- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
R v Savage
Factual and Procedural Background
The judgment consolidates two criminal appeals that turned on the mental element required for offences under sections 20 and 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (“the Act”).
- Regina v. Savage. The Appellant, “Mrs. Savage,” was tried in the Crown Court on a single count of unlawful wounding (s. 20). During an altercation in a public house she threw beer over the Victim; the glass either struck or shattered against the Victim’s wrist, causing a cut. The jury convicted under s. 20. The Court of Appeal quashed that conviction for misdirection on “maliciously,” substituted a conviction under s. 47 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm), and certified points of law of general public importance.
- Director of Public Prosecutions v. Parmenter. The Respondent, “Mr. Parmenter,” was convicted on four counts of unlawfully inflicting grievous bodily harm (s. 20) on his infant son by rough handling. The trial judge’s direction on “maliciously” was founded on Reg. v. Mowatt. The Court of Appeal considered the direction ambiguous, quashed the s. 20 convictions, declined to substitute s. 47 verdicts, and certified questions on the mens rea for both sections.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a verdict of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s. 47) is a permissible alternative on an indictment alleging unlawful wounding under s. 20.
- Whether s. 47 requires proof that the defendant intended or foresaw actual bodily harm, or whether proof of assault plus resulting harm suffices.
- The correct test of “maliciously” in s. 20: must the prosecution show actual foresight of some physical harm (subjective test) or is it enough that the defendant ought to have foreseen it (objective test)?
- Whether, for s. 20, foresight must extend to wounding/GBH specifically, or whether foresight of any physical harm is sufficient.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant Savage
- Contended that common assault is no longer an alternative verdict unless expressly charged; therefore s. 47 should not have been substituted.
- Argued that s. 47, if available, still requires intent or recklessness as to actual bodily harm.
Director of Public Prosecutions (in Parmenter)
- Maintained that the recorder’s direction mirrored Reg. v. Mowatt; subjective foresight of some harm, not necessarily GBH, is all s. 20 demands.
- Sought substitution of s. 47 convictions if the s. 20 convictions were unsound.
Respondent Parmenter
- Argued that the jury had been invited to convict on an objective standard (“ought to have foreseen”) contrary to Reg. v. Cunningham.
- Submitted that without subjective foresight of harm the s. 20 convictions could not stand, and s. 47 required a similar mental element.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Reg. v. Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421 | “Maliciously” in s. 20 imports subjective foresight of some physical harm. | Approved; forms the governing definition for s. 20. |
| Reg. v. Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 | Subjective recklessness as test of “maliciously.” | Held still good law; refined but not displaced. |
| Reg. v. Wilson [1984] 1 AC 242 | s. 47 is an alternative verdict on a s. 20 indictment. | Followed; first certified question answered affirmatively. |
| Reg. v. Spratt [1990] 1 WLR 1073 | Suggested s. 47 requires subjective recklessness to harm. | Expressly rejected in favour of Savage and Roberts. |
| Reg. v. Roberts (1972) 56 Cr App R 95 | For s. 47, mens rea of assault alone suffices; causation is an objective question. | Endorsed as correct statement of law. |
| Reg. v. Mearns [1991] 1 QB 82 | Common assault no longer implicit alternative after Criminal Justice Act 1988. | Cited to explain why s. 47, not common assault, was substituted. |
| Reg. v. Caldwell [1982] AC 341 | Objective test of recklessness under Criminal Damage Act 1971. | Distinguished; not applicable to offences using “maliciously.” |
| Reg. v. Lawrence [1982] AC 510 | Clarified recklessness in driving offences. | Cited in the discussion of differing statutory contexts. |
| Reg. v. Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493 | Applied Caldwell recklessness to manslaughter by driving. | Referenced to contrast with Offences Against the Person Act. |
| Reg. v. Venna [1976] QB 421 | Mens rea of common assault (intent or subjective recklessness). | Relied on to define assault element in s. 47. |
| Reg. v. Springfield (1969) 53 Cr App R 608 | Narrow reading of alternative verdicts. | Overruled by Wilson; cited historically. |
| Reg. v. Stephenson [1979] QB 695 | Recklessness under Criminal Damage Act. | Discussed in context of Caldwell. |
| Reg. v. Briggs (Note) [1977] WLR 605 | Civil cases on recklessness. | Mentioned in analysis distinguishing objective/subjective tests. |
| Reg. v. Ward (1871) LR 1 CCR 356; Reg. v. Bradshaw (1878) 14 Cox CC 83 | Historical treatment of “maliciously.” | Cited to illustrate early approach. |
| Reg. v. Lillis [1972] 2 QB 236 | Historical purpose of Criminal Law Act 1967 s. 6(3). | Used to interpret “include” and “amount to.” |
| Reg. v. Grimshaw [1984] Crim LR 108 | Error in judicial direction akin to Parmenter. | Noted as precedent for misdirection. |
| Reg. v. Sullivan [1981] CLR 46 | Scope of “physical harm” in s. 20 analysis. | Cited to support reading of “particular kind of harm.” |
| Reg. v. Majewski [1977] AC 443 | Intoxication and specific intent. | Mentioned in discussion of Caldwell. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The House (per Lord Ackner, with Lords Keith, Brandon, Jauncey and Lowry concurring) undertook a structured analysis:
- Alternative Verdicts (s. 6(3) Criminal Law Act 1967). Adopting Reg. v. Wilson, the Lords held that allegations of wounding “include” allegations of assault occasioning actual bodily harm because the greater injury necessarily incorporates the lesser. Thus a jury may return a s. 47 verdict on a s. 20 indictment.
- Mens Rea for s. 47. Relying on Reg. v. Roberts, the Court concluded that the mental element is that of the underlying assault only; causation of actual bodily harm is an objective question. No foresight of harm beyond the assault need be proved.
- Meaning of “Maliciously” in s. 20. The House reaffirmed Cunningham as qualified by Mowatt: the prosecution must show that the defendant actually foresaw the risk of some physical harm. An objective (“ought to have foreseen”) standard is impermissible.
- Extent of Foresight Required. Following Mowatt, foresight need not extend to grievous bodily harm or wounding; awareness of the risk of any physical harm suffices. Arguments for a tighter correlation between foresight and ultimate injury were rejected as inconsistent with established principles (e.g., murder and manslaughter doctrines).
- Application to the Cases.
- Savage: The recorder erred on “maliciously,” but the jury necessarily found an intentional assault that caused harm; therefore substitution of a s. 47 conviction was proper.
- Parmenter: The judge’s direction used an objective standard (“should have foreseen”), vitiating the s. 20 convictions. Evidence did not prove subjective foresight of harm, so s. 20 could not stand; however, on the facts an assault causing actual bodily harm was established, warranting substituted s. 47 convictions.
Holding and Implications
Final Orders: the appeal of “Mrs. Savage” is DISMISSED; the appeal in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Parmenter is ALLOWED IN PART, substituting convictions for assault occasioning actual bodily harm on the four counts.
Implications: The decision harmonises the mens rea for sections 20 and 47. For s. 20, subjective foresight of some physical harm is essential; for s. 47, the prosecution need prove only the mens rea of assault plus causation of harm. The judgment clarifies jury directions nationwide and resolves conflicting Court of Appeal authority, but creates no new offence.
Alert