Hayes & Ors v Transco Plc

Factual and Procedural Background

Three claimants, all long-term employees (service engineers) of Company A, brought a claim for disturbance allowances under what they asserted was a term of their contracts of employment. The claimants included two employees and the executor of a deceased employee. The contracts incorporated a 1993 agreement containing provisions about travelling fares and disturbance allowances payable upon compulsory transfer between depots. The claimants contended that following a change in working practices in June 1995, they were compulsorily transferred between depots and thus entitled to disturbance allowances. Company A denied that the 1993 agreement remained part of the contracts after 1995 and argued that the claimants no longer had a "normal depot" under the new system.

The initial trial was held in November 2002 before Judge Trigger, who found in favour of the claimants, awarding them disturbance allowances plus interest and costs. Company A applied unsuccessfully for permission to appeal, then sought permission from the appellate court on grounds challenging both the merits and alleged procedural irregularities. The appellate court heard submissions in September 2003 and ultimately granted permission to appeal on procedural grounds, allowing the appeal and ordering a new trial.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the 1993 agreement, specifically section O concerning disturbance allowances, remained part of the claimants' contracts of employment after the 1995 change in working practices.
2. Whether the claimants retained a "normal depot" under the new working system post-1995, entitling them to disturbance allowances upon compulsory transfer.
3. Whether the trial judge's procedural decisions, particularly limiting cross-examination and excluding certain evidence, amounted to a serious procedural irregularity rendering the judgment unjust under CPR 52.11(3)(b).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Company A)

• The 1993 agreement, including section O, ceased to form part of the contracts after the 1995 changes.
• The claimants no longer had a "normal depot" but operated under a district or site start working system without a fixed base.
• The trial judge erred in limiting cross-examination and excluding relevant evidence, which was unfair and prejudicial.
• Section O should be construed in light of the 1993 circumstances, with a "normal depot" meaning a place used only outside working hours, which did not apply post-1995.

Respondents' Arguments (Claimants)

• Section O remained part of their contracts despite the 1995 changes.
• The claimants retained a "normal depot" and were compulsorily transferred between depots, entitling them to disturbance allowances.
• The procedural rulings at trial did not prejudice Company A.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the procedural history and the trial conduct, focusing on the fairness of the trial process under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). It acknowledged the wide case management powers of judges, including limiting cross-examination and excluding evidence, but emphasised that such powers must be exercised fairly.

The court found that both parties had overlapping factual and legal issues concerning the construction of section O of the 1993 agreement and the factual existence of a "normal depot" after 1995. Evidence about the changed working practices was central to these issues.

During the trial, the claimants introduced new documents without prior notice, and the trial judge allowed their admission. Company A sought to adduce previously excluded evidence and to cross-examine on it but was refused permission and subjected to a draconian time limit on cross-examination without reasonable notice. The judge justified this by the need to complete the trial within a limited timeframe.

The court concluded that the refusal to admit Company A's excluded evidence, coupled with the severe restriction on cross-examination, amounted to a serious procedural irregularity under CPR 52.11(3)(b). This was unjust because it deprived Company A of the opportunity to present relevant evidence on a key issue, the existence of a normal depot post-1995.

The court noted that the trial judge's observations about counsel's conduct, while robust, did not constitute procedural irregularity. The court also clarified that the refusal to admit two additional witnesses was not flawed.

Consequently, the court held that the trial judge erred in principle and that the procedural irregularity rendered the judgment unjust, necessitating a new trial. The court emphasised that the case management powers should be exercised with reasonable notice and fairness, especially when cross-examination is curtailed.

Holding and Implications

The appellate court ALLOWED THE APPEAL on the grounds of serious procedural irregularity and ORDERED A NEW TRIAL.

The direct effect is that the initial judgment in favour of the claimants is set aside, and the parties will retry the case with full opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, including the previously excluded evidence. The court highlighted that the new trial will be treated as a test case, with no issue estoppel arising from the previous judgment, allowing parties to advance any case as appropriate.

No new legal precedent on the substantive issues of contract construction or employment terms was established. The decision primarily clarifies the importance of procedural fairness and proper case management in trials, particularly regarding the admission of evidence and the conduct of cross-examination under CPR.