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Norowzian v Arks Ltd & Anor (No. 2)

England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Nov 4, 1999
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from a copyright infringement claim brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendants, Company A and Company B, concerning two films: the Plaintiff's film "Joy" and the Defendants' film "Anticipation". The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants copied a substantial part of "Joy" in producing "Anticipation". The claim against a third defendant, Company C, and claims for passing-off were abandoned during the trial. The trial lasted six days, and the judgment was delivered by Judge Rattee, who dismissed the Plaintiff's claim. The Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) seeking to overturn that decision.

The Plaintiff's film "Joy" is a short, dialogue-free film featuring a single man dancing on a rooftop in The City, with distinctive filming and editing techniques, notably the use of "jump cutting" to create a surreal effect. The Defendants' film "Anticipation" is an advertisement featuring a man waiting for a pint of beer to settle, performing a series of dance movements with similar jump-cut editing techniques. The Defendants argued that any similarities were limited to style and technique rather than substantive copying.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a film can be considered a "dramatic work" under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
  2. If the Plaintiff's film "Joy" qualifies as a dramatic work, whether the Defendants' film "Anticipation" copied a substantial part of it, constituting copyright infringement.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Plaintiff contended that the film "Joy" is itself a dramatic work, as it is a work of action capable of being performed before an audience, and thus protected under the 1988 Act.
  • The Plaintiff argued that the Defendants copied a substantial part of "Joy" in making "Anticipation", particularly pointing to similarities in filming and editing style and specific dance movements.
  • It was submitted that the copyright protection extends to the film as a whole, not just individual elements, and that the originality lay in the entire work's theme and presentation.
  • In the alternative, the Plaintiff argued that "Joy" was a recording of a dramatic work, though this submission was rejected by the trial judge.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Defendants maintained that a film per se cannot be a dramatic work under the 1988 Act, relying on the categorisation in the statute and previous legislation.
  • They argued that even if "Joy" were a dramatic work, "Anticipation" did not copy a substantial part of it, as the similarities were limited to general style and technique, which are not protected by copyright.
  • They illustrated this with examples such as the Pointillism art technique, emphasizing that copying style or technique alone does not constitute infringement.
  • The Defendants also contended that the trial judge's factual findings on substantial copying should be respected and not overturned on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ex p. Firth (1882) 19 Ch.D. 419 Procedural fairness regarding adducing evidence on new points not raised below. The court considered and rejected the Defendants' objection to the Plaintiff raising the point of whether a film can be a dramatic work at the appellate stage despite it not being distinctly taken below.
Pro Sieben Media AG v. Carlton UK Television Ltd [1999] FSR Appellate court's reluctance to overturn trial judge's findings on fact and degree, especially in copyright substantiality. The court applied this principle to uphold the trial judge's finding that the Defendants did not copy a substantial part of the Plaintiff's work.
Norowzian v Arks (No 1) [1998] FSR 394 Distinction between a physical film and the cinematographic work contained within it. Referenced in the analysis of whether the film "Joy" constituted a dramatic work or a recording of a dramatic work.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed whether a film can be considered a "dramatic work" under the 1988 Act. The trial judge had held that a film per se cannot be a dramatic work, but the Court disagreed. It reasoned that the statutory definition is broad and that a dramatic work includes works of action capable of performance before an audience, which can encompass films. The Court rejected the argument that the statutory categorisations imply mutual exclusivity between films and dramatic works and noted that the omission of an exclusion in the 1988 Act (present in earlier legislation) suggests inclusion rather than exclusion.

The Court also considered international obligations under the Berne Convention, concluding that cinematographic works must be protected as dramatic works under the 1988 Act.

Regarding the Plaintiff's film "Joy", the Court found it to be an original dramatic work in its own right, not merely a recording of a dramatic work. The film's unique editing and filming techniques contributed to its originality.

Turning to the question of copying, the Court upheld the trial judge's factual finding that the Defendants' film "Anticipation" did not copy a substantial part of "Joy". The similarities were limited to style and technique, which are not protected by copyright. The Court emphasized that the works' subject matters were different and that the essence and theme of "Joy" were not reproduced in "Anticipation".

The Court declined to overturn the trial judge's assessment of substantiality, applying established appellate principles that factual findings, especially those involving impressionistic judgments, should not be lightly disturbed.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED THE APPEAL.

The direct effect of the decision is the affirmation of the trial judge's dismissal of the Plaintiff's copyright infringement claim against the Defendants. The Court confirmed that a film can be a dramatic work under the 1988 Act but found that the Plaintiff's film was not substantially copied by the Defendants' film. No new precedent was set beyond clarifying the interpretation of "dramatic work" in relation to films within the statute. Costs were awarded against the Plaintiff in relation to the appeal.