Everett, R (on the application of) v Bristol City Council

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal from a judicial review application relating to the service and subsequent withdrawal of an abatement notice issued under Part III of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 ("the 1990 Act"). The local authority, Company A, served an abatement notice on the owner of a residential property ("the Property") following a complaint by the tenant, the Appellant, about the steepness of an internal staircase which was alleged to be a statutory nuisance. The notice required the removal and reconstruction of the staircase in compliance with Building Regulations. The tenant initially accepted the tenancy aware of the staircase's steepness but later found it difficult to use due to a back injury and complained. The local authority withdrew the abatement notice following legal advice that an excessively steep staircase could not constitute a statutory nuisance. The tenant sought judicial review of this withdrawal, which was dismissed by the High Court. The tenant appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether premises in such a state as to create a likelihood of accident causing personal injury constitute a statutory nuisance under section 79(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.
2. Whether the local authority had the power to withdraw the abatement notice once served.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Section 79(1)(a) of the 1990 Act covers premises that are in such a state as to be likely to cause injury to health by accidental physical injury, not limited to disease or infection.
• The ordinary meaning of "injury to health" includes accidental physical injuries such as falls or burns.
• Legislative history should not restrict the scope of the 1990 Act to disease alone, as the Act consolidates and amends earlier legislation and introduces new nuisances.
• Case law prior to the 1990 Act supports the view that dangerous premises creating a risk of injury fall within statutory nuisance provisions.
• An updated construction of the statute is necessary to reflect contemporary standards of health and safety risks.
• Examples of risks covered should include defective wiring, gas installations, lack of handrails, and other hazards causing potential accidental injury.

Respondent's Arguments

• The statutory language and legislative history show that "injury to health" refers to disease or ill-health, not accidental physical injury.
• Historical statutes and case law demonstrate that statutory nuisance provisions target sanitary issues and threats to public health, not physical dangers.
• Separate statutory regimes, such as the Building Act 1984, address dangerous buildings and physical injury risks.
• The local authority lawfully withdrew the abatement notice based on legal advice that the staircase did not constitute a statutory nuisance.
• It is not appropriate for the court to expand the scope of the 1990 Act beyond its long-standing interpretation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Great Western Railway Co v Bishop (1872) LR 7 QB 550	Statutory nuisance provisions relate to nuisances injurious to health understood as disease, not physical injury.	The court relied on this case to affirm that statutory nuisance legislation targets sanitary matters and disease risk, excluding physical injury risks.
Coventry City Council v Cartwright [1975] 1 WLR 845	Physical injury from dangerous premises does not constitute "prejudicial to health" under statutory nuisance provisions.	Supported the conclusion that the statutory nuisance regime concerns health threats from disease rather than accidental physical injury.
R v Parlby (1889) 22 QBD 520	Historical case law relevant to the interpretation of "injury to health" in nuisance statutes.	Cited to demonstrate that earlier courts did not restrict "injury to health" to disease alone but did not extend it to accidental injury risks.
Turley v King [1944] 2 All ER 489	Case law on statutory nuisances and health-related interpretations.	Referenced in the context of statutory nuisance interpretation supporting the traditional meaning.
Cunningham v Birmingham City Council (1998) 30 HLR 158	Considerations of statutory nuisance and health risks.	Used to illustrate the settled understanding of statutory nuisance scope.
London Borough of Southwark v Ince (1989) 21 HLR 504	Judicial interpretation of statutory nuisance provisions.	Supported the traditional scope of statutory nuisance focused on health risks from disease.
Pearshouse v Birmingham City Council (Unreported, 4 Nov 1998)	Relevant case on statutory nuisance and injury to health.	Considered in argument but did not establish coverage of accidental physical injury.
Birmingham City Council v Oakley (Unreported, 18 Dec 1998)	Recent case affirming that statutory nuisance provisions do not cover accidental physical injury.	Followed the reasoning that statutory nuisances relate to disease risk, not physical injury.
Bishop Auckland Local Board v The Bishop Auckland Iron and Steel Co (1882) LR 10 QB 138	Distinguished case clarifying scope of "injury to health" in nuisance context.	Confirmed that injury to health does not include accidental physical injury but relates to nuisance from offensive smells and similar causes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed statutory construction exercise focusing on the language and legislative history of section 79(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, which defines statutory nuisances as including premises "in such a state as to be prejudicial to health or a nuisance." The court acknowledged that, linguistically, the phrase "injurious, or likely to cause injury, to health" could be interpreted broadly enough to include accidental physical injury. However, the court gave greater weight to the legislative history, tracing the language back to mid-19th century public health statutes aimed at preventing disease and ill-health rather than physical accidents.

The court noted that separate statutory provisions and regulatory regimes exist to address physical dangers in buildings, such as the Building Act 1984 and Building Regulations, which are discretionary and distinct from the mandatory statutory nuisance regime. The court also relied on established case law, including Great Western Railway Co v Bishop and Coventry City Council v Cartwright, which consistently interpreted statutory nuisance provisions as targeting health risks from disease rather than physical injury.

The court rejected the appellant's argument for an updated or broader interpretation that would include accidental injury risks, emphasizing that the statutory language has been judicially understood for over a century and that any change in scope is a matter for Parliament. The court further reasoned that the physical dangers posed by the steep staircase did not fall within the intended scope of the statutory nuisance provisions and that the local authority's withdrawal of the abatement notice was lawful.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal.

The holding confirms that the statutory nuisance provisions under section 79(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 do not extend to premises that are likely to cause accidental physical injury, but are confined to nuisances prejudicial to health in the sense of disease or ill-health. Consequently, a steep internal staircase, although potentially hazardous, does not constitute a statutory nuisance under the Act. The local authority was entitled to withdraw the abatement notice served on the property owner. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming the traditional interpretation of the statutory nuisance regime. The risk of accidental injury in premises remains subject to other statutory frameworks such as the Building Act 1984 and Building Regulations.