Regina v Trewin

Factual and Procedural Background

On 2nd December 2005, in the Crown Court at The City, before Judge Rucker and a jury, the Appellant was convicted on nine counts of a ten-count indictment alleging sexual offences against two boys. The case involved historic sexual abuse allegations, with complaints made several years after the alleged offences. The first three counts related to a boy born in 1983, with offences alleged to have occurred when he was between 9 and 11 years old. The remaining counts concerned another boy, born in January 1984, the son of the Appellant's cousin, who spent significant time at the Appellant's residence. The Appellant was acquitted on one count but convicted on the others, which included specimen counts covering different periods of alleged sexual misconduct.

The defence was a total denial of any sexual impropriety, contending that the accusers fabricated their stories. The Crown also relied on evidence from three other young men who alleged single incidents of sexual impropriety by the Appellant, which were admitted under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as evidence of the Appellant's propensity to molest adolescent boys.

Additionally, a substantial body of hearsay evidence was admitted to support the veracity of the five complainants, consisting of testimony from individuals to whom the complainants had made complaints at various times. Most complaints were made significantly after the alleged events. The Appellant was convicted following a retrial after the first jury failed to reach a verdict.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the hearsay evidence admitted under section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was properly admitted and properly directed to the jury.
2. Whether the bad character evidence relating to the three additional complainants was properly admitted and whether the jury was correctly directed on its use.
3. Whether the summing-up by the trial judge adequately directed the jury on the separate consideration of each complainant's evidence, particularly in relation to bad character evidence.
4. Whether the jury was properly directed on the burden and standard of proof.
5. Whether the direction on the Appellant's good character was adequate and properly conveyed its evidential significance.
6. Whether the interests of justice required a retrial following the quashing of the convictions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The hearsay evidence admitted under section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was improperly admitted, particularly as it related to complainants other than those named on the indictment.
• The jury was misdirected by the trial judge's summing-up, which failed to clearly instruct the jury to consider each complainant's evidence separately, especially regarding unproved allegations forming bad character evidence.
• The summing-up diluted the burden and standard of proof by emphasizing frailty of memory and discrepancies without adequate caution.
• The direction on good character was defective, failing to give the Appellant the full benefit and weight of his good character evidence, contrary to established legal principles.

Crown's Arguments

• The hearsay evidence was properly admitted to rebut suggestions of fabrication and to show the fact of complaints made by the witnesses.
• The phrase "the offence is one to which the proceedings relate" in section 120(7) could include offences alleged by other complainants relied upon under bad character provisions.
• The summing-up appropriately directed the jury on the burden and standard of proof, and no additional direction on innocent contamination was required.
• The direction on good character was fair, with the judge emphasizing the substantial body of evidence and the appellant's credibility.
• The interests of justice warranted a retrial, as confirmed by the complainants' expressed wishes.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Ian 0 [2006] EWCA Crim 556	Interpretation of "complaint made as soon as reasonably expected" under section 120(7) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.	The Court referred to this case to illustrate the wide interpretation of timely complaints and noted the trial judge did not consider this issue adequately in the present case.
R v Lowe [2007] EWCA Crim 3047	Proper jury directions on bad character evidence, including separate consideration of each incident and warnings about the significance of unproved allegations.	The Court criticized the trial judge's summing-up for failing to give clear directions on separate consideration of each complainant's evidence, referencing Lowe as guidance.
R v Alan V [2003] EWCA Crim 3641	Necessity of jury direction regarding risk of innocent contamination in cases involving multiple complainants.	The Court considered whether such a direction was required but concluded it was not necessary here as the issue was not specifically raised in cross-examination.
R v Chapman [2006] EWCA Crim 1656	Proper directions on the evidential significance of good character evidence and its role in assessing credibility and propensity.	The Court found the trial judge's direction on good character defective in Chapman and applied similar criticism to the present case, although noting the summing-up preceded Chapman.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the admissibility of hearsay evidence under section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, distinguishing between subsections governing admissibility and use of such evidence. It noted that while the hearsay evidence was admitted to rebut fabrication, the trial judge did not give the jury appropriate directions explaining the limited purpose and weight of this evidence, which was unduly favourable to the Appellant.

The Court expressed concern that the trial judge did not specifically consider whether complaints were made "as soon as reasonably could be expected," a key criterion under section 120(7), which was not addressed in the trial judge’s ruling. The Court acknowledged that some evidence may have been properly admitted but emphasized the need for more thorough scrutiny.

Regarding the summing-up, the Court found that the judge properly directed the jury to consider each count and complainant separately for those named on the indictment but failed to extend this caution to the three additional complainants whose evidence was admitted under bad character provisions. The judge’s compendious treatment of these witnesses' evidence risked the jury giving undue weight to unproved allegations without proper safeguards. The Court relied on the precedent in R v Lowe to highlight the necessity of clear directions on bad character evidence.

The Court rejected the submission that a direction on the risk of innocent contamination was required, noting the issue was not raised in cross-examination and the trial circumstances did not warrant it.

On the burden and standard of proof, the Court found no substantive error, observing that although the judge discussed memory frailty and discrepancies, he ultimately reaffirmed the correct standard without dilution.

The Court critically assessed the judge’s direction on good character, finding it failed to give the Appellant the full benefit of the evidential significance of his good character. While the judge recognized the Appellant’s good character as "powerful" evidence, the direction left it to the jury's unfettered judgment rather than instructing them on its proper weight, a defect akin to that found in R v Chapman.

Considering these factors collectively, particularly the deficiencies in the summing-up and directions relating to bad character and hearsay evidence, the Court concluded that the convictions could not be regarded as safe.

Holding and Implications

The Court ALLOWED THE APPEAL and QUASHED THE CONVICTIONS on all counts of which the Appellant was convicted.

The Court ordered a retrial on all offences, with a fresh indictment to be preferred and the Appellant to be re-arraigned within one month. Directions were given regarding bail conditions, including residence and non-contact with witnesses, and representation orders for the retrial were to be arranged.

No new legal precedent was established; rather, the decision emphasized the necessity of proper jury directions on hearsay and bad character evidence and the evidential significance of good character in sexual offence trials. The ruling underscores the importance of safeguarding the fairness of trials involving historic allegations and multiple complainants.