- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Elmi v Harrods Ltd & Anor
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from judgments of the Employment Appeal Tribunal concerning the interpretation of section 7 of the Race Relations Act 1976. The appellant, Company A, operates a well-known retail store where it licenses third-party companies ("Licensees") to manage specific departments. The Licensees employ staff who must be approved by Company A and adhere to its rules, including uniform and conduct standards. Although these staff members are employed by the Licensees, they sell goods owned by Company A at the point of sale.
Three complainants, identified as the Respondents, brought claims of unlawful racial discrimination against Company A. None were employees or applicants for employment directly with Company A but were employed or sought employment through Licensees. The complaints arose from Company A’s withdrawal of approval or refusal to approve these individuals, resulting in loss of employment or employment opportunity.
The Industrial Tribunals initially held that claims under section 7 could be brought against Company A. Company A appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which dismissed the appeals and allowed one appeal by a complainant. The key legal question was whether section 7 of the Race Relations Act 1976 applied to the circumstances of these complainants. Company A appealed to the Court of Appeal, which heard the three appeals together.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the work done by individuals in the position of the complainants at Company A’s departments constitutes “work done for [Company A]” for the purposes of section 7 of the Race Relations Act 1976.
- Whether such individuals are “supplied under a contract made with [Company A]” by their respective employers (the Licensees) within the meaning of section 7.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 7’s concept of “work for the principal” requires that the individuals performing the work be under the managerial control of the principal (Company A), which was not the case here.
- The contractual arrangements did not delegate managerial authority over employees from the Licensees to Company A.
- The work must be made available to the individuals by the principal itself, not by the Licensees who employed them.
- The primary obligation in the contracts between Company A and Licensees was to market goods, not to supply labour; thus, the supply of workers was not the dominant purpose of the contract.
Respondents' Arguments
- This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Showboat Entertainment Centre Ltd v Owens [1984] I.C.R. 65 | Recognition of the Commission for Racial Equality’s enforcement rights alongside individual rights to complain of discrimination. | Supported the view that individual remedies should co-exist with enforcement by the Commission, underscoring the need for personal redress under section 7. |
| Jones v Tower Boot Co Ltd [1997] I.C.R. 254 | Purposive construction of discrimination legislation to provide wide protection to victims. | Applied to interpret section 7 broadly to ensure effective remedies for discrimination victims. |
| Savjani v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1981] Q.B. 458 | Wide interpretation of the Race Relations Act to cover humiliatingly discriminatory conduct. | Supported a broad and purposive reading of the statute consistent with its remedial purpose. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the contractual arrangements between Company A and the Licensees, noting that Licensees operate departments under Company A’s name and sell goods owned by Company A. Staff employed by Licensees, although not Company A employees, perform work that is plainly “work for” Company A in the ordinary sense because they sell Company A’s goods and receive payment on its behalf.
The Court rejected the appellant’s argument that section 7 requires the principal to have managerial control over the workers. It found no textual basis in section 7 for such a limitation and emphasized that a restrictive reading would deny a remedy to discrimination victims, contrary to the legislative purpose.
The Court also rejected the submission that the supply of workers must be the primary purpose of the contract between Company A and the Licensees. It held that if the contract obliges the Licensee to supply individuals to do work for Company A, section 7 applies regardless of whether the supply of labour is a dominant contractual purpose.
In sum, the Court adopted a purposive interpretation of section 7 consistent with the broad remedial aims of the Race Relations Act 1976 and relevant case law. It concluded that the Employment Appeal Tribunal had correctly held that section 7 applies to the claims brought by the complainants.
Holding and Implications
The appeal by Company A is dismissed.
The Court affirmed that section 7 of the Race Relations Act 1976 applies to the claims of unlawful racial discrimination brought by individuals employed by Licensees but performing work for Company A. The decision ensures that victims of discrimination in such contractual arrangements have access to personal remedies under section 7. No new precedent beyond the direct effect on the parties was established.
Alert