Paxton's Trs v Cowie

Factual and Procedural Background

The testator executed a trust-disposition and settlement whereby his entire estate was to be divided into two equal parts. One part was to be divided among his own brothers and sisters and their families, with children inheriting their deceased parent's share. The other part was to be divided among his deceased wife's relatives: specifically, a legacy of £200 to one sister with a substitutionary legacy if she predeceased the testator, and the remainder to be equally divided among three of the wife's relatives, including a brother who predeceased the testator without issue. The trustees initiated a multiple-poinding to determine the rightful recipient of the share that would have belonged to the deceased wife's brother had he survived. Competing claims were made by (1) the testator's heirs in mobilibus, asserting the share fell into intestacy, and (2) the surviving legatees under the trust deed, claiming the share by accretion. The Lord Ordinary initially ruled in favor of the surviving legatees. The heirs in mobilibus reclaimed, and the case was heard before seven Judges due to its importance.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, under the terms of the trust-disposition and settlement, the share of a predeceased legatee who was to receive an equal portion among several named legatees accresces (passes) to the surviving legatees or falls into intestacy.
2. Whether the rule excluding accretion applies to legacies expressed to be divided "equally" or "share and share alike" among multiple legatees, particularly in the context of residue or general bequests versus specific legacies.
3. The proper interpretation of the testator's intention regarding accretion in the absence of explicit contrary expressions in the trust deed.

Arguments of the Parties

Heirs in Mobilibus (Appellants) Arguments

• The trust deed's terms, considered independently of any settled rule, do not support accretion; the scheme leaves no place for it, as specific provisions exist for some legatees' predecease but not for the deceased wife's brother.
• The legacy of £200 to one sister and its destination over on predecease to a different relative shows the testator did not intend accretion among the wife's relatives.
• The surviving legatees are not the whole residuary legatees; the estate is divided into two separate halves, each with distinct beneficiaries, negating accretion across these groups.
• There is a well-established legal rule that legacies given "equally" or "share and share alike" are separate and distinct, excluding accretion unless the testator expressly indicates otherwise.
• Precedent cases (Paterson v. Paterson, Rose v. Roses, Torrie v. Munsie) establish that accretion is excluded in such cases, and the law of Scotland and England supports this principle.
• Cases cited by respondents in support of accretion are either inapplicable or do not override the settled rule.

Surviving Legatees (Respondents) Arguments

• The trust deed effectively creates a bipartite division of the estate, one half for the testator's relatives and one half for his wife's, indicating the testator did not intend intestacy on the wife's half.
• Two of the wife's relatives were favored with specific liferent and fee interests, supporting an intention to benefit the wife's family collectively.
• The rule excluding accretion applies only to special legacies, not to heirs or residuary legatees; the second half of the estate is effectively a residue for the wife's relatives.
• Lord Stair's distinction between special legacies and heirs supports accretion among residuary legatees.
• Precedents cited by the appellants do not undermine the principle that accretion applies to residuary legacies, and the present case aligns with this principle.
• The testator's scheme contemplates a double residue, one for each family, and accretion operates within each residue but not between them.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Torrie v. Munsie (1832)	Established that legacies given "equally" exclude accretion among legatees of residue.	Followed as a binding precedent to exclude accretion in the present case.
Robertson v. M'Vean (1819)	Suggested accretion might apply to residuary legacies but was ambiguous and not widely recognized.	Overruled and discounted due to obscurity and lack of subsequent recognition.
Paterson v. Paterson (1741)	Confirmed accretion does not apply to special legacies given equally.	Applied to support exclusion of accretion for legacies expressed to be divided equally.
Rose v. Roses (1782)	Similar to Paterson, reinforcing exclusion of accretion among special legatees.	Applied to exclude accretion in the case of equal division of legacies.
Bannerman v. Bannerman (1843)	Accretion applies among residuary legatees, even with unequal shares.	Distinguished; held not to support accretion when legacies are special and severed.
Moir's Trustees (1871)	Accretion in exercise of power of apportionment, not testamentary writing.	Held not authoritative on testamentary accretion.
Buchanan's Trustees (1883)	Reaffirmed the rule excluding accretion where legacies are given equally or in equal shares.	Followed as recent and authoritative support for the rule.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the terms of the trust-disposition and settlement, noting the clear division of the estate into two equal parts, each designated for distinct groups of relatives. The Court emphasized the express language directing the second part to be "equally divided" among four named individuals, including the predeceased wife's brother.

The Court applied the well-established rule of construction that when a legacy is given to multiple persons "equally" or in "equal shares," each legatee is entitled only to their own share, and there is no accretion of the share of a predeceased legatee to the survivors unless the testator expressly indicates otherwise. This rule applies regardless of whether the legacy is a liferent or fee, or whether it concerns residue or specific sums or corporeal moveables.

The Court found no language in the trust deed indicating an intention to allow accretion. The presence of specific provisions for other legatees' predecease, with different dispositions, further supported the conclusion that the testator did not intend accretion for the deceased wife's brother's share.

The Court reviewed the authorities cited by both parties, giving particular weight to the series of decisions from the 18th century to the late 19th century that consistently applied the rule excluding accretion in cases of legacies given "equally." The Court rejected the weight of Robertson v. M'Vean due to its ambiguity and lack of recognition in subsequent jurisprudence.

While the respondents argued that the second half of the estate was effectively a residue and accretion should apply, the Court distinguished this case from those concerning residuary legatees, emphasizing the express language of equal division and the absence of contrary intent.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the share of the predeceased legatee did not accresce to the surviving legatees but fell into intestacy and passed to the testator's heirs in mobilibus.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final ruling was to RECALL THE LORD ORDINARY'S INTERLOCUTOR and to REPEL THE CLAIM of the surviving legatees for accretion, while SUSTAINING THE CLAIM of the testator's heirs in mobilibus.

This decision means that the share of the predeceased wife's brother did not pass to the surviving legatees by accretion but instead fell into intestacy and passed to the testator's heirs. The Court emphasized that no new precedent was set beyond reaffirming the settled rule that legacies given "equally" exclude accretion absent contrary intention. The case clarifies the application of this principle in the context of trust-dispositions involving residue and specific legacies.