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Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellant, an employee of the Respondent, suffered personal injuries on 3 April 1942 when dangerous machinery was allegedly left unfenced. From 30 April 1942 the Respondent paid the Appellant weekly sums of £1 15s. as workmen’s compensation until the Appellant returned to work on 2 October 1942. On 24 July 1942 the Appellant’s solicitor wrote to the Respondent reserving a possible common-law claim. On 5 February 1943 the Appellant issued a writ seeking damages for negligence and breach of statutory duty.
At first instance, Judge [Laski] (Manchester Assizes) dismissed the claim, holding that section 29(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1925 barred the action. A specially constituted Court of Appeal (presided over by Judge [Greene]) unanimously affirmed that decision. The present appeal to the House of Lords challenged both the dismissal of the action and the continuing authority of two earlier Court of Appeal cases on which the Respondent had relied.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under section 29(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1925, a workman who has accepted weekly payments “under the Act” is thereafter barred from pursuing a common-law action for damages arising from the same injury.
- Whether the Court of Appeal decisions in Perkins v. Hugh Stevenson & Sons Ltd. [1940] 1 KB 56 and Selwood v. Townley Coal & Fireclay Co. Ltd. [1940] 1 KB 180 were correctly decided and, if correct, whether they bound the House in the present case.
- On the facts, whether the Appellant had irrevocably exercised his statutory “option” by continuing to accept compensation after becoming aware of his alternative common-law remedy.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The earlier authorities (Perkins and Selwood) were wrongly decided or distinguishable; mere receipt of payments should not extinguish the common-law remedy unless the workman had knowingly and conclusively “opted.”
- Section 29 should be read as merely preventing the employer from paying twice; damages can be reduced by any sums already received, so no injustice to the employer arises.
- The Appellant accepted payments before fully appreciating the statutory choice; therefore the “option” had not been exercised when the writ was issued.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Court of Appeal precedents establish that acceptance of compensation as such bars a subsequent action for damages; the House should follow or uphold them.
- Section 29 independently protects an employer from dual liability. Because payments were made and received under the Act, the Appellant’s action is statutorily excluded.
- By July 1942 the Appellant knew of the choice yet continued to draw compensation; this conduct amounts to a deliberate exercise of the statutory option.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Perkins v. Hugh Stevenson & Sons Ltd. [1940] 1 KB 56 | Acceptance of payments with knowledge of alternative bars common-law action. | Upheld for its actual facts; used to demonstrate that conscious receipt of payments operates as an election. |
| Selwood v. Townley Coal & Fireclay Co. Ltd. [1940] 1 KB 180 | Mere receipt of a single payment under the Act bars later action. | Criticised as going too far; not followed to the extent it conflicts with a knowledge-based test. |
| Brown v. William Hamilton & Co. 1944 SLT 282 | Section 29’s later words are explanatory, not a separate bar; damages may be reduced by sums already paid. | Endorsed for the proposition that prior payments can be set off against damages, preserving employer from double payment. |
| Unsworth v. Elder Dempster Lines Ltd. [1940] 1 KB 658 | Payments under the Act may be deducted from any damages awarded. | Cited to reject the view that an employer would necessarily “pay twice.” |
| Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. Ltd. v. M’Mullan [1934] AC 1 | Breach of statutory duty remains an alternative common-law remedy. | Used to illustrate that common-law rights survive unless expressly removed. |
| Coe v. London & North Eastern Ry. Co. [1943] KB 531 | Discussion of “option” versus equitable “election.” | Quoted to contrast differing views on the knowledge required for a binding choice. |
| Lissenden v. C.A.V. Bosch Ltd. [1940] AC 412 | Distinction between equitable election and statutory choice. | Cited to clarify that section 29 involves a statutory, not equitable, option. |
| Bennett v. L. & W. Whitehead Ltd. [1926] 2 KB 380 | Institution of proceedings may constitute an irrevocable choice. | Referenced in analysing whether the initiation or withdrawal of claims finalises the worker’s option. |
| Cribb v. Kynoch Ltd. (No. 2) [1908] 2 KB 551 | Failure in one forum bars subsequent pursuit in the other. | Relied on to show that once proceedings are carried to conclusion the alternative remedy is lost. |
| Burton v. Chapel Coal Co. Ltd. 1909 SC 430 | Scottish approach to finality after pursuing one remedy. | Discussed as comparative authority; not adopted in full. |
| Blain v. Greenock Foundry Co. (1903) 5 F 893 | Limits on switching remedies if Act does not apply. | Reviewed but not determinative. |
| M'Donald v. James Dunlop & Co. (1905) 7 F 533 | As above, Scottish treatment of abandonment and re-litigation. | Considered in historical survey. |
| Rouse v. Dixon [1904] 2 KB 628 | Comment on when a choice is made “to a decision.” | Used in examining the stage at which the option crystallises. |
| Edwards v. Godfrey [1899] 2 QB 333 | Effect of failing in one forum on the right to proceed in the other. | Cited for analogy on finality. |
| Mackay v. Rosie 1908 SC 174 | Acts as evidence of choice. | Referenced in the broader discussion of conduct amounting to election. |
| Birch v. Pease & Partners Ltd. [1941] 1 KB 615 | Conduct evidencing a binding election. | Considered but not central to outcome. |
| Kinneil Cannel & Coking Coal Co. Ltd. v. Waddell [1931] AC 575 | Employer’s protection from double liability. | Quoted to support the view that the section prevents double payment, not necessarily double process. |
| Codling v. John Mowlem & Co. Ltd. [1914] 2 KB 61 | Employer’s right not to pay twice interpreted from earlier statute. | Discussed in evaluating the historical backdrop of section 29. |
| Kendall v. Hamilton (1879) 4 App Cas 504 | General dictum that election requires knowledge. | Cited—but distinguished—as originating in a different context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The House gave five separate speeches, each concurring in the dismissal of the appeal but offering varied analyses. The majority reasoning may be summarised as follows:
- Statutory Framework: Section 29(1) preserves the employer’s civil liability but forbids the worker from simultaneously pursuing statutory compensation and a common-law action, thereby protecting the employer from dual exposure.
- Nature of the “Option”: The provision confers a statutory, not equitable, choice. While knowledge of the alternative remedy is relevant, the decisive factor is the worker’s deliberate conduct. Acceptance of compensation after learning of the alternative amounts to an irrevocable election.
- Assessment of Earlier Authority:
- Perkins was upheld on its facts because the worker continued to accept weekly payments long after becoming aware of his common-law rights.
- Selwood was criticised for suggesting that even a single, unsolicited payment could bar an action where the worker lacked knowledge of the alternative.
- Double-Payment Point: The Court rejected the argument that permitting a damages action would necessarily make the employer “pay twice,” noting that any sums already received under the Act would simply be deducted from damages.
- Application to Present Facts: The Appellant knew of his alternative remedy by July 1942 yet continued to draw statutory compensation until October 1942. This constituted a conscious and final exercise of the statutory option, barring subsequent common-law proceedings.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED with costs.
Because the Appellant knowingly continued to receive statutory compensation after becoming aware of his alternative remedy, section 29(1) precluded his common-law action. The House affirmed the core reasoning of Perkins, disapproved the broader reach of Selwood, and clarified that prior payments may be deducted from any future damages to prevent double recovery. The decision leaves intact the overarching principle that an informed acceptance of one remedy irrevocably excludes the other, but it limits the circumstances in which mere receipt of payments will bar a claim. No new cause of action was created; the immediate effect is the final dismissal of the Appellant’s suit.
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