Permanent Secretary & Ors v Ramjohn (Trinidad and Tobago)

Factual and Procedural Background

These consolidated appeals arise from two separate judgments of the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago dated 8 July 2009. Both concern the scope of the Prime Minister’s (“Appellant”) powers under section 121 of the Constitution, which regulates appointments to senior public offices and the Appellant’s power (i) to transfer certain officers to posts abroad and (ii) to veto appointments recommended by the Public Service Commission (“PSC”).

First Appeal – Respondent A

• Respondent A, a career Foreign Service officer, was transferred on 24 May 2004 to a post at the Republic’s High Commission in London under section 121(6)(b).
• After she had sold her belongings and prepared to relocate, the Appellant revoked the transfer on 4 June 2004, citing an intelligence report that allegedly linked her to the disappearance of blank passports in 2001. No reasons were given to her at the time.
• Respondent A commenced judicial review on 11 June 2004. The trial judge quashed the revocation and awarded damages; the Court of Appeal set aside the quashing and damages but declared that she had been treated unfairly.
• The Appellant now challenges that declaration; Government Officer A also seeks an adverse costs order against Respondent A.

Second Appeal – Respondent B

• Respondent B topped PSC interviews in 2001 for Commissioner of State Lands, an office covered by the section 121(4) veto. Legislative changes delayed the appointment until 2004.
• On 22 October 2004 Government Minister A advised the Appellant that the post’s responsibilities had widened and suggested re-interviewing the top three candidates. The Appellant vetoed Respondent B on 10 November 2004.
• The PSC then promoted the second-ranked candidate. Respondent B’s request for reasons under the Judicial Review Act 2000 was met only with the statement that the Appellant “did not support” his promotion.
• The trial judge dismissed Respondent B’s claim; the Court of Appeal declared that the Appellant had breached the rules of natural justice. The Appellant appeals; Respondent B seeks additional remedies.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, in exercising powers under section 121(4) and 121(6) of the Constitution, the Appellant is a “person acting in the exercise of a public duty or function in accordance with any law” and therefore subject to section 20 of the Judicial Review Act 2000, which mandates fairness and observance of natural justice.
2. If so, what procedural fairness is required when (a) revoking an overseas transfer already effected (first appeal) or (b) vetoing a PSC-recommended promotion (second appeal).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The revocation and veto were operational or managerial decisions, comparable to routine staff deployment, and therefore outside the court’s supervisory jurisdiction (relying on R (Tucker)).
• National security considerations justified withholding reasons from Respondent A; divulging the intelligence report risked further harm.
• Urgency surrounding replacement of an officer implicated in wrongdoing precluded consultation with Respondent A.
• In the second appeal, the veto power is primarily political; fairness standards are limited and did not require giving Respondent B reasons or an opportunity to respond.

Respondents' Arguments

• The Appellant exercised public powers and was therefore bound by section 20 of the Judicial Review Act to act fairly.
• Revoking Respondent A’s appointment without notice or explanation, after she had materially altered her position, was manifestly unfair.
• Vetoing Respondent B without disclosing any grounds or providing a rational explanation was irrational and contrary to natural justice.
• National-security assertions were irrelevant: no security risk would have arisen from informing the affected officers of the allegations or reasons.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Statutory Applicability. The Board (per Judge Brown) held that the Appellant’s powers under section 121 are public functions; section 20 of the Judicial Review Act therefore obliges the Appellant to act “in accordance with the principles of natural justice or in a fair manner.”

First Appeal. Revoking Respondent A’s overseas posting on the basis of an untested intelligence report, without disclosing the allegation or allowing any response, was procedurally unfair. National security was no bar: revealing the allegation to Respondent A posed no risk. The urgency argument lacked evidential support. Distinguishing Tucker, the Board confirmed the Court of Appeal’s declaratory relief and rejected the subsidiary costs appeal.

Second Appeal. The veto power is constitutionally broad but must be exercised rationally and fairly. While fairness does not invariably require advance consultation, the total absence of any stated reason or rational explanation rendered the decision unfair. The Board varied the declaration to emphasise the lack of rationality and explanation rather than an absolute duty to consult. Claims for damages and disclosure were dismissed: (i) no pleaded cause of action survived under section 8(4) of the Judicial Review Act; (ii) PSC minutes were exempt under the Freedom of Information Act.

General Observations. The Board stressed that its findings rest on the “very particular circumstances” shown by the evidence; good-faith executive action will rarely be disturbed, but fairness may nonetheless require disclosure or explanation where significant interests are affected.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Appellant’s appeals are DISMISSED. The declarations of unfairness are upheld; in the second appeal the declaration is varied to state that the Appellant failed to act rationally or to provide a rational explanation. All cross-appeals for further relief are DISMISSED.

Implications: The decision affirms that the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, when exercising constitutional powers of transfer or veto under section 121, is subject to the statutory duty of fairness. While the veto remains a broad political tool, its exercise must be rational and, where individual reputations or legitimate expectations are at stake, accompanied by adequate explanation. The judgment does not create a general licence for disappointed candidates to litigate; challenges will succeed only in exceptional cases where clear unfairness is demonstrated.