It emphasized that the purpose of an inquest is to answer four statutory questions: who the deceased was, and how, when, and where they died. The court noted that in article 2 cases, the scope may be broadened to ascertain the circumstances of death, but this does not extend to identifying perpetrators when such findings would amount to determining criminal liability, which is prohibited.
The Coroner’s discretion to set the scope of inquests was affirmed as broad and to be exercised with regard to statutory purposes, practical realities, and fairness. The court rejected the High Court’s formulation of the key question as improperly expanding the scope beyond statutory limits. It found that the Coroner was correct to exclude the Perpetrator Issue because the jury is prohibited from making determinations of criminal liability, and the inquest process is distinct from criminal investigations or trials.
The court acknowledged the extensive prior police investigations and the quashing of the Birmingham Six convictions, noting that the failure of police investigations does not impose a duty on the Coroner to investigate the identity of perpetrators. It also rejected arguments that article 2 requires such investigation through inquests, distinguishing between procedural obligations to investigate state responsibility and substantive obligations to enforce the law, the latter being the police’s domain.
The court further recognized practical difficulties posed by the passage of time, the complexity of evidence, and the limited resources of the inquest process, concluding that including the Perpetrator Issue would be disproportionate and unsuitable.
Finally, the court underscored that while the jury could consider facts relevant to criminal liability, they cannot express opinions identifying or naming perpetrators, thus supporting the Coroner’s exclusion of the Perpetrator Issue from the scope.
Holding and Implications
The court ALLOWED the Coroner’s appeal and restored his ruling of 3 July 2017, confirming the exclusion of the Perpetrator Issue from the scope of the resumed inquests.
The Respondents' application for permission to bring a cross-appeal was refused.
The decision directly affects the parties by affirming the Coroner’s discretion to limit the inquest scope to the four statutory questions and excluding an inquiry into the identity of perpetrators, consistent with statutory prohibitions and the nature of inquests. No broader precedent altering the law was established; rather, the ruling clarified the application of existing principles to complex, historic inquests involving alleged state responsibility and article 2 procedural obligations.
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