Turner v. Grovit and Others

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, an English-qualified solicitor domiciled in The State, was employed as “Group Solicitor” within a multinational currency-exchange structure referred to in the judgment as the “Company Group.” His employing entity was successively changed within that group, most recently to Company A, an overseas company registered in The State. In late 1997 the Plaintiff relocated temporarily to Foreign City 4 under an amended but still English-law contract. After working there for only 35 days, he alleged repudiatory breaches of contract, resigned, and on 2 March 1998 began unfair- and wrongful-dismissal proceedings against Company A before an Employment Tribunal in The State.

Company A challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing that the Plaintiff’s place of employment was Foreign State 1 and that it (Company A) should be sued in Foreign State 3 or Foreign State 2. The Tribunal rejected these objections; its decision was upheld by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, and the substantive employment claim later succeeded, with substantial damages awarded.

Meanwhile, on 21 October 1998 Company B, another member of the Company Group, started proceedings against the Plaintiff in the court of First Instance in Foreign City 4, claiming approximately 85 million pesetas for alleged breaches of a “service agreement.” The Plaintiff denied that court’s jurisdiction and, on 18 December 1998, applied in the High Court of The State for an injunction restraining the Defendants (the Defendant individual, Company A and Company B) from pursuing the Foreign City 4 action.

A temporary injunction was granted ex parte but was later discharged by a Deputy Judge. The Court of Appeal allowed the Plaintiff’s appeal, finding the Foreign City 4 proceedings an abuse of process designed solely to harass and hinder the Employment Tribunal claim. It issued wide restraining orders against the Defendants. The Defendants appealed to the House of Lords, contending that such “anti-suit” relief is incompatible with the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 1968 (“the Convention”). The House of Lords, considering the point not acte clair, decided to refer the compatibility question to the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, after the Convention’s incorporation into domestic law, courts in The State retain power to grant injunctions restraining parties from commencing or continuing proceedings in another Convention country.
2. If such a power exists, whether its exercise on the ground that the foreign proceedings are brought in bad faith to obstruct domestic litigation is consistent with the Convention, particularly Articles 21–23.
3. Whether the existence of earlier Employment Tribunal proceedings in The State engaged Article 21 (“lis alibi pendens”) so as to affect the grant of injunctive relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants’ Arguments

• The Convention has displaced any domestic power to restrain proceedings in another Convention state; therefore the courts of The State lack jurisdiction to issue such injunctions.
• Even if some power survives, using it to curb alleged “abusive” litigation is inconsistent with the Convention because jurisdictional disputes must be resolved exclusively by the foreign court seised.
• Article 21 precludes the courts of The State from intervening; only the Foreign City 4 court may determine whether the two sets of proceedings involve the same cause of action and parties.

Plaintiff’s (Amicus-Curiae) Arguments

• The injunction is directed in personam at the Defendants, not at the foreign court, and therefore does not trespass on that court’s jurisdiction.
• Domestic law (Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 37(1)) expressly empowers courts to grant relief where a party’s conduct is “unconscionable,” including abusive foreign litigation meant to frustrate existing domestic proceedings.
• Nothing in the Convention expressly or implicitly removes that equitable power, provided the order is based on conduct and not on the forum-conveniens doctrine.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Lord Hobhouse, delivering the principal speech, emphasised that:

• An anti-suit injunction is directed solely at the party before the court; it does not question or bind the foreign court’s jurisdiction.
• The statutory authority for such relief is s. 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, limited by equitable principles requiring “unconscionable,” “vexatious,” or “oppressive” conduct.
• The Court of Appeal had expressly found, on uncontested evidence, that the Foreign City 4 action was a “sham and pretence” orchestrated by the Defendant with the sole purpose of harassing the Plaintiff and undermining the Employment Tribunal proceedings.
• Under domestic doctrine, three elements justified the injunction: (a) existing litigation in The State; (b) foreign proceedings brought in bad faith to obstruct it; and (c) necessity to protect the domestic process.
• The Convention’s text contains no clause expressly forbidding such injunctions. Because the order addresses conduct, not jurisdiction, it does not contravene Articles 21–23 or impair mutual trust.
• Nevertheless, differing views expressed about the Convention’s scope meant that the matter was not acte clair. Article 3(1) of the 1971 Luxembourg Protocol therefore obliged the House to refer the interpretative question to the ECJ.

Holding and Implications

ORDER: QUESTION REFERRED TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE.

The House of Lords unanimously decided that a definitive interpretation of the Convention is necessary and formulated a reference asking whether it is inconsistent with the Convention for courts in The State to enjoin parties, subject to their jurisdiction, from pursuing foreign proceedings commenced in bad faith to frustrate domestic litigation. Pending the ECJ’s ruling, the validity of the Court of Appeal’s restraining orders remains provisional. No broader precedent on the merits was set, but the reference signals the potential for ECJ clarification of the interface between equitable anti-suit relief and Convention rules.