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Laporte, R (on the application of ) v. Chief Constable of Gloucestershire
Factual and Procedural Background
The Claimant, a peace protester opposed to the 2003 Iraq war, booked a seat on one of three coaches travelling from The City to a lawful anti-war demonstration outside RAF Fairford on 22 March 2003. Acting under overall direction of the Chief Constable, police stopped the coaches at a lay-by near Lechlade, searched them pursuant to sections 60 and 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, seized a small number of items (including shields, hard hats and a flare), and identified eight members of the “Wombles” anarchist group.
No passenger-specific questioning occurred. Most passengers, including the Claimant, were compelled to remain on the coaches, which were escorted back to The City; doors were held shut and no comfort breaks were permitted. Three designated demonstration speakers were allowed to proceed; one passenger was arrested in relation to an earlier incident.
The Claimant sought judicial review of (1) the refusal to allow her to continue to the demonstration and (2) the enforced return journey. The Divisional Court rejected the first ground but upheld the second. The Court of Appeal affirmed both conclusions. The House of Lords (this opinion) hears the Claimant’s appeal on the first issue and the Chief Constable’s cross-appeal on the second.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether common-law powers to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace justified stopping the coaches and preventing the Claimant from attending the demonstration.
- Whether the police interference was “prescribed by law” and proportionate under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
- Whether the enforced confinement on the return journey constituted unlawful detention contrary to Article 5.
Arguments of the Parties
Claimant's Arguments
- The common-law power arises only where a breach of the peace is imminent; no such imminence existed at Lechlade.
- Police action was not “prescribed by law” because it exceeded domestic authority and statutory schemes under the Public Order Act 1986.
- The measure was indiscriminate and disproportionate, violating Articles 10, 11 and 5 ECHR.
Chief Constable's Arguments
- Police may take any reasonable steps to prevent a real risk of disorder; imminence is a flexible concept.
- The discovery of protective gear and the known presence of Wombles created a collective intent to cause disorder.
- No less intrusive measure was practicable; logistical constraints made selective action impossible.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Moss v McLachlan [1985] | Police may block demonstrators to avert imminent disorder. | Distinguished; House held facts here lacked the immediacy present in Moss. |
| Albert v Lavin [1982] | Power/duty to act when breach of peace “about to” occur. | Core authority; used to define the threshold of imminence. |
| R v Howell [1982] | “Imminent” breach justifies preventive action. | Re-affirmed as correct test; no breach imminent at Lechlade. |
| Humphries v Connor (1864) | Preventive steps against provocative conduct. | Cited historically; not determinative of outcome. |
| Piddington v Bates [1961] | Reference to “real possibility” test. | Treated as aberrant; court declined broad reasonableness standard. |
| O’Kelly v Harvey (1883) | Dispersal where no other means to keep peace. | Discussed; emphasised rarity of such power. |
| Steel v UK (ECHR 1998) | Concept of breach of peace compatible with “prescribed by law”. | Relied upon for Convention analysis. |
| Duncan v Jones [1936] | Police may relocate meeting to avert disorder. | Considered but not followed; modern proportionality standards applied. |
| Redmond-Bate v DPP (1999) | Police must protect lawful speech unless violence imminent. | Cited to support claimant’s free-speech argument. |
| Foulkes v Chief Constable (1998) | Necessity and imminence govern arrest power. | Used to illustrate proper standard of imminence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Threshold of Power: The House reaffirmed that common-law preventive powers arise only where a breach of the peace is imminent. Imminence is a strict prerequisite, not a sliding scale of “reasonableness”.
2. Application to Facts: At Lechlade no violence was occurring or about to occur; extensive policing plans at Fairford further reduced urgency. Mr Lambert’s own log recorded that arrest would be unlawful because no breach was imminent.
3. Prescribed by Law: Parliament has provided detailed statutory controls (Public Order Act 1986). Superimposing a broad common-law discretion would undermine that scheme; the police action therefore lacked a clear legal basis.
4. Proportionality: Measures were indiscriminate. Innocent passengers, including the Claimant, were treated as potential offenders without inquiry. Less intrusive alternatives (escorting to Fairford, targeting known Wombles) were available.
5. Detention on Return Journey: Confining passengers and denying basic needs amounted to detention not justified under Article 5; even if initial stop were lawful, forced return breached Convention rights.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; Cross-Appeal Dismissed.
The House declared that the Chief Constable’s actions in stopping the coaches and compelling the Claimant’s return were unlawful, not prescribed by law, and disproportionate under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. The judgment tightens the common-law threshold for police intervention, emphasising that preventive action requires an imminent breach of the peace and must be targeted and proportionate. It reaffirms the primacy of statutory public-order powers and reinforces protections for peaceful protest.
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