Director of Public Prosecutions v Jones & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

On 1 June 1995 a Police Inspector observed 21 individuals standing on the grass verge alongside a public highway (the A344) next to The Monument at Stonehenge. The group displayed banners reading “Never Again,” “Stonehenge Campaign – 10 Years of Criminal Injustice,” and “Free Stonehenge.” Concluding that the gathering was a “trespassory assembly” under an order made pursuant to section 14A of the Public Order Act 1986, the officer required the participants to disperse. Several complied, but the two Appellants remained. They were arrested, charged, and subsequently convicted by The Local Magistrates’ Court.

On appeal, the Crown Court overturned the convictions, finding that the gathering was peaceful, non-obstructive, and constituted reasonable use of the highway. The Respondent then appealed by way of case stated to the Divisional Court, which reinstated the convictions. The present appeal to the House of Lords concerns that reinstatement and, more broadly, the scope of the public’s common-law rights on the public highway.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the common-law “public right of access” to the highway is confined to passage and activities strictly ancillary to passage, thereby excluding any right of peaceful assembly.
2. Whether a peaceful, non-obstructive assembly falls outside the “particular purpose” for which the public is entitled to use the highway within the meaning of section 14A(9) of the Public Order Act 1986.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

• A peaceful and non-obstructive assembly on the highway is lawful and within the scope of the public right to use the highway.
• The existence of a section 14A order cannot itself define or curtail the limits of that right; instead, the statute presupposes whatever limits already exist at common law.
• Article 11(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights recognises a substantive right of peaceful assembly that should be accommodated within domestic common law.

Respondent’s Arguments

• The public right of access to a highway is limited to passing and repassing and activities incidental to that purpose; any assembly, even if peaceful and non-obstructive, exceeds that limited right and is therefore trespassory.
• Because the assembly exceeded the public’s limited right, it fell within the prohibitory scope of the section 14A order, rendering the Appellants liable under section 14B(2).

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Delivering the principal speech, Judge Irvine observed that the Divisional Court’s approach conflated the effect of a section 14A order with the underlying limits of common-law highway rights. He described this reasoning as “circular,” explaining that section 14A presupposes pre-existing limits; it does not itself create them. The analysis of Judge McCowan was therefore criticised for relying on the very order whose validity depended on the contested limits.

The House examined the common-law authorities invoked below. In Ex parte Lewis, the court had contemplated an assembly causing obstruction or nuisance; it did not necessarily bar a peaceful, unobstructive gathering. Likewise, Harrison v. Duke of Rutland concerned deliberate interference with landowner interests and sport, not a peaceful demonstration. Judge Irvine suggested that these earlier cases did not conclusively resolve whether a non-obstructive, peaceful assembly was outside the highway right.

The opinion further noted that the Divisional Court dismissed the relevance of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights by characterising common-law toleration of peaceful assemblies as adequate. Judge Irvine questioned whether mere toleration, as opposed to recognition of a right, satisfies the Convention’s requirements.

Holding and Implications

This information was not available in the provided opinion.