- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, a private citizen supported by an association, learned on 13 January 1977 that Union A (a postal workers’ union) had resolved to instruct its members to suspend the handling of mail between the United Kingdom and South Africa. A press report the next day stated that Union B (a telecommunications engineers’ union) intended to halt circuits to South Africa except in emergencies.
Believing that the contemplated action would breach sections 58 and 68 of the Post Office Act 1953 and section 45 of the Telegraph Act 1863, the Plaintiff asked the Attorney-General on 14 January for consent to bring relator proceedings in the Attorney-General’s name. Consent was refused.
The Plaintiff then issued his own writ against Union A, immediately seeking an interim injunction. Stocker J refused, holding that—without the Attorney-General’s consent—no jurisdiction existed. On urgent appeal (15 January) the Court of Appeal granted a short interim injunction, permitted the joinder of Union B and the Attorney-General as defendants, and allowed the Plaintiff to add claims for declarations. Interim relief lapsed on 18 January.
On 27 January the Court of Appeal (majority) ruled that it lacked power to review the Attorney-General’s refusal of consent and that no final injunction was available; but it held (unanimously) that the Plaintiff could pursue declaratory relief and, pending trial, interim injunctions. The Attorney-General, both unions and the Plaintiff all obtained leave to appeal. The present opinions determine those consolidated appeals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a private citizen, lacking any special damage or private right but alleging threatened criminal conduct, can obtain injunctions or declarations when the Attorney-General has refused to consent to relator proceedings.
- Whether the Plaintiff’s action should be struck out for want of locus standi.
- Whether interim injunctions granted against Union A and Union B were within the court’s jurisdiction.
- Whether section 14 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts 1974-76 bars the tort claims advanced against the unions.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The public has a general interest in the enforcement of criminal law; every citizen therefore possesses sufficient standing to seek preventive relief where widespread illegality is threatened.
- The court’s declaratory jurisdiction under Order 15 r.16 (formerly O.25 r.5) is “almost unlimited” and permits relief even absent a cause of action.
- Because private prosecution is available after an offence, analogous preventive relief should be available before an offence.
- The Attorney-General’s discretion is confined to filtering out frivolous or oppressive cases; refusal in a “proper” case should not block resort to the courts.
Attorney-General and Unions’ Arguments
- Only the Attorney-General may represent the public in civil litigation over public rights; his decision to refuse consent is constitutionally unreviewable.
- The Plaintiff alleges no private right and no special damage; therefore he lacks standing.
- Declaratory and injunctive relief are equally unavailable to a private plaintiff in respect of purely public rights; interim orders were ultra vires.
- Any putative tort claim is barred by section 14 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 and by section 29 of the Post Office Act 1969.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Triefus & Co Ltd v The Post Office [1957] 2 QB 352 | Post Office contractual immunity | Illustrates absence of private contractual rights in postal services. |
| Shore v Wilson (1839-42) 9 Cl & F 355 | Role of Attorney-General in relator actions | Cited to show historic control exercised by the Attorney-General. |
| Attorney-General v Cockermouth Local Board (1874) 18 Eq 172 | Attorney-General is dominus litis in relator suits | Relied on to show that actions remain under the Attorney-General’s control. |
| L.C.C. v Attorney-General [1902] AC 165 | Court cannot review the Attorney-General’s decision whether to sue | Formed key authority that refusal of consent is unassailable. |
| Ex parte Newton (1855) 4 E&B 869 | Non-reviewability of Attorney-General’s fiat in criminal matters | Analogous support for civil relator refusals. |
| Attorney-General v Sheffield Gas Consumers Co (1853) 3 De G M & G 304 | Nature of public interest litigation | Distinguished: emphasised that private plaintiffs cannot invoke fictional public interest. |
| London Association of Shipowners v London & India Docks Joint Committee [1892] 3 Ch 242 | Need for special damage or private right | Cited to show declarations require locus standi. |
| Thorson v Attorney-General of Canada (1974) 43 DLR (3d) 1 | Canadian exception for constitutional review | Distinguished as based on constitutional context, not English law. |
| Flast v Cohen 392 US 83 (1968) | U.S. taxpayer standing | Held inapplicable to English constitutional arrangements. |
| Stockport District Waterworks Co v Manchester (1863) 9 Jur NS 266 | Private individuals may not “usurp” representation of public interest | Applied as central authority denying plaintiff’s standing. |
| Attorney-General v Harris [1961] 1 QB 74 | Exceptional use of injunction to aid criminal law where penalties inadequate | Shown to be distinguishable; required Attorney-General’s presence. |
| Attorney-General v Chaudry [1971] 1 WLR 1614 | Emergency relator injunction | Cited; court stressed need for Attorney-General’s participation. |
| Attorney-General v Bastow [1957] 1 QB 515 | Attorney-General only person who may sue for public rights | Relied on heavily. |
| Attorney-General v Sharp [1931] 1 Ch 121 | Injunctions where criminal penalties ineffective | Illustrative of narrow category governed by Attorney-General. |
| Attorney-General v Premier Line Ltd [1932] 1 Ch 303 | As above | Same distinction drawn. |
| London Passenger Transport Board v Moscrop [1942] AC 332 | No declaration absent private right or Attorney-General | Treated as decisive against plaintiff’s declaratory claim. |
| Dyson v Attorney-General [1912] 1 Ch 158 | Declarations where plaintiff faced unlawful demand | Distinguished: Dyson had a private right threatened. |
| Attorney-General ex rel McWhirter v Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] QB 629 | Obiter on citizen’s standing | Court held those dicta unsupported and refused to follow. |
| Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109 | Special damage or private right required | Applied to reject standing. |
| Springhead Spinning Co v Riley (1868) 6 Eq 551 | Injunction possible where crime invades private right | Used to contrast with present absence of private right. |
| Cutler v Wandsworth Stadium [1949] AC 398 | Breach of statute as public wrong | Cited to classify infringements here as public, not private, wrongs. |
| Guaranty Trust Co v Hannay [1915] 2 KB 536 | Wide scope of declaratory jurisdiction in private disputes | Held irrelevant because no private dispute existed. |
| Eastham v Newcastle United FC [1964] 1 Ch 413 | Further example of declaratory relief in private law | Distinguished. |
| North London Railway Co v Great Northern Railway Co [1883] 11 QBD 30 | Section 45 Judicature Act affects procedure, not jurisdiction | Used to show interim orders could not extend jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Five separate opinions, all concurring in the result, emphasised the following points:
- Exclusive public representation. Public rights are vested in the Crown; only the Attorney-General may sue to protect them. A private individual cannot “usurp” that function absent a private right or special damage.
- Non-reviewability of discretion. The Attorney-General’s refusal to consent to relator proceedings is constitutionally unassailable in the courts (Judge Wilberforce; Judge Fraser; citing L.C.C. v Attorney-General).
- Limits of declaratory relief. A declaration requires a justiciable dispute about legal rights between parties. Where the plaintiff has no private right and the Attorney-General opposes the suit, no jurisdiction exists (Judge Diplock and Judge Edmund-Davies; applying Moscrop and Stockport).
- Injunctions ancillary to crimes are exceptional. Civil injunctions to restrain criminal conduct are confined to situations—initiated by the Attorney-General—where statutory penalties are inadequate or emergency demands (Harris; Chaudry). Extending that remedy to private litigants would “destroy one of the pillars” of English public law.
- Interim orders cannot create jurisdiction. Section 45(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 affects procedure only; it cannot authorise interim injunctions where the court lacks power to grant final relief.
- Trade-union immunity. Even if the Plaintiff possessed locus standi, section 14 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 bars tort actions against the unions, and section 29 of the Post Office Act 1969 precludes tort liability of postal employees.
- P.O.E.U. injunction. The ex parte interim order against Union B was granted without evidence and in disregard of statutory notice safeguards; it was criticised as procedurally unsound.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The House of Lords allowed the appeals of the Attorney-General, Union A and Union B; the Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed. All claims and interim injunctions were struck out, with costs awarded against the Plaintiff.
Implications: The decision re-affirms that only the Attorney-General may invoke civil jurisdiction to protect public rights, that his consent to relator proceedings is not reviewable, and that private citizens lack standing to seek declarations or injunctions based solely on threatened criminal conduct. The ruling preserves the constitutional separation between executive discretion and judicial power and limits the expansion of civil remedies into the sphere of criminal enforcement.
Alert