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Governor of Her Majesty Prison Brockhill Ex Parte Evans, R v.
Factual and Procedural Background
On 12 January 1996 the Plaintiff was sentenced at The Crown Court to two years’ imprisonment. Pursuant to section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, time spent in custody before trial had to be deducted when fixing the conditional release date. That calculation was the statutory responsibility of the prison governor, here the Defendant.
Relying on a line of earlier Divisional Court decisions, the Defendant fixed the release date at 18 November 1996. Contending that the correct date was 17 September 1996, the Plaintiff:
- 6 September 1996 – applied for a writ of habeas corpus.
- 16 October 1996 – sought judicial review and damages for false imprisonment.
On 15 November 1996 the Divisional Court held that the lawful release date had always been 17 September 1996 and ordered the Plaintiff’s immediate release (Plaintiff v. Defendant [1997] QB 443). A subsequent damages claim was dismissed by Judge Collins, who nevertheless assessed general damages at £2,000. The Court of Appeal, by majority, reversed on liability and increased damages to £5,000 ([1999] QB 1043). The Defendant appealed to the House of Lords, which delivered judgment on 27 July 2000.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a prison governor is liable in the tort of false imprisonment when a prisoner is detained beyond the lawful release date in reliance on judicial authorities that are subsequently overruled.
- Whether English courts should embrace a doctrine of prospective overruling so as to shield officials from civil liability in such circumstances.
- Whether the Court of Appeal erred in increasing the general damages award from £2,000 to £5,000.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The Defendant was bound to follow existing Divisional Court authority; acting otherwise would breach the constitutional separation of powers.
- Detention pursuant to what was then accepted as “the law” constituted lawful justification; therefore no tort of false imprisonment arose.
- Introducing liability would be unfair to officials who faithfully obey judicial precedent; any change in law should operate only prospectively.
- Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not compel compensation where detention accords with prevailing judicial interpretation.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- False imprisonment is a tort of strict liability; once detention is adjudged unlawful, liability follows irrespective of good faith.
- The declaratory theory means the statute has always borne its true meaning; past judicial error cannot legalise continued detention.
- Article 5(5) of the Convention guarantees an enforceable right to compensation for unlawful detention.
- Denying damages would leave the victim without remedy while sheltering the State from the consequences of its own mistake.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Governor of Blundeston Prison, ex parte Gaffney [1982] 1 WLR 696 | Earlier method for calculating release dates on concurrent sentences. | Identified as erroneous; reliance on it could not justify continued detention. |
| R v Secretary of State (Home Office), ex parte Read (1987) 9 Cr App R (S) 206 | Same calculation approach as Gaffney. | Cited as part of the mistaken line of authority followed by the Defendant. |
| R v Governor of Styal Prison, ex parte Mooney [1996] 1 Cr App R (S) 74 | Confirmed Gaffney methodology. | Overruled by the Divisional Court; could not legitimise detention. |
| R v Secretary of State, ex parte Woodward & Wilson (24 June 1996) | Applied the same discount calculation. | Treated as part of the erroneously applied jurisprudence. |
| R v Secretary of State, ex parte Naughton [1997] 1 WLR 118 | Cast doubt on correctness of earlier discount cases. | Triggered the Plaintiff’s habeas corpus application. |
| R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex parte Evans [1997] QB 443 | Declared that the Plaintiff’s lawful release date was 17 September 1996. | Foundation for the finding that post-17 September detention was unlawful. |
| Eshugbayi Eleko v Officer Administering Government of Nigeria [1931] AC 662 | Executive must justify any interference with liberty before a court. | Cited as classical authority supporting strict liability for false imprisonment. |
| Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143 | Re-affirmed Eleko; courts safeguard liberty against executive action. | Used to reinforce need for legal justification of detention. |
| Colwell (1988) 13 NSWLR 714 | Australian authority: good-faith detention still actionable when unlawful. | Offered comparative support for the majority view in the Court of Appeal. |
| Fairhurst (1986) 8 Cr App R (S) 346 | Judicial discretion to discount pre-sentence custody. | Contrasted with governor’s non-discretionary statutory duty. |
| Towers (1987) 9 Cr App R (S) 333 | Example of sentencing discount. | Illustrative of discretionary judicial approach versus governor’s duty. |
| Lodde (C.A.), The Times, 8 Mar 2000 | Further example of discretionary discount. | Cited similarly to Towers. |
| Collins (1994) 16 Cr App R (S) 156 | Approach to remand time deduction later overruled. | Used as background to difficulties in applying section 67. |
| Olliet v Bessey (1682) T Jones 214 | Gaoler protected when acting under court warrant valid on its face. | Distinguished: no warrant fixed the Plaintiff’s release date. |
| Greaves v Keene (1879) 4 Ex D 73 | Similar principle regarding warrants. | Distinguished for same reason as Olliet. |
| Henderson v Preston (1888) 21 QBD 362 | Governor protected by clear warrant stating imprisonment term. | Court held no comparable protection existed here. |
| Olotu v Home Office [1997] 1 WLR 328 | Governor not liable where continued custody required court order for bail. | Held inapplicable; here release required no further order. |
| Percy v Hall [1997] QB 924 | Constable’s defence when reasonably enforcing byelaws later invalidated. | Analogy rejected; governor’s duty was strict, not discretionary. |
| Mee v Cruickshank (1902) 20 Cox 210 | Detention after sentence expiry amounts to false imprisonment. | Cited as traditional authority. |
| Demer v Cook (1903) 88 LT 629 | Warrant is gaoler’s sole protection; must not detain beyond its terms. | Used to illustrate absence of warrant authorising extended detention. |
| Benham v United Kingdom [1996] 22 EHRR 293 | Strasbourg view: validity of detention hinges on domestic law and court order. | Discussed while analysing Article 5 compatibility. |
| Engel v Netherlands [1976] 1 EHRR 647 | Detention may be arbitrary even if lawful domestically. | Referenced in Convention analysis. |
| Tsirlis & Kouloumpas v Greece [1997] 25 EHRR 198 | Convention test for arbitrariness. | Cited in Article 5 discussion. |
| Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245 | Law must be accessible and foreseeable. | Used while examining clarity of section 67. |
| Zamir v United Kingdom (1985) 40 DR 42 | Same “prescribed by law” requirement. | Referenced in the same context. |
| Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 | Debate on declaratory theory and restitution for mistake of law. | Considered during discussion of retrospectivity. |
| Launchbury v Morgans [1973] AC 127 | Observations on retrospective effect of overruling. | Cited in the same discussion. |
| Reg v National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte Hudson [1972] AC 944 | Judicial decisions normally operate retrospectively. | Relied on to reject prospective overruling in this case. |
| SW v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 363 | Courts may develop criminal law through interpretation. | Used to illustrate acceptability of judicial development. |
| Chevron Oil Co v Huson (1971) 404 US 97 | U.S. example of prospective overruling. | Mentioned in comparative discussion; not adopted. |
| Starrs v Ruxton 2000 SLT 42 | Scottish litigation foreshadowing Human Rights Act issues. | Cited as future arena for retrospectivity questions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Five Law Lords – Judges Slynn, Browne-Wilkinson, Steyn, Hope and Hobhouse – delivered concurring speeches.
Strict liability of false imprisonment. All judges accepted that the tort requires no proof of fault; detention must be justified by law. Once the Divisional Court declared that the lawful release date was 17 September 1996, any subsequent custody was ipso facto unlawful.
No valid justification. The Defendant could not rely on the sentencing order, which contained no release date. Section 67 placed the calculation duty squarely on the governor; mistaken judicial guidance did not transform unlawful detention into lawful custody.
Rejection of “good-faith” defence. Precedents such as Eleko and Boddington were invoked to affirm that executive belief in legality is irrelevant; liberty can be curtailed only if objectively lawful.
Prospective overruling declined. Although academic and comparative arguments for limiting the retrospectivity of judicial change were canvassed, the House held this was not an appropriate occasion to introduce such a doctrine. Liberty cases, they said, exemplify why full retrospective effect is necessary.
Convention compatibility. Judges Steyn and Hope analysed Article 5 ECHR, concluding that unlawful detention under domestic law necessarily breached the Convention, which in turn mandated compensation.
Damages assessment. The Court upheld the increased award of £5,000. Fifty-nine days of unlawful custody was “substantial”; the figure lay well within the discretionary range and provided guidance for future cases.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL. The House of Lords affirmed the Court of Appeal: the Defendant is liable for 59 days of false imprisonment and must pay £5,000 in general damages.
Implications: The ruling confirms that prison governors – and by extension the State – bear strict liability for unlawful detention even when acting on judicial precedent later overturned. The House declined to create a doctrine of prospective overruling, thereby reinforcing the declaratory nature of judicial decisions and the robust protection accorded to personal liberty.
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